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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The central proposal of this dissertation is that now, in the wake of 
the Second Vatican Council (1962-5), official Roman Catholic teaching on 
sin and sacramental reconciliation is not, but ought to be, based upon a 
contemporary paradigm of sin and reconciliation—i.e. a paradigm which 
is concordant with, and adequate in light of, the teachings and goals of 
this Council.  According to the author, an existing “liturgical-narrational” 
model of sin and reconciliation ought to be elevated to the status of such 
a paradigm or supermodel. 
The author arrives at this conclusion after examining two critical 
post-Conciliar documents—the revised Rite of Penance (1973) and Pope 
John Paul II’s Post-Synodal Apostolic Exhortation Reconciliation and 
Penance (1984)—in light of three points made by Patrick McCormick in 
his book Sin As Addiction (1989).  This examination yields three 
corresponding insights:  first, the two documents contain elements of 
different models of sin and reconciliation; second, a juridical model—the 
dominance of which is demonstrated—is inadequate (as a paradigm); 
third, a model which respects the narrative character of sin and 
reconciliation is also present in the documents. 
 
   vii
Ultimately, four original proposals are submitted.  The first of these 
is that there are four distinct models of sin and reconciliation employed 
in both the Rite of Penance and Reconciliation and Penance.  These 
models are here called the juridical, the personalistic, the medical, and 
the liturgical-narrational.  Second, a liturgical-narrational model is 
identified and developed.  This model is developed by including and 
improving upon McCormick’s addiction-recovery model.  Third, the 
author sees the confession of sins as being “narrative proclamation.”  
This proposal is a synthesis of the liturgical character of the ancient 
public exomologesis and of the detail-oriented character of private 
confession.  Fourth, a previously unrecognized type of social sin is 
recognized:  the sin of a community against itself.  Such a sin, as well as 
other sins, will be both treated and resisted with the help of a properly 
implemented liturgical-narrational paradigm.  This implementation 
requires an adaptation of the third of the 1973 rites (i.e. Rite “C”). 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Contemporary Roman Catholic theologies of sin and sacramental 
reconciliation find support and inspiration in the reform-minded 
emphases of the Second Vatican Ecumenical Council (1962-5) in general, 
and in two challenges of the Council in particular.  The two particular 
challenges were, first, the call for a shift away from the legalism and 
juridicism of the moral manuals and canon law and toward a more 
biblical and personalistic presentation of moral theology (OT 16; GS 3, 
12), and second, the call for reforms in the rite and celebration of 
sacramental penance (SC 72, 109-10).1 
A legalistic moral theology did not sit well with the Fathers of the 
Second Vatican Council.  This legalism had accumulated and calcified 
over the course of many centuries.  In the early Church, there were often 
only three sins that were seen as requiring an ecclesial response beyond 
that of baptism,2 and already these sins were sometimes referred to as 
crimina (i.e. crimes) which separated their perpetrators from the holy 
community that is the Church.3  In the sixth century, monks in Ireland 
began to address sin and penance via the individualism and juridicism 
   2
that were operative in the Celtic culture surrounding them.4  In the 
thirteenth century, St. Thomas Aquinas tied moral theology to classicist 
metaphysics and anthropology, intensifying the Fourth Lateran Council’s 
(1215) concern for distinguishing which sins are mortal or “truly” sinful, 
and furthering the view that these sins are isolated acts committed by 
totally free and knowing beings which upset a world that would 
otherwise consist of a balanced order.5  The calcification of legalism and 
juridicism occurred in the manualist tradition, a tradition that is rooted 
partly in the decrees of the Fourth Lateran Council and the Council of 
Trent (1545-63), that every mortal sin be confessed according to number 
and species.6 
Equally problematic at the time of the Second Vatican Council 
were sacramental practice and the theology underlying it.  Two of the 
greatest problems were, first, the prevalent neo-Thomist understanding 
of grace as being extrinsic to human experience, and second, a 
correlative emphasis upon instrumental efficient causality in the 
sacramental event.7  Other problems that were rooted in the Tridentine 
tradition were a concern for liturgical uniformity and rigidity, a fixation 
on the hierarchical dimension of the Church, a clerical monopolization of 
ministry, and inadequate attention to sacred scripture.  The sacramental 
experience of the laity prior to the Second Vatican Council could be 
characterized as being passive, dependent, superstitious, isolating, and 
disintegrated.8  Sacramental penance, in particular, was often a juridical 
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experience:  the lay “criminal” would privately confess his or her criminal 
acts to a clerical judge, who in turn would assign a just punishment and 
administer a sacramental pardon.9 
The Second Vatican Council addressed these problems with the 
same overarching approach that characterized most, if not all, of its 
responses:  historical consciousness.10  This, of course, refers to an 
awareness that human persons, communities, institutions—indeed, all of 
creation—are dynamic, not static.  It means that who we are, how we 
think, and what we do is unavoidably conditioned by the time and the 
space in which we live, and that we acknowledge this conditioned 
experience.  The Council Fathers acknowledged that this temporal and 
spatial conditioning applies not only to humanity in some general way, 
but also to the Church, to its doctrine and life.  Indeed, The Dogmatic 
Constitution on the Church (LG) repeatedly emphasizes the historical, 
progressive nature of the Church, for example:  “ . . . it will be brought to 
glorious completion” (LG 2); it “ . . . grows visibly” (LG 3); “ . . . she is, on 
earth, the seed and the beginning of that kingdom” (LG 5). 
The sphere of the Church that is its moral theology has been 
greatly influenced by this historical consciousness.  In its two documents 
on matters of morals, The Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the 
Modern World (GS) and The Declaration on Religious Liberty (DH), the 
Council practiced the biblical and personalistic presentation of moral 
theology that it called for in The Decree on the Training of Priests (OT 
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16).  Historical-critical studies of scripture and acceptance of the modern 
philosophical school of personalism11 helped the Council to assert tenets 
such as the solidarity of the Church with the world (GS 1) and the 
human person’s right to religious freedom (DH 2).  These and other 
developments in the documents of the Council have inspired and 
supported many moral theologians to work at a revision of moral 
theology in this post-Conciliar age.  This revision of moral theology sees 
that a legalistic-juridical approach to morality was the fruit and servant 
of particular eras and cultures and also that this approach is inadequate 
in most parts of the Church and the world today.  This historically 
conscious shift away from a legalistic morality has led theologians to 
urge many other changes of emphasis, for example:  from obedience to 
discipleship; from norms to vision; from nature to persons; from acts to 
character; from individualism and autonomy to relationality and 
interdependence; from abstract freedom to contextualized freedom.12 
The sphere of sacramental theology has also been affected by 
historical consciousness.  Modern and contemporary scholars not only 
pointed out that medieval, Tridentine, and neo-Thomist doctrine and 
practice were temporally and spatially conditioned, but these scholars 
also employed both earlier and later thought in their effort to reform the 
sacramental life of the Church.  Scholars such as Edward Schillebeeckx 
and Karl Rahner employed phenomenology and existentialism to point 
out that sacraments are real symbols which enable us to encounter God 
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in various ways, since real symbols are distinct but inseparable from the 
reality which they express.13  Related to this is the vision of the Church 
as the basic sacrament of Christ,14 that is, a vision of the Church and 
Christ as causing each Other to be present.15  Earlier than Schillebeeckx 
and Rahner, and more directly related to my dissertation, is the 
scholarship of Bartholome Xiberta, whose 1922 thesis demonstrated 
that, in the patristic age, reconciliation with the Church was the primary 
orientation of sacramental penance (preferred over interior conversion), 
and that its celebration was invariably communal.16  All of this 
scholarship was officially embraced at the Second Vatican Council, as is 
evident in the following passages: 
. . . the Church, in Christ, is in the nature of sacrament—a sign 
and instrument, that is, of communion with God and of unity 
among all men . . . . (LG 1) 
 
Those who approach the sacrament of Penance obtain pardon 
from God’s mercy for the offense committed against him, and 
are, at the same time, reconciled with the Church which they 
have wounded by their sins and which by charity, by example 
and by prayer labors for their conversion. (LG 11) 
 
It must be emphasized that rites which are meant to be celebrated 
in common, with the faithful present and actively participating, 
should as far as possible be celebrated in that way rather than by 
an individual and quasi-privately. (SC 27) 
 
A development in moral theology that has been faithful to these 
challenges has been the discussion of sin and reconciliation in terms of 
models.  A crucial part of this discussion is the realization that the 
juridical model of sin and reconciliation is only one of several possible 
models.  In addition to the juridical model, contemporary theologians 
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have proposed and considered collaborative, demonic, and medical 
models, to mention a few.17  This pluralistic hamartology (i.e. 
understanding of sin) is valuable since, it is argued, no one model or 
system of images completely explains the mystery of sin and the needed 
response to it.18 
In this dissertation I align myself with those theologians who 
pursue a pluralistic approach to the reality of sin.  I completely agree 
that no one model of sin is sufficient.  However, as I will argue, whenever 
one simultaneously employs several models of sin, eventually one of 
these models will be established as the dominant one, and this dominant 
model—i.e. paradigm—of sin is linked with a correlative paradigm of 
reconciliation.  In this dissertation I intend to demonstrate that two 
critical post-Conciliar documents—the Ordo Paenitentiae19 and Pope 
John Paul II’s Apostolic Exhortation Reconciliatio et Paenitentia20—
employ at least four different models of sin and reconciliation, and that 
ultimately both documents prefer one model (i.e. a juridical model), a 
model that is inconsistent or discordant with teachings and the 
trajectory of the Second Vatican Council.  Furthermore, I will argue that 
what I call a “liturgical-narrational” model ought to be the dominant 
model of sin and reconciliation in the post-Conciliar Church.  That is, I 
will argue that shifting from a juridical paradigm to this liturgical-
narrational paradigm is both necessary in contemporary Roman 
Catholicism and allowed for in the documents of the Second Vatican 
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Council.  Moreover, I will develop the liturgical-narrational model by 
including and improving upon Patrick McCormick’s addiction-recovery 
model of sin and reconciliation.21 
Hence my arguments in this dissertation are related very much to 
a contemporary proposal offered by theologian Patrick McCormick.  After 
he surveys contemporary scholarship in the field of hamartology, 
especially scholarship that employs a models approach, and after 
demonstrating the inadequacy of several models of sin, particularly what 
he calls the “crime” model, McCormick defends a disease model of sin 
and a healing model of reconciliation.22  He then develops these models 
into his major proposal:  that there is need for an addiction model of sin 
and a correlative recovery model of reconciliation.23  These models 
recognize that sin is partly beyond the will of a sinner, that it is often 
repetitive, cyclical, ingrained, and reinforced by small and large groups, 
and that it can even be codependent and multigenerational.  These 
models also encourage us to see ourselves as sinning persons who are 
responsible for commitment to individual and communal recovery, a 
recovery that is progressive, integrating, confessional, and centered upon 
God’s Word and the virtues.24 
While I agree with much of what McCormick argues, my 
contribution here, however, will be that I recognize and develop what I 
call a liturgical-narrational model of sin and reconciliation, a model, I will 
argue, that is both more comprehensive and more firmly based in 
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Christian tradition than are McCormick’s models.  The liturgical-
narrational model sees sin and reconciliation in terms of the many 
subsidiary stories or narratives that are part of the one overarching 
narrative or economy of salvation.  My development of this model 
emphasizes a crucial aspect of addiction-recovery:  the honest telling and 
re-telling of one’s narrative of sin and salvation to and with a community 
of reconciling and converting story-hearers and story-tellers.  McCormick 
discusses such story-telling,25 but his focus upon addiction and recovery 
fails to sufficiently situate this story-telling within the overarching story 
of salvation and the Church’s multidimensional mission in this ongoing 
story.  I do so situate this story-telling by seeing it as proclamation by 
and in the Church.  In other words, I see the confession of sins and the 
sharing of one’s ongoing moral narrative as proclamation, a proclamation 
that is joined to the proclamation of God’s Word. 
In addition to being related to McCormick’s work in the field, my 
development of the liturgical-narrational model also relates to the work of 
other theologians and scholars.  I integrate Karl Rahner’s sacramental 
theology, including his proposal of an ongoing liturgy of the world,26 
Gerald O’Collins’ distinguishing of foundational, collective-dependent, 
and individual-dependent histories of revelation and salvation,27 Alasdair 
MacIntyre’s narrative concept of selfhood,28 and Robert Bellah’s 
discussion of communities of memory and their practices.29  I am also 
contributing to the fundamental option school, arguing, for example, 
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with Charles E. Curran that mortal sin is rarely simply one isolated 
action.30  Furthermore, I incorporate Norbert Rigali’s argument for an 
understanding of freedom and sin as being relational, an argument 
which implies that the traditional dichotomy between “personal ethics” 
and “social ethics” is antiquated.31 
Additionally, I am here contributing to the relatively young 
conversation about the concept of social sin.  Pope John Paul II, in his 
primary and most extended treatment of social sin, sees social sin as sin 
“committed either by the individual against the community or by the 
community against the individual,”32 and he later adds that social sin 
also “refers to the relationships between the various human 
communities.”33  What I will point out is that there is a type of social sin 
that is ignored in these statements:  social sin is also sin committed by 
the community against itself.  What I have in mind here are sins such as 
the omission of honest and regular dialogue about what is sinful, the 
maintaining of conspiracies of silence, and even codependent group-
system sins.34  My development of the liturgical-narrational model 
illuminates these sins and challenges the Church to attend to them via 
communal forms of confession and reconciliation.  In this my work 
relates to arguments made by theologians such as Peter E. Fink,35 James 
Dallen,36 and, of course, Patrick McCormick. 
One other way that this work relates to that of others is that it 
takes a tool used widely in contemporary theology—i.e. a models 
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approach—and applies it to the mystery of sin.  What distinguishes my 
work with models is that I hold, contrary to the likes of Avery Dulles37 
and Patrick Kerans,38 that anyone who employs a models approach 
probably cannot avoid preferring and positing one paradigm as the model 
that is primary or dominant over the other models.39  Furthermore, I 
affirm Dallen’s observation that the Ordo Paenitentiae employs 
reconciliation and liturgical models,40 but I argue that these models are—
in the Ordo and in Reconciliatio et Paenitentia—subordinated to a 
juridical paradigm.  Finally, I stand with those theologians who recognize 
that sin is a multifaceted mystery and not simply the product of 
individuals and isolated actions. 
My dissertation consists of five chapters.  This first chapter is, 
obviously, an introduction.  In Chapter Two I will describe four models of 
sin and reconciliation, and then demonstrate how each of these models 
is employed in the Ordo Paenitentiae and in Reconciliatio et Paenitentia. 
In Chapter Three I will demonstrate that the juridical model is the 
dominant model or paradigm of sin and reconciliation in these two 
documents.  The task of Chapter Four will be to explain how the juridical 
model is significantly divergent from or discordant with the theological 
and pastoral methods, teachings, and tendencies of the Second Vatican 
Council, and that it is thus an inadequate paradigm in this post-
Conciliar age.  Finally, in Chapter Five I will revisit the liturgical-
narrational model (which will be introduced in Chapter Two) and argue 
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that this model ought to unseat the juridical model from the latter’s 
status as paradigm, since the liturgical-narrational model is more in line 
with the Council and more relevant.  Furthermore, I will develop the 
liturgical-narrational model by including and improving upon Patrick 
McCormick’s addiction-recovery model.  Amidst this development I will 
submit at least two other original claims of mine:  first, that the 
confession of sins is a form of narrative proclamation; second, that a 
previously unrecognized type of social sin is the sin of a community 
against itself. 
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CHAPTER 1 NOTES 
 1. Throughout this dissertation I will employ parenthetical 
references to the Conciliar documents and paragraphs cited.  Also, in 
these references, the abbreviations for the Latin document titles will be 
given.  See the List of Abbreviations in the front matter of this 
dissertation. 
     The English translation of the Conciliar documents that I refer 
to and quote from is Austin Flannery, ed., Vatican Council II: The 
Conciliar and Post Conciliar Documents (Northport, NY: Costello 
Publishing Co., 1975). 
 
 2. These three sins or tria capitalia (i.e. adultery, apostasy, and 
murder) are first grouped together in Acts 15.29.  See Kenan B. Osborne, 
Reconciliation And Justification: The Sacrament and Its Theology 
(Mahwah, NJ: Paulist, 1990): 
It seems that at the time of Augustine and Innocent I these three 
sins were the only sins which needed to be submitted to the 
public rite of reconciliation, at least in their churches of Rome 
and North Africa. (61) 
 
 3. James Dallen, The Reconciling Community: The Rite of 
Penance, Studies in the Reformed Rites of the Catholic Church, no ed., 
vol. 3 (New York: Pueblo, 1986; reprint, Collegeville: Order of St. 
Benedict, 1991), 61 (page references are to reprint edition).  Also see 
again Osborne: 
During this early patristic period . . . attempts were made to 
indicate which sins were the “deadly” ones, the crimina . . . 
and which sins were the “everyday” sins.  No clear pattern 
emerges . . . . (69) 
 
 4. John Mahoney, The Making Of Moral Theology: A Study of the 
Roman Catholic Tradition (Oxford: Clarendon, 1987), Chapter 1. Also see 
Dallen, 106, 129 n. 9. 
 
 5. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica (New York: Benziger, 
1948; reprint, Westminster, MD: Christian Classics, 1981), I-II, QQ. 87-
9.  Also see Dallen, 149. 
 
   13
 6. Council of Trent, Session XIV, De sacramento Paenitentiae [Of 
the Sacrament of Penance], Chapter 5 and canons 7-8; see J. Neuner 
and J. Dupuis, eds., The Christian Faith in the Doctrinal Documents of 
the Catholic Church (New York: Alba House, 1982), nos. 1626, 1647-8.  
Canon 8 reaffirms the teaching of the Fourth Lateran Council.  Also see 
Dallen, 149. 
 
 7. Kenan B. Osborne, Sacramental Theology: A General 
Introduction (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist, 1988), 50-3.  A good illustration of 
the difference between neo-Thomism and neo-Scholasticism can be 
found in John A. Gallagher, Time Past, Time Future: An Historical Study 
of Catholic Moral Theology (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist, 1990), 49, 147-8. 
 
 8. Joseph Martos, Doors To The Sacred: A Historical Introduction 
to Sacraments in the Catholic Church, Expanded ed. (Liguori, MO: 
Triumph Books, 1991), 100.  This is not to say that there were no 
valuable aspects of the laity’s pre-Conciliar sacramental experience.  For 
example, the Latin Tridentine Mass often created an atmosphere of 
transcendence and prayerfulness that is, today, missed by some who 
once experienced it. 
 
 9. Patrick McCormick, Sin As Addiction (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist, 
1989), 55. 
 
10. See Richard M. Gula, Reason Informed By Faith: Foundations 
of Catholic Morality (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist, 1989), 28-40.  Also see 
Johannes Feiner, “Commentary on the Decree [on Ecumenism],” trans. 
R.A. Wilson, chap. in Commentary On The Documents of Vatican II, vol. 
2, Decree On Ecumenism et al., ed. Herbert Vorgrimler (New York: 
Herder & Herder, 1968): 
The Second Vatican Council became more aware of the historical 
relativity of different aspects of the Church’s life, institutions and 
structures than any previous Council. (96) 
 
11. David J. O’Brien and Thomas A. Shannon, eds., Catholic Social 
Thought: The Documentary Heritage (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1992), 164. 
 
12. Gallagher, 203-22.  Gallagher provides a satisfactory 
introduction to some prominent theologians who have worked at a 
revision of moral theology. 
 
13. Karl Rahner, “The Theology of the Symbol,” chap. in 
Theological Investigations, vol. 4, More Recent Writings (London: Darton, 
Longman & Todd, 1966), 221-52. 
 
   14
14. Edward Schillebeeckx, Christ The Sacrament Of The Encounter 
With God (Bilthoven: H. Nelissen, 1960; reprint, Kansas City, MO: Sheed 
& Ward, 1963), 47-82 (page references are to reprint edition). 
 
15. Rahner, ibid. 
 
16. Bartholome F. Xiberta, Clavis Ecclesiae: De Ordine Absolutionis 
Sacramentalis ad Reconciliationem cum Ecclesia (Rome: Collegium Sancti 
Alberti, 1922).  See Dallen, 186, 266, upon whom I rely. 
 
17. Mark O’Keefe, What Are They Saying About Social Sin? 
(Mahwah, NJ: Paulist, 1990), 35-9. 
 
18. Ibid.  See also Avery Dulles, Models of the Church (Garden 
City, NY: Image Books, 1978), 13-37. 
 
19. Sacred Congregation for Divine Worship, Rituale Romanum ex 
Decreto Sacrosancti Concilii Oecumenici Vaticani II instauratum, 
auctoritate Pauli VI promulgatum, Ordo Paenitentiae (Editio typica: Rome: 
Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1974).  Throughout this dissertation I will 
examine, refer to, and quote from the English translation of the Ordo 
Paenitentiae or Rite of Penance as prepared by the International 
Commission on English in the Liturgy (ICEL: 1974).  This translation can 
be found in The Rites of the Catholic Church, 2d ed. (New York: Pueblo, 
1983). 
 
20. John Paul II, Post-Synodal Apostolic Exhortation Reconciliatio 
et Paenitentia [Reconciliation and Penance].  Throughout this dissertation 
I will examine, refer to, and quote from the English translation On 
Reconciliation and Penance in the Mission of the Church Today 
(Washington, DC: United States Catholic Conference, 1984). 
 
21. McCormick, 146-200. 
 
22. Ibid., 123-45. 
 
23. Ibid., 146-200. 
 
24. Ibid., 178-200. 
 
25. Ibid., 193-200. 
 
26. Karl Rahner, “On the Theology of Worship,” chap. in 
Theological Investigations, vol. 19, Faith and Ministry (London: Darton, 
Longman & Todd, 1983), 141-9. 
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27. Gerald O’Collins, Fundamental Theology (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist, 
1981), 83-113. 
 
28. Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, 2d ed. (Notre Dame: U of 
Notre Dame, 1984), 204-25. 
 
29. Robert N. Bellah et al., Habits Of The Heart: Individualism and 
Commitment in American Life (Berkeley: U of California, c. 1985; reprint, 
New York: Harper & Row, 1986), 152 ff. (page references are to reprint 
edition). 
 
30. Charles E. Curran, Christian Morality Today: The Renewal of 
Moral Theology (Notre Dame: Fides, 1966), xvi-ii. 
 
31. Norbert J. Rigali, “Human Solidarity and Sin in the Apostolic 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
FOUR MODELS WITHIN TWO CRITICAL DOCUMENTS 
 
 
Two official Roman Catholic documents that have been published 
since the closing of the Second Vatican Council warrant special attention 
in any contemporary study of sin and sacramental penance.  These two 
post-Conciliar documents are the 1973 Ordo Paenitentiae (OP) and Pope 
John Paul II’s 1984 Post-Synodal Apostolic Exhortation Reconciliatio et 
Paenitentia (RP).1  OP is critical since it is the Church’s official response 
to the Second Vatican Council’s call for a reform of the practice of 
sacramental penance (SC 72).  RP is crucial for at least two reasons.  
One is that it is the first and longest Magisterial document authored by 
the current Roman pontiff that teaches specifically on sin and 
reconciliation.2  The second reason is that in RP Pope John Paul II offers 
the most extensive Magisterial teaching ever on the reality of social sin.3 
These two critical documents each employ four different models of 
sin and reconciliation.  That is to say, the four models that are employed 
in one are also employed in the other.  Furthermore, I speak of models of 
sin and reconciliation since, as I will point out, each model of sin is 
yoked to a correlative model of reconciliation.  In this second chapter I 
will describe each model and demonstrate how the two documents 
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employ each one.  I have named the four models the juridical, the 
personalistic, the medical, and the liturgical-narrational. 
 
Juridical Model 
 
The first model I will attend to is what I call the juridical model.4  
The juridical model is called such because it is a model that focuses 
upon matters of law, crime, judgment, etc.  This model presupposes that 
the world possesses a balanced, static order with accompanying fixed 
laws and tendencies.  Given this cosmology, this model’s moral 
methodology tends to be a physicalist form of natural law, i.e. a 
“tendency in moral analysis to emphasize, or even to absolutize, the 
physical and biological aspects of the human person and human actions 
independently of the function of reason and freedom.”5  It sees human 
beings abstractly, as rational animals with a spiritual faculty called free 
will.  It understands sin to be primarily an individual’s transgression of a 
law and an upsetting of the alleged cosmic order.  The juridical model 
also emphasizes a precise conceptual distinction between mortal sins 
(i.e. those sins that are said to always require individual absolution) and 
venial sins (i.e. those sins that do not require individual absolution). 
This juridical model of sin is joined with a response to sin—i.e. a 
model of penance—that is also mainly juridical.  God is depicted as a 
judge.  The Church is usually seen as a reified perfect entity, and as a 
hierarchical institution where sacramental ministry is largely limited to 
those who have been ordained for that purpose.  The Church’s 
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sacraments are understood as being administered in particular moments 
via a cleric’s power.  The sacrament that addresses serious post-
baptismal sins is called “penance,” and it is executed privately and 
immediately by one minister who judges, sentences, and pardons each 
penitent criminal separately from others.  The four traditional parts of 
penance, as well as penitential ministry, are understood as follows:  
contrition is both regret for having disrupted the cosmic order and a 
desire for a restoration of this order; confession is a statement of, or 
admission to, crimes; absolution is a declarative statement6 (issued by 
the judging cleric) which pardons and reinstates; the act of penance is 
given as a punishment or means of satisfaction; penitential ministry is 
limited to ordained priests, who act as official judges.  Each recipient of 
this sacrament, having assumed full responsibility for each crime, is 
pardoned and must do penance, resolving not to upset the newly 
restored order of things in the future.  Theologian John Mahoney 
confirms the existence of what I have called the juridical model: 
. . . the Sacrament of Penance has suffered for centuries from 
an over-conceptualized and rigorously univocal pursuit of the 
idea of God as judge and of the sinner’s encounter with him as 
taking place within some sort of [248] court of law.  And it appears 
that moral theology as a whole, unconsciously or at least 
unreflectively, has done something similar and at a much 
deeper level with the whole idea of morality, expressing it 
almost entirely in the language of law as enacted, promulgated, 
and sanctioned by God as the supreme legislator.  And yet such 
language is purely analogical . . . . 7 
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Juridical Model in OP 
 
OP contains an introduction, four chapters, and three appendices.  
Throughout this dissertation the 40 paragraph Introduction will be the 
focus of all of my analyses of OP.  This will be so since the Introduction 
presents the theological foundations of the entire revised Rite.8 
The Introduction itself is divided into six parts.  The first part, “The 
Mystery of Reconciliation in the History of Salvation” (OP 1-2), contains 
five points that are characteristic of the juridical model.  One of these is 
the presupposition that there exists a universal balanced order, an order 
that is disrupted by sins and restored by God’s action in the Church’s 
sacraments.  Original sin is seen as the cause of the first disruption, a 
disruption that is overcome by Christ’s victory over sin and the mediation 
of this victory in the sacrament of baptism (OP 2.1).  This is to say that, 
once a person is baptized into Christ’s death, he enjoys a state of grace.  
In such a worldview it behooves the Christian to work at maintaining this 
state.  When he fails to do this—i.e. sins—he ought to seek a restoration 
of this state in the sacrament of penance.  Indeed, OP 2.3 includes a 
reworded version of one of the canons on penance issued by the 
juridical-minded 9 Council of Trent:  “Thus the faithful who fall into sin 
after baptism may be reconciled with God and renewed in grace.”10  A 
second juridical point (implied in OP 2.3) is that the moral life is 
understood not so much in terms of discipleship or vocation but as 
mainly concerned with a careful observance of laws.  A third point that is 
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repeatedly implied via various statements throughout Part One is the 
preference for immediate pardons (not gradual moral development), since 
moral innocence (not moral growth) tends to be a main goal of the 
juridical model.  Fourth, the Church is divided into innocent and guilty 
groups (OP 2.1), with the “innocent” group not seen as having a share in 
the “crimes” of the guilty.11 
Before moving on to illustrate the juridical model’s presence within 
the second part of OP’s Introduction, there is a fifth juridical point in the 
first part that ought to be highlighted.  This fifth point is an emphasis 
upon office and its accompanying powers.  There are three explicit 
references to office and power:  “ . . . he sent the Holy Spirit upon the 
apostles, empowering them to forgive or retain sins” (OP 1.2 referring to 
JN 20.19-23); a quoting of the Petrine commission in Mt 16.19 (OP 1.3); 
“. . . he gave to his apostles and their successors power to forgive sins” 
(OP 2.3).  In my categorizing of these passages as belonging to the 
juridical model of sin and penance I am not denying the possibility that 
other such models can be associated with them.  I am merely pointing 
out that these and similar passages, despite the fact that alternative 
interpretations of them exist,12 have traditionally connoted hierarchical, 
authoritarian, and clerical images of the Church, ministry, and 
sacraments.13  Given these connotations, I think my labeling of these 
passages as juridical is reasonable. 
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The Introduction’s second part, “The Reconciliation of Penitents in 
the Church’s Life” (OP 3-7), makes even more references to the juridical 
model.  One of these is the employment of the juridical term “pardon.”  
Before Part Two, the treatment of sin by God and/or the Church is 
referred to by non-juridical words such as “reconciling” (OP 1.1), 
“healing” (OP 1.2), and “calling” (OP 1.3).  However, in Part Two, “pardon” 
appears for the first time (OP 4.1) and it is used a total of four times (also 
4.2, 6.1, and 6.5).  The most revealing of these four uses is the one in OP 
6.5:  “Through the sign of absolution God grants pardon to the sinner . . . 
and thus the sacrament of penance is completed.”  This is the most 
revealing use of the term “pardon” because it practically identifies 
absolution as a pardon—an identification that was not made in 
Catholicism until the ninth century, when the cleric presiding over 
Penance began to be viewed as a judge who could declare such a pardon.  
Originally, in ancient penance,14 when the presiding official was viewed 
as a leader of a penitential liturgy, absolution was a concluding 
blessing—i.e. a deprecative statement addressed to God—in that 
liturgy.15 
Another first in Part Two is OP’s initial reference to sin 
classification.  This appears in OP 7.1 with the distinction made between 
“grave” and “venial” sins.  Grave sins are broadly defined here as 
withdrawals from communion and as life-taking.16  The classic term 
“venial sin” refers, of course, to less seriously sinful actions, but which 
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are also, nevertheless, forfeitures of “the full freedom of the children of 
God” (OP 7.1).  This qualitative language is present also in OP 7.2 and 
7.3.  OP 7.2 rewords Canon 7 of the Council of Trent’s De sacramento 
Paenitentiae, which mandates confession to a priest of “each and all 
mortal sins.”17  OP 7.3, while recommending frequent confession of 
venial sins, highlights the fact that confession or special treatment of 
these sins is not mandatory. 
There are at least four implications of such sin classification, 
implications which are characteristic of juridicism.  One of these is that 
morality is understood to be act-centered or analytical, not synthetic or 
holistic.  A second implication is that penance and conversion are 
essential only consequent to serious sins; that is, penance and 
conversion need not mark the entirety of each Christian’s life.  Thirdly, a 
highlighting of the grave/venial distinction of sin tends toward moral 
minimalism—a focusing upon serious sins of commission, and a de-
emphasis of sins of omission.  Finally, sin classification implies that the 
sacrament of penance is essentially about the meting out of just 
punishments. 
Yet another first in Part Two is the discussion of the sacrament of 
penance in terms of its parts (OP 6).  This discussion has its roots in the 
Scholastic concern for distinguishing the matter and form of the 
Church’s sacraments, and in the Council of Trent’s embracing of this 
schema.18  There are said to be four parts of the sacrament:  contrition, 
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confession, and satisfaction are the parts to be performed by the 
penitent, parts which the Council of Trent labeled as “quasi-matter”;19 
the fourth part, absolution, is to be performed by the minister and is the 
form of the sacrament.  These four parts are not necessarily nor 
exclusively representative of the juridical model, but the treatment they 
receive in OP 6 supports understanding them according to this model: 
OP 6 addresses only individual persons and their individual sins; it 
excludes the role of the community in penitential ministry; it excludes 
“parts” such as liturgy, conscience formation, and spiritual direction; 
confession is referred to as an “accusation” (OP 6.3). 
Besides containing these firsts, Part Two of OP continues some of 
the juridical emphases that are present in Part One.  Two of these 
emphases are the distinction between cosmic/moral order versus 
disorder, and the distinction between the innocent and the guilty.  These 
two emphases are obvious in the paragraph devoted to satisfaction (OP 
6.4).  The opening sentence here begins, “True conversion is completed 
by acts of penance . . . ,” thus suggesting that conversion is not an 
ongoing process but is rather a regaining of a static balance.  Here it is 
also stated that, in his act of penance, the penitent will “restore the order 
which he disturbed.”  OP 6.4 closes by including a phrase from 
Philippians 3.13—“forgetting the things which are behind him”—which 
seems to be lifted out of its context in order to support the emphasis on 
   24
the innocence that can supposedly be regained in the sacrament of 
penance.20 
A third juridical emphasis that is continued in Part Two is the 
emphasis upon office.  Penitential ministry is limited to the ordained (OP 
6.1), who are to exercise this ministry as judges (OP 6.3), and who are 
irreplaceable (OP 6.5 and 7.2). 
Before moving on to examine Part Three, one more matter about 
Part Two is noteworthy.  The entire Introduction of OP contains 55 
footnotes.  Of these 55 footnotes, 8 refer to the Council of Trent; and of 
these 8 references, 6 are made in Part Two, a part itself containing a total 
of 21 footnotes.  This means that three-fourths of all of OP’s references to 
the Council of Trent are contained in Part Two, a part that also devotes 
almost one-third of its references to this Council.  Since the Council of 
Trent was, among other things, a tribute to juridicism,21 the second part 
of OP’s Introduction might very well be the most juridical-minded part of 
the document. 
The third part, “Offices and Ministries in the Reconciliation of 
Penitents” (OP 8-11), contains aspects of the juridical model that are 
already present in the previous two parts.  One of these is the sharp line 
drawn between the innocent and the guilty.  We see this distinction being 
made in OP 8, which states that the Church calls sinners to repentance 
and “intercedes for them . . . .”  Here an idealistic view of the Church 
obscures the whole Church’s sinful and converting dimension; that is, it 
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is here implied that sin is a reality that can only be found outside of the 
Church’s innocent confines.22 
Other juridical tenets that continue to be affirmed in Part Three 
are the limiting of penitential ministry to juridical officers (i.e. priests), 
and a reduction of the sacrament to pardoning (i.e. absolving).  We see 
the former in OP 8, 9.1, 9.2, and 10.1; we see the latter in OP 9.3.  Also 
present in Part Three is an individualistic view of the moral life, sin, 
penance, and ministry.  This individualism is most obvious in OP 11, 
which bears the sub-heading, “The Penitent,” and which goes on to 
discuss the role of a penitent in isolation from all other penitents.  It is 
also present in OP 10.4, which, furthermore, connotes attorney-client 
privilege:  “ . . . the confessor comes to know the secrets . . . he is bound 
to keep the sacramental seal of confession absolutely inviolate.” 
Part Four, “The Celebration of the Sacrament of Penance” (OP 12-
35), is the longest part of OP’s Introduction.  The bulk of this part 
consists of a presentation of the structures and rationales of the three 
possible forms of celebrating sacramental reconciliation provided for in 
OP.23  These three forms, each of which is fully contained in its own 
chapter of OP, are:  “Rite for the Reconciliation of Individual Penitents” 
(which is also labeled Rite “A” and discussed in OP 15-21); “Rite for 
Reconciliation of Several Penitents with Individual Confession and 
Absolution” (Rite “B”—discussed in OP 22-30); “Rite for Reconciliation of 
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Penitents with General Confession and Absolution” (Rite “C”—discussed 
in OP 31-35). 
The second and third forms—i.e. Rites “B” and “C”—are the first 
new rituals of penance in a millennium.24  Their existence begins to fulfill 
the post-Conciliar Church’s obligation to retrieve and develop communal 
and liturgical celebrations of conversion and reconciliation, celebrations 
that were considered essential in the early Church.25  Unfortunately, 
despite these innovations, the individualistic Rite “A” is clearly preferred 
in OP.  This preference is obvious in OP 31.1:  “Individual, integral 
confession and absolution remain the only ordinary way for the faithful 
to reconcile themselves with God and the Church . . . .”  This 
individualism, of course, is characteristic of juridical thinking.26 
Several other tenets of juridicism also reappear in Part Four.  Two 
of these are the limiting of penitential ministry to priests and the 
reduction of the sacrament of penance to the absolution.  OP 13.1 
identifies the presiding priest as the lone minister of reconciliation, and 
OP 15-21 repeatedly portray the sacrament as a penitent’s dependence 
upon one priest.  As for the absolution, its official formula appears in OP 
for the first time in OP 19.2, and then again in OP 21.  In both instances 
these words of absolution are called “essential,” and in OP 21 they are 
even said to be “sufficient” for the sacrament to be valid.  Furthermore, 
the formula is declarative, thus reinforcing the juridical view of 
penitential ministry as being one that is limited to a juridical officer.27 
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Three other juridical tenets that Part Four repeats are sin 
classification, act analysis, and the order-innocence/disorder-guilt 
distinction.  The first two of these can be found in OP 18.3, 33, 34, and 
35.1.  The third of these can be seen six times in Part Four, in OP 18.2, 
18.3, 19.1, 25, 33, and 35.1.  Phrases in these paragraphs suggest that 
the sacrament of reconciliation is not a celebration and reinforcement of 
conversions that are, or ought to be, ongoing, but that it is rather a 
means to restore order, regain moral innocence, and balance moral 
ledgers.  Indeed, the Trent-like understandings of contrition, conversion, 
and penance that imbue OP 6 reappear here with remarkable similarity.  
OP 33 states that penitents are to resolve to avoid committing certain 
sins again, as OP 6.2 calls for “the intention of sinning no more.”  Acts of 
penance are seen as means to “restitution” (OP 18.2) and as making up 
for the past (OP 18.3), while OP 6.4 aligns them with “reparation” and 
order-restoration.  And OP 19.1 characterizes sincere penitents as those 
who resolve to “begin a new life,” as OP 6.1 speaks of the intent to “lead a 
new life.”  Again, all of this language represents the juridical model’s 
focus on acts and sharp distinction between moral guilt and moral 
innocence.  The belief that each human person lives one life that is a 
meandering journey between complete disintegration and complete 
integration is given no credence in the juridical weltanschauung; 
dichotomization and analysis are embraced while congruence and 
synthesis are ignored. 
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The last two parts of the Introduction are the shortest.  Part Five, 
“Penitential Celebrations” (OP 36-37), discusses these liturgies of the 
Word, liturgies which contain no traces of the juridical model.  The only 
juridical-minded statement in Part Five appears in OP 37.1 and is echoed 
in OP 37.3:  these celebrations are to be seen as subordinate to 
celebrations of the sacrament of penance.  While non-juridical vision sees 
these liturgies as intimately linked with the sacrament,28 proponents of 
the juridical model view them as nonsacramental since they lack priestly 
absolution.  Part Six, “Adaptations of the Rite to Various Regions and 
Circumstances” (OP 38-40), continues this emphasis upon individual 
absolution (OP 40), as well as the limiting of penitential ministry to 
priests (OP 38, 40). 
To conclude my illustration of the juridical model’s presence within 
OP I want to highlight how OP treats the term “reconciliation.”  The 
employment of this term intends to sum up and signify the Church’s 
revision of what for centuries had been called the sacrament of 
penance;29 indeed, this term is offered as the new alternative name of the 
sacrament (OP 22.1).  The term is rooted in scripture—particularly in the 
Pauline corpus30—and it bears strong personalistic and communitarian 
connotations.  This is to say that “reconciliation” is intended to remind 
us that this sacrament is to be experienced as a graced return of sinful 
persons not only to friendship with God, but also with the human 
persons and communities against which have been sinned.31 
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To speak about this further and in more technical or thematic 
theological language, reconciliation is a mystery which consists of 
objective and subjective dimensions.  Objective reconciliation refers to 
the theological fact that God the Father has forgiven the sins of humanity 
because of the sacrificial death of His Son, Jesus Christ.  In this sense, 
reconciliation has been realized.  However, reconciliation in its subjective 
dimension is incomplete since it needs to be subjectively appropriated or 
consummated by individuals and communities.32 
There are at least two ways of viewing this subjective dimension 
and how it is realized.  One way is to see reconciliation as being 
gradually achieved.  Those holding this view would never claim that 
reconciliation can be completely realized this side of the Kingdom of God.  
Rather, they—i.e. we—claim that reconciliation is realized asymptotically:  
in ever greater degrees, and not completely until the eschaton.33  Thus, 
in this vision, each celebration of the sacrament of reconciliation is a 
placing of a building-block, to (continue to) speak metaphorically. 
The other way of viewing subjective reconciliation is to see this as 
being able to be instantly and fully appropriated here and now.  That is 
to say, in terms of the aforementioned metaphor, each celebration of 
sacramental reconciliation is a complete construction of an entire 
building.  Although OP offers no explicit description or definition of 
reconciliation,34 the document implicitly prefers to see reconciliation this 
latter way.  I point this out now because I see this as part of the juridical 
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view of sin as being that which disrupts an alleged cosmic order, and as 
part of the juridical view of the sacrament that treats post-baptismal sin 
as the means to order-restoration.  Let us recall: 
Thus the faithful who fall into sin after baptism may be reconciled 
with God and renewed in grace. (OP 2.3) 
 
It is therefore fitting to have several penitential celebrations during 
Lent, so that all the faithful may have an opportunity to be 
reconciled with God and their neighbor and so be able to celebrate 
the paschal mystery in the Easter triduum with renewed hearts. 
(OP 13.2) 
 
. . . reconciliation with God is asked for and given through the 
ministry of the Church. (OP 19.2) 
 
My illustration of the employment of the juridical model of sin and 
reconciliation in OP is now completed.  It is time to so illustrate vis à vis 
RP. 
 
Juridical Model in RP 
 
RP is an Apostolic Exhortation of Pope John Paul II’s, issued in 
response to the Sixth General Assembly of the Synod of Bishops, in 
which the Pope offers “as the fruit of the same Synod a doctrinal and 
pastoral message on the subject of penance and reconciliation” (RP 4.12).  
Its publication date—December 2, 1984—is the eleventh anniversary of 
the promulgation of OP.35  RP contains an Introduction, three parts that 
contain a total of seven chapters, and a Conclusion. 
The first appearances of juridical thinking within RP occur in the 
Introduction’s (RP 1-4) numerous statements about reconciliation.  In 
fact, when these statements refer to the subjective dimension of 
   31
reconciliation they usually see this dimension as it is often seen in OP:  
reconciliation consists in the complete restoration of order here and now.  
For example, it is claimed that there exist acts of reconciliation which 
restore unity (RP 4.7), that the Church can re-establish an “original 
reconciliation” (RP 4.8), and that reconciliation will result when persons 
are converted (RP 4.10-12).  This last statement not only signifies a 
juridical understanding of reconciliation, but it also reflects a juridical 
view of conversion—i.e. conversion is an achievable goal, not an ongoing 
process.  Also juridical-minded is a statement about sin in RP 4.5:  sin is 
something to be overcome, not something with which we continually 
wrestle. 
These juridical views of sin, conversion, and reconciliation 
continue in Part One, “Conversion And Reconciliation: The Church’s 
Task And Commitment” (RP 5-12).  Sin is described in legalistic terms—
i.e. as “disobedience” and as a “transgression” (RP 10.2).  Sin is also seen 
as something that disrupts order (RP 10.2), and as something that can 
be overcome (RP 6.3, 8.7, 10.7).  As for conversion, it is thrice referred to 
in the past tense, as if it were something that comes to a successful end 
(RP 6.1, 6.2, 10.6).  Indeed, conversion is said to be a prelude to 
reconciliation (RP 6.2), and reconciliation is itself said to be completely 
achievable (RP 7.5, 9.5). 
Other appearances of juridical tenets in Part One are the limiting 
of penitential ministry to empowered officers only (RP 8.3), and a sharp 
   32
distinction between the morally innocent and the morally guilty.  The 
latter tenet is implied in three references to the Church’s task of 
reconciling.  In RP 9.5 the “innocent” Church is distinguished from “vast 
sections of humanity in the modern world that . . . keep their distance 
from her and oppose her.”  In RP 10.6 this Church is distinguished from 
“all humanity,” to which it offers a (condescending) monologue.  This 
monological stance is echoed in RP 12.3:  “The Church . . . as Mother 
and Teacher, untiringly exhorts people to reconciliation.”  These 
references fail to include the facts that the Church must constantly 
exhort itself, as well as the world, to pursue conversion and 
reconciliation, and that the world sometimes so exhorts the Church. 
Part Two, “The Love That Is Greater Than Sin” (RP 13-22), contains 
an Introduction and two chapters.  Although the focus of the first of 
these chapters is sin, and although the focus of the second of these 
chapters is the divine mercy that triumphs over sin, these chapters 
overlap and, to some degree, treat both of these mysteries, and aspects of 
them, simultaneously.  Perhaps the best way to illustrate the 
employment of the juridical model in Part Two is to highlight how a 
biblical passage that is central to Part Two is interpreted and applied.  
The passage in question is 1 Jn 5.16-21. 
The first of five references to this passage36 occurs in RP 17.  John 
Paul II’s first comment on this passage is a sound one: 
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At any rate, by this distinction of concepts John seems to wish 
to emphasize the incalculable seriousness of what constitutes 
the very essence of sin, namely the rejection of God. (RP 17.4)  
What is questionable, however, is the Pope’s second comment: 
But in this passage the Apostle’s intention is also to underline 
the certainty that comes to the Christian from the fact of having 
been “born of God” through the coming of the Son:  the Christian 
possesses a power that preserves him from falling into sin; God 
protects him, and “the evil one does not touch him.” (RP 17.4)    
Apparently the Pope, in Part Two, has lifted 1 Jn 5.16-21, as well as 
other New Testament passages,37 out of its context in order to support 
his present employment of the juridical model.  There are two juridical-
minded points that the Pope makes via his references to 1 Jn:  first, that 
the author of 1 Jn is concerned with developing a conceptual distinction 
between “venially” sinful acts and “mortally” sinful acts; second, that 1 
Jn is urging a moral perfectionism and asserting that failing in this is a 
fall from the “white” of moral innocence into the “black” of moral guilt 
(i.e. there is no “gray” area in the moral life to speak, again, 
metaphorically). 
In arguing that John Paul II has accommodated 1 Jn 5 et al. 
according to a juridical bias I am encouraged by Johannine scholars 
such as Raymond E. Brown,38 Bruce Vawter,39 and Rudolf 
Schnackenburg.40  In a section of his The Community Of The Beloved 
Disciple that is devoted to the Johannine Epistles, Brown begins by 
pointing out that the overall purpose of the author of 1 Jn is to warn its 
readers about a heretical “group that has seceded from the (Johannine) 
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community (1 Jn 2.19) but is still trying to win over more adherents.”41  
Brown then explains how the author (whom Brown sees as being the 
primary representative of the Johannine community’s orthodox school42) 
and the secessionists conflict with regard to christology, ethics, 
eschatology, and pneumatology. 
In his discussion of the ethical and pneumatological differences, 
Brown presents evidence that renders invalid any linking of 1 Jn with the 
two aforementioned juridical points, as the Pope has done.  First of all, 
the statements about “deadly sin” in 1 Jn 5.16f. are not part of a larger 
discussion of how sins may be classified or graded.  Rather, these 
statements merely highlight the fact that the secessionists have 
committed the deadliest sin—apostasy—and that they must thus be 
ignored.43  Furthermore, when we read that “no one who is a child of God 
sins” because “he who was born from God protects him” (1 Jn 5.18) or 
because “God’s seed remains in him” (1 Jn 3.9), we are not being urged 
by the author to pursue a moral perfectionism that sharply separates the 
morally innocent and the morally guilty.  Rather, the “seed” that prevents 
our sinning is most probably the knowledge-providing Paraclete/Spirit 
who refutes the apostate—i.e. sinful—teaching of the secessionists.44  
Indeed, when the author of 1 Jn writes that a Christian “cannot be a 
sinner” (1 Jn 3.9), it is very likely that he means “cannot consistently be 
a sinner for elsewhere he recognizes that Christians may fall short of the 
‘should.’”45 
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Before moving on to analyze Part Three of RP, I ought to point out 
other juridical tenets that are present in Part Two.  Besides containing 
instances of an act-centered hamartology, the classification of these acts, 
the sharp distinction between order/innocence and disorder/guilt, and 
the hope that actual sins can be perfectly avoided (all of which is 
supposedly supported by 1 Jn), Part Two also contains passages which 
limit the responsibility for sin and conversion to individuals in isolation.  
Nowhere is this more obvious than in RP 16.9: 
Whenever the Church speaks of situations of sin, or when she 
condemns as social sins certain situations or the collective 
behaviour of certain social groups, big or small, or even of whole 
nations and blocs of nations, she knows and she proclaims that 
such cases of social sin are the result of the accumulation and 
concentration of many personal sins.  . . .  The real responsibility, 
then, lies with individuals.                                                                                  
This individualism is also present in RP 13.4, 14.4, 22.2, and in 
subdivisions 1, 2, 10, and 11 of RP 16.  Furthermore, sin is often 
discussed in juridical terms, such as “disobedience” (RP 14.2, 14.3, 14.4, 
15.4, 17.15), “rebellion” (RP 17.6, 17.7), “crimes” (RP 17.8), “a disorder 
perpetrated” (RP 17.9), “illicit acts” (RP 18.7), and as deserving of 
“punishment” (RP 17.7, 17.10, 18.10) or “condemnation” (RP 17.3).  
Finally, it is claimed that the traditional concept of mortal sin—i.e. the 
juridical model of mortal sin—is unchangeable (RP 17.17), and it is 
implied that the teaching on sin as contained in the juridical tradition is 
identifiable with the teaching on sin that is given in the word of God (RP 
17.18).46 
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Part Three, “The Pastoral Ministry Of Penance And Reconciliation” 
(RP 23-35), is RP’s longest part.  It is a veritable cornucopia of juridical-
minded statements.  These statements reflect all of the values of the 
juridical model.  These are frequently repeated, and they can be 
summarized as follows:  mortal sins remove one from communion with 
the morally innocent Church; confessing these sins privately to an 
empowered Church officer and receiving absolution privately from him 
instantly and perfectly restores one to this communion.  Even more 
illustrative is contrasting what is focused upon versus what is ignored in 
Part Three’s juridical statements by listing these contrasts in table form. 
 
Table 1.—Aspects of Sin and Reconciliation Focused Upon and 
Ignored in Juridical Statements Contained in Part Three of RP  
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Focused Upon Ignored 
 
 1. The holiness of the reified Church 1. Sin in the concrete Church 
 2. Moral perfection 2. Moral progress 
 3. Individual acts 3. Whole life 
 4. Sin classification 4. Characterization 
 5. A penitent in isolation 5. Penitents together 
 6. Instant reinstatement 6. Gradual conversion 
 7. Absolution is pardon 7. Absolution is prayer 
 8. Office 8. Charism 
 9. Observing laws 9. Experiencing meaning      
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Most of the paragraphs in Part Three point to or contain at least 
one of these foci.  Instead of citing them all, I think it would suffice to 
highlight several of the more outstanding passages.  RP 26.6 contains 
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the aforementioned sharp distinction between disorder and guilt versus 
order and innocence:  “To do penance means, above all, to re-establish 
the balance and harmony broken by sin . . . .”  This distinction is also 
prominent in RP 27.3 and especially in RP 31.17: “Every confessional is a 
special and blessed place from which, with divisions wiped away, there is 
born new and uncontaminated a reconciled individual—a reconciled 
world!”  We also see in statements such as these the emphasis upon 
instantaneous and absolute pardoning (also see RP 31.11).  Indeed, a 
pardoning absolution is said to be the unchangeable substance of the 
sacrament of penance (RP 30.2).47 
The most explicit example of the juridical model appears in RP 
31.3: 
. . . the Sacrament is a kind of judicial action; . . . sinners . . . 
accept the punishment (sacramental penance) which the 
confessor imposes on them and receive absolution from him.    
This confessing by a lone penitent to a lone judge/absolver is said to be 
“the only ordinary way” to reconciliation, and that this is so due to “the 
will of the Lord Jesus” (RP 33.2).  Furthermore, those bishops who 
permit the communal celebration of penance with general absolution48 
are admonished (RP 33.3-4). 
The final five paragraph subdivisions of Part Three—which 
comprise RP 34—are all very juridical-minded.  Taken together these 
subdivisions reveal an understanding of the sacrament that reduces it to 
confession and absolution.  That is, most of the difficult work of serious 
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conversion is seen as extrinsic to the sacrament.  This is observable in 
RP 34.2, which attempts to address those who are situated in irregular 
sexual unions: 
. . . the Church can only invite her children who find themselves 
in these painful situations to approach the divine mercy by other 
ways, not however through the Sacraments of Penance and the 
Eucharist, until such time as they have attained the required 
dispositions.                                                                                    
The “other ways” to mercy recommended later in RP 34.5 are vague and, 
again, are seen as extrinsic to sacramental reconciliation.  Since Part 
Three—in harmony with the juridical model—limits penitential ministry 
to those who are empowered to issue pardon-like declarative absolutions, 
and since it limits the sacrament to the individual form of celebration,49  
this vagueness and extrinsicism are inescapable.  As I will show below,50 
a non-juridical approach to sin and reconciliation can attempt to 
incorporate communal conversion, and diverse ministries that facilitate 
such conversion, within celebrations of the sacrament. 
Before proceeding to the next section of this chapter, I would like 
to here state a bit more about the juridical model.  I am not arguing that 
this model is inadequate.  On the contrary, there are aspects of this 
model which continue to benefit the Church directly and the world 
indirectly.  Among these, for example, is the pursuit of universal moral 
laws via the methodology of natural law. 
What I am arguing is that the juridical model of sin and 
reconciliation is inadequate as a paradigm in the Church today.   Official 
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Catholic teaching on sin and reconciliation ought to be based upon a 
contemporary paradigm.  Such a paradigm would not jettison the 
juridical model, but would rather include what is still relevant and 
fecund in that (and other) models.  Nevertheless, the new paradigm 
would be a model that would replace the juridical model in terms of 
primacy. 
Having described the juridical model of sin and reconciliation, and 
having demonstrated its employment in RP, as well as in OP, I now 
proceed to do the same vis à vis the personalistic model. 
 
Personalistic Model 
 
The personalistic model of sin and reconciliation51 shares with the 
juridical model an emphasis upon the individual and his or her 
individual responsibility.52   The former model differs from the latter, 
however, in its incorporation of both biblical and modern philosophical 
ideals.  The personalistic model presupposes that the world is 
anthropocentric, an environment given to humanity by God and in which 
man either flourishes and co-creates with God or wastes and destroys.  
Its moral methodology tends to be, appropriately, a personalistic form of 
natural law, i.e. a form which is based not on human nature, but on “the 
nature of the human person and human action” (GS 51).53   It sees 
human beings as individual persons who are to listen for God’s call 
within their consciences and realize their respective vocations through 
personal choices and acts.  While the juridical model sees sin as a 
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transgression or crime, the personalistic model sees sin as a betrayal or 
infidelity.  The latter model also views sins as failures:  failures to self-
actualize; failures to love God and neighbor; failures to offer one’s entire 
self as gift.  This model holds that a consequence of sin is alienation:  
alienation from self, God, neighbor, Church, world, all creation, and, 
ultimately, from a life that is meaningful. 
The correlative response to sin in this model is just as 
personalistic.  Emphasized over the unity of the divine nature is the 
Trinity of divine persons.  The Church is still seen as hierarchical but it 
is also recognized as being a community, a people, even a family.  
Sacraments are appreciated as encounters with the three-personed God.  
The sacrament that treats sins is called “reconciliation,” since the 
alienated sinner is here welcomed back—in the person of the priest-
confessor—by a loving, forgiving Father and family.  A most obvious 
employment of modern thought is when these encounters are referred to 
in terms of rights, i.e. when it is said that reconciliation is a right of 
God’s and of an individual’s.54  The four traditional parts of penance, as 
well as penitential ministry, are understood as follows:  contrition is a 
desire to return to communion; confession is a revelation of a contrite 
heart; absolution is a declarative statement55 that welcomes; the act of 
penance is one of reparation, or is a sign of commitment to personal 
conversion and self-actualization; penitential ministry is limited to 
ordained priests, who act as community representatives. 
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Personalistic Model in OP 
Two major characteristics of the personalistic model appear 
simultaneously at the beginning of OP.  These are, first, the resituating of 
what has been traditionally called the sacrament of “penance” within the 
framework of “reconciliation,” and second, reference to the three persons 
in God, as opposed to God as an apersonal unity.  Although I will 
attempt to discuss these characteristics separately, their 
interrelationship will lead to some overlapping.  I will treat first OP’s 
references to the Trinity. 
Even though OP’s references to the Trinity are primarily inspired—
as I will demonstrate below—by the liturgical-narrational model, it is 
necessary nevertheless to show how these references are also part of the 
personalistic model.  In order to do this I point out that personalism is 
concerned with respecting the subjectivity and/or the relatedness of 
persons.56  Given such concerns, it follows that the personalistic model 
will refer to God in ways that respect and illuminate subjectivity and 
relatedness regarding God. 
There are several of such references in OP, especially within the 
first six paragraphs (i.e. OP 1-6).  Whenever one of the divine persons is 
mentioned usually the other two are also immediately discussed (hence, 
respecting relatedness), and these discussions distinguish the divine 
persons according to each one’s unique activity in the economy of 
salvation (hence, respecting subjectivity).  OP 1 reminds us that God the 
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Father “has shown forth his mercy by reconciling the world to himself,” 
that Jesus’ sacrifice reconciles us with the Father, and that Jesus “sent 
the Holy Spirit,” who in turn enables the forgiveness of sins.  OP 5.1 
states that a repentant sinner “comes back” not simply to God, but to a 
God who is three persons:  “. . . to the Father who ‘first loved us’ . . . to 
Christ who gave himself up for us, and to the Holy Spirit who has been 
poured out on us abundantly.”  OP 6.6 says that in the sacrament the 
Father “receives the repentant son,” that Christ brings the “lost sheep” 
back, and that the Holy Spirit “sanctifies this temple of God again . . . .”  
OP 19.2 points out how the formula of absolution is personalistic:  it 
shows that reconciliation “comes from the mercy of the Father,” that 
reconciliation is linked with Christ’s paschal mystery, and that 
forgiveness is tied to the activity of the Holy Spirit.  Finally, OP 24.3 
orders that readings chosen for communal celebrations of penance 
should illustrate God (the Father) “calling men back to conversion,” and 
that reconciliation comes through Christ’s death and resurrection and 
“through the gift of the Holy Spirit.” 
The second personalistic tenet that appears (simultaneously with 
the Trinitarian references) at the beginning of OP is the viewing of the 
sacrament of penance also as one of “reconciliation.”  Earlier in this 
second chapter I stated that the employment of this term intends to sum 
up and signify the Church’s revision of the sacrament—that 
“reconciliation” is intended to remind us that the sacrament is to be 
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experienced as a graced return of sinful persons not only to friendship 
with God, but also with the human persons and communities against 
which have been sinned.  I also pointed out that there are two 
dimensions or types of reconciliation in salvation history:  the objective 
dimension, which refers to the Father’s forgiveness through the sacrifice 
of the Son;  and the subjective dimension, which refers to the 
appropriation or realization of reconciliation here and now.57  But no 
matter which dimension one is referring to, “reconciliation” points toward 
the personalistic emphasis upon personal relationships and the varying 
degrees of intimacy that are possible within relationships. 
More specifically, “reconciliation” refers to the core of biblical 
personalism:  covenant.  To have covenant awareness is to recognize that 
we Christians share both solidarity in sin and solidarity in salvation,58 
that our sins offend God, ourselves, and each other, and that these 
damaged personal relationships must be repaired and improved.  It is 
also to remember that, in the divine-human dialogue of salvation, the 
divine persons always take the initiative, an initiative that is marked by 
steadfast, personal, passionate, and unconditional love.59 
The very first words of OP are those that comprise the heading of 
Part One, and these words include the message that reconciliation is a 
mystery (a message which is repeated in OP 24.3).  The following two of 
the remaining five part-headings also contain the term “reconciliation”; 
they remind us that it is something that must happen to penitents.  
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Furthermore, all three of the different rites offered in OP are rites “for 
reconciliation,” not “for penance.” 
Beyond the headings and sub-headings (i.e. within the text of OP), 
it is interesting to note who, or what, does this reconciling work.  OP 1.1, 
citing 2 Cor 5.18ff., says that the Father reconciles the world.  OP 1.2 
says that Jesus reconciled sinners.  OP 2.3, 4.2, and 5.2 report that the 
sacrament itself reconciles.  The “whole Church” performs the “work of 
reconciliation according to OP 8.  In OP 24.3 it is said that the Spirit 
gives reconciliation.  OP 31.1 says that the faithful (who have sinned) 
“reconcile themselves with God and the Church . . . .”  Finally, priests are 
reconcilers, according to OP 40.1. Perhaps all of this diversity signifies 
that reconciliation is a phenomenon that is active and passive, individual 
and communal, divine and human.  And the overall significance of 
referring to the sacrament as one of “reconciliation,” again, is that 
persons must be reunited and relationships must be repaired. 
The personalistic model is also visible in OP in various passages 
that discuss sin and conversion.  Sin “disrupts our friendship” with God 
(OP 5.1), is a withdrawal “from the communion of love with God” (OP 
7.1), and “works against God, against the community and one’s 
neighbors, and against the sinner himself” (OP 25).  The last passage 
cited exemplifies OP’s personalistic sensitivity to the social or horizontal60 
dimension of sin, which is also obvious in OP 3.2, 4.1, 4.2, 5.2, and 5.3.  
Indeed, OP 5.3 points out that joint or collective sin is a frequent 
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occurrence, and OP 3.2 refers to the sinful dimension of the Church.61  
Also noteworthy is the movement away from the classification of sins in 
OP 5.1:  “ . . . every sin is an offense against God . . . .” 
As for the personalistic passages devoted to conversion, these are 
consistent with several of the characteristics of conversion that recur 
throughout the inspired books of the Bible.  Ronald D. Witherup has 
tried to show that there are fifteen such characteristics.62   Seven of 
these fifteen can be seen in OP’s personalism.  First, that conversion 
begins due to God’s initiative can be seen in OP 5.1, 6.1, 7.1, and 25.  
Second, that conversion is rooted in the image of “turning” is obvious in 
OP 1.2, 5.1, 6.4, 6.6, and 25.  Third, that conversion depends upon the 
recognition of sin and the hearing of God’s Word is visible in OP 6.3, 17, 
24, and 36.  Fourth, that conversion is a process appears in OP 3.2, 4.1, 
6.2, 7.3, 11.3, and 20.2.  Fifth, that conversion affects the whole person 
is present in OP 6.2 and 7.4.  Sixth, the relational or communal 
dimension of conversion is treated in OP 3.2, 4.1, 4.2, 5.3, 8, 22.3, 36, 
and 40.1.  Finally, that conversion is expressed in reparative and 
charitable actions can be seen in OP 5.3, 6.4, 7.4, 18.3, 25, and 35.2. 
Of all of these passages, one of the outstanding ones is OP 5.3: 
In fact, men frequently join together to commit injustice.  It is thus 
only fitting that they should help each other in doing penance so 
that they who are freed from sin by the grace of Christ may work 
with all men of good will for justice and peace in the world.    
Regarding this passage, Dallen has noted that it “is the first correlation 
of the sacrament and work for justice in an official document.”63  
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Interestingly, this passage is immediately followed by OP 6, in which all 
six of its paragraph subdivisions contain personalistic statements that 
are individualistic, not communitarian.  For example: 
The follower of Christ . . . should above all be converted to God with 
his whole heart. (OP 6.1) 
 
The sacrament of penance includes the confession of sins, which 
comes from true knowledge of self before God . . . [and] the will 
to open his heart to the minister of God . . . . (OP 6.3) 
 
The only other appearances of personalism in OP occur in 
statements about the ministry to penitents.  Although OP 9 stipulates 
that bishops and priests are the official ministers of the sacrament of 
penance, and although this limiting of the ministry pervades OP, it is 
interesting to note the first sentence of the paragraph that precedes       
OP 9: 
The whole Church, as a priestly people, acts in different ways in 
the work of reconciliation which has been entrusted to it by the 
Lord. (OP 8)                                                                                 
Although this sentence and sentences like it are primarily inspired by the 
liturgical-narrational model, it does represent a strain of personalism 
which subtly reminds us that the official ministers of penance act as 
representatives of a Church that is a people as well as a hierarchical 
institution.  That this ministry belongs to the whole Church is also 
underlined in OP 6.5 and 19.2.  Indeed, if a distinction between the 
“work of reconciliation” and the “ministry of reconciliation” cannot 
legitimately be drawn, then the whole Church participates in this 
ministry “ ‘by charity, example, and prayer’” (OP 4.2 citing LG 11), and by 
   47
helping “each other in doing penance” (OP 5.3).  Furthermore, it is stated 
that the penitent person “shares by his actions in the sacrament itself” 
(OP 11.2), and that he “celebrates with the priest” (OP 11.3).  OP 40.2 
even allows lay persons to contribute to the adaptation of celebrations. 
As for the official ministers of penance (i.e. bishops and priests), 
they “reveal the heart of the Father and show the image of Christ the 
Good Shepherd” when they perform their ministry (OP 10.3).  This 
ministry, however, is not simply possessed by virtue of ordination; 
personal gifts, skills, and qualities are to be acquired, cultivated, prayed 
about, and practiced.  For example, the minister “should welcome the 
penitent with fraternal charity and . . . address him with friendly words” 
(OP 16), he should help and encourage the penitent (OP 18.1), and he 
should “acquire the knowledge and prudence necessary for this task by 
serious study” (OP 10.1).  Indeed, discernment of spirits is not official:      
“ . . . it is a gift of the Spirit as well as the fruit of charity” (OP 10.1).  
Furthermore, the official ministers are to respect and cooperate with the 
particular needs and circumstances of individuals and communities—
that is to say, they should adapt the rites according to these needs and 
circumstances (OP 26.1, 38, 39, 40). 
My demonstration of the employment of the personalistic model of 
sin and reconciliation in OP is now completed.  I will now so demonstrate 
vis à vis RP. 
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Personalistic Model in RP 
The employment of the personalistic model within RP occurs under 
four of the five major headings under which it occurs in OP:  sin; 
conversion; reconciliation; penitential ministry.  In the previous section I 
treated reconciliation before I treated sin and conversion due to the 
import of the former term with regard to the personalistic model.  Having 
done this, I will, in this section, reverse this order so that it corresponds 
to the order in which we experience these realities.  And so I begin with 
the personalistic views of sin in RP. 
Pope John Paul II, in RP, offers the most extensive Magisterial 
teaching ever on the reality of social sin.  This teaching is articulated 
primarily in RP 16, which is comprised of 11 paragraph subdivisions.  
There are three legitimate or acceptable meanings of the term “social 
sin,” according to RP:  first, every sin—even those that appear to be 
private—affects more than just the person who sins (RP 16.5); second, 
there are sins that “by their very matter constitute a direct attack on 
one’s neighbour” (RP 16.6); third, there are sins committed amidst “the 
relationships between the various human communities” (RP 16.7).  These 
three different meanings of social sin—especially the first meaning—are 
obviously rooted in the communitarian pole of personalism, i.e. in the 
pole that refers to the intrinsic relatedness of human persons.64 
Social sin is also seen as a “communion of sin,” which is the 
antithesis of that solidarity known as the Communion of Saints           
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(RP 16.5), and it is called the “ ‘horizontal’ dimension . . . of division”    
(RP 7.7).  This dimension not only pervades the world (RP 1.5, 2.1, 2.2, 
10.2, 15, 23.4, 25.12, 31.7, 31.15, 35.7), but it also is very present in the 
Church (RP 2.3, 25.7, 26.15). 
Despite this attention to the social nature of persons and their 
sins, priority is given to individuality and to “that ‘vertical’ dimension of 
division . . . concerning the relationship between man and God, a 
dimension which . . . always prevails over the ‘horizontal’ dimension”    
(RP 7.7).  The primary victim of sin is said to be the sinner himself        
(RP 16.2).  Moreover, regarding the perpetration of sin, RP stresses that 
actual sin can properly be attributed only to individual persons; that is, 
RP perpetuates the distinction between proper sins and sins by analogy 
(RP 16.1, 16.7 ff.).  This emphasis is given despite RP’s recognition of 
sins being committed by communities, groups, and nations (RP 16.6, 
16.7, 16.9).65 
RP also contains personalistic understandings of conversion and 
reconciliation.  I have already explained how the term “reconciliation” is 
rooted in personalism.  RP illuminates this basis by examining (in RP 5-
6) one of the most personalistic of Jesus’ parables:  the parable of the 
Prodigal Son (Lk 15.11-32).  RP points out several aspects of conversion 
and reconciliation as contained in the parable, aspects which are 
repeatedly reaffirmed and developed throughout the document. 
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Two of these aspects are the dependence of reconciliation upon 
conversion and the centrality of self-knowledge in conversion.  Like the 
Prodigal Son, each one of us must “desire to return to communion with 
his Father” (RP 5.3).  That is, reconciliation requires a prior “desire to 
return”—a conversion.  This point is reaffirmed in RP 4.5, 4.12, 6.2, 
13.3, 20.3, 23.4, and 35.7.  Indeed, these and other passages recognize 
that reconciliation can be delayed for some time since conversion is 
likened to journeying upon a road (RP 13.3), a course (RP 20.3), and a 
path (RP 8.7, 12.4, 35.7).  Furthermore, RP’s personalism posits self-
knowledge as the core of conversion.  Again, like the Prodigal Son, we 
each must see that an “independent existence . . . [is a] mirage,” and that 
seeking such independence will leave us “alone, dishonoured, [and] 
exploited” (RP 5.3).  Contrition and conversion are “a rediscovery of one’s 
true identity” (RP 31.9) and a recognition of “oneself as being a sinner, 
capable of sin and inclined to commit sin” (RP 13.2). 
Two other personalistic aspects of conversion and reconciliation 
that RP notices within this parable and then expands upon are the 
aforementioned vertical and horizontal dimensions.  As with sin, so with 
conversion and reconciliation:  RP emphasizes the primacy of the vertical 
dimension (RP 7.7).  Although communal conversion is recognized       
(RP 23.6), and although there can be “ever new manifestations of 
conversion and reconciliation both within the Church and outside her” 
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(RP 12.5), individual conversion in isolation is said to be most authentic, 
even when the necessary conversion is one from social sin: 
. . . to speak even analogically of social sins . . . is meant to be an 
appeal to the consciences of all, so that each may shoulder his or 
her responsibility seriously and courageously in order to change 
those disastrous conditions and intolerable situations. (RP 16.7)     
Another example of the alleged primacy of the vertical dimension of 
conversion can be found in RP’s discussion of acts of satisfaction.  The 
horizontal dimension of such acts—i.e. their benefit to the community—
is ignored, yet much is said about how these acts “are the sign of the 
personal commitment that the Christian has made to God . . . to begin a 
new life” (RP 31.12).  Furthermore, RP’s personalistic statements about 
conversion are, more often than not, concerned with each person’s 
“heart” (RP 4.11, 6.4, 8.7, 23.1, 31.8), soul (RP 20.3, 26.5), and/or 
conscience (RP 22.2, 25.4, 26.8, 31.7). 
Similarly, the horizontal dimension of reconciliation is second to its 
vertical dimension.  Although it is admitted that people who approach 
the sacrament are reconciled with “brethren,” with the Church, and with 
creation, it is “emphasized that the most precious result . . . consists in 
reconciliation with God, which takes place in the inmost heart of the son 
who was lost and found again” (RP 31.15).  Reconciliation “is principally 
a gift of the heavenly Father” (RP 5.4; see also RP 4.9, 6.3, 7.1, 10.1, 
20.4, 23.1, 31.16), and it is only after this vertical reconciliation is 
achieved that horizontal reconciliation can and should be sought         
(RP 4.11, 7.7, 13.6). 
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Finally, among RP’s personalistic statements about the ministry to 
penitents, several are remarkable.  First of all, this ministry is said to be 
the essence of the Church’s mission, since the Church’s “central task [is 
that] of reconciling people” (RP 8.5; see also RP 4.12, 6.4, 23.1).  Second, 
since all the People of God are ministers of reconciliation (RP 8.3, 12.1, 
23.6, 31.14), it is stated that this ministry is effective in proportion to 
how well the Church as a whole—including the official ministers of 
reconciliation—pursues continual conversion (RP 9.2, 29.7, 31.19).  
Third, this ministry is to be directed by the Catholic Church not only 
towards its own members, but also towards other Christian 
communities, other religions, and even towards the arena of 
international politics (RP 23.5, 25.1-15).  Related to this multi-directional 
view of reconciliation is a fourth remarkable claim:  dialogue and mutual 
forgiveness are to be aspects of the ministry of reconciliation   (RP 9.4, 
25.1-15). 
As for RP’s personalistic statements about the official ministers of 
reconciliation (i.e. bishops and priests), these echo those of OP.  It is said 
that, in the sacrament of reconciliation, the official minister makes 
present “the Christ who appears as the brother of man” (RP 29.5).  
Furthermore, this minister must have “human qualities,” he must visibly 
be committed to his own conversion, and he must possess not only 
doctrinal, moral, and spiritual training, but also “training in dialogue and 
especially in how to deal with people in the pastoral context” (RP 29.7-8).  
   53
He should remember that he represents the community to the penitent   
(RP 31.10), and he should give “careful attention to the celebration” so 
that it will receive “fresh life . . . and prevent it from declining into a mere 
formality and routine” (RP 32.8). 
Having described the personalistic model of sin and reconciliation, 
and having demonstrated its employment in RP, as well as in OP, I now 
proceed to do the same vis `a vis the medical model. 
 
Medical Model 
 
The medical model of sin and reconciliation66 integrates biblical, 
patristic, and modern ideals.  It presupposes that the world, though 
predominantly conducive to human development, contains the power of 
evil, a power that is virulent, contagious, and enduring.  It sees human 
beings as capable of healthy development yet as simultaneously 
vulnerable or susceptible to this virulent power.  It sees sins as specific 
manifestations of, or contributions to, this power; i.e. sins are wounds or 
diseases67 that persons and communities acquire, perpetuate, 
exacerbate, and proliferate.  Like diseases, sins affect all dimensions of a 
person, are of varying kinds and durations, and sometimes result in 
death. 
Of course, the correlative response to sin is a medical one.  Biblical 
and patristic allusions to Christ as Physician are highlighted.  The 
Church is a community devoted to health and vitality, which its 
sacraments mediate.  In particular, the sacrament of reconciliation 
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mediates healing, recovery, or therapy.  The four traditional parts of 
penance, as well as penitential ministry, are understood as follows:  
contrition is a desire to be healed; confession is an acknowledgement and 
description of an illness(es); absolution is a declarative statement68 that 
medicates; the act of penance is a prescribed diet or regimen; penitential 
ministry is limited to ordained priests, who act as healers or therapists. 
 
Medical Model in OP 
 
Of OP’s four models of sin and reconciliation, the medical model is 
the one that is employed the least.  There are nine medical statements 
about sin, seven statements about the sacrament of penance, four 
statements about the act of penance, two statements about penitential 
ministry, and one statement about contrition.  Sin is called a “sickness”  
(OP 1.2, 6.4), a “wound” (OP 4.2, 7.1), “harm” (twice in OP 5.2), an 
“injury” (OP 6.4), a “weakness” (OP 7.1), and a “disorder”  (OP 10.1).  
Accordingly, the sacrament that treats sin provides “healing” (OP 1.2, 
7.1, 7.4), “strength” (OP 7.1), and “remedy” (OP 7.2, 7.3, 10.1).  The act 
of penance in itself is seen as a “remedy” (twice in OP 6.4), as something 
that repairs the injury of sin (OP 6.4), and as an “antidote” (OP 18.3).  
The official minister of penance, like a physician, “should understand the 
disorders of souls and apply the appropriate remedies to them” (OP 10.1), 
and should “provide   . . . an antidote to weakness” (OP 18.3).  Finally, 
contrition is seen as the intention to repair the harm which one may 
have caused (OP 35.2). 
   55
Three things are noteworthy about these medical statements.  
First, they help us to recognize that sins can be shared or collective, as 
are epidemics.  OP 7.1 makes this point most clearly:  “. . . the wound of 
sin is varied and multiple in the life of individuals and of the community 
. . . .”  This passage also contains a second noteworthy matter:  that 
there are varying types of sinfulness as well as various methods of 
healing sacramentally.  Third, sin and the sacramental treatment of sin 
are, from the viewpoint of the penitent, both passive and active 
experiences.  This is to recall that sin is inherited and acquired as much 
as it is caused by the persons who suffer from it.  And it is to view the 
sacrament of penance as partly a passively received medicine and partly 
a prescribed regimen which the penitent must actively fulfill.69 
 
Medical Model in RP 
 
RP, like OP, employs the medical model of sin and reconciliation 
least of all.  All of these employments can be grouped under one of two 
possible headings:  they either refer to sin or to the Church’s ministry to 
sinners. 
There are nine medically-related terms used whenever RP refers to 
sin.  Of these nine, the first to appear is the term “divisions,” which are 
said to be multiple and “deep and painful” (RP 1.5).  These divisions are 
cultural, political, and economic (RP2.2)   as well as ecclesial (RP 2.3), 
and they “can at times seem incurable” (RP 2.3).  Furthermore, they are 
rooted in a “wound” (RP 2.4), which is the second medical term for sin.  
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Appropriate to the medical model, there is no sharp distinction made 
between original sin and actual sins—both types of sin constitute this 
wound (RP 2.4).  This wound is twofold, something “which the sinner 
opens in himself and in his relationship with his neighbour” (RP 15.5), 
and it is also something inflicted upon the whole Church (RP 31.14).  Sin 
is a “break” (RP 4.10), an “infected source” (RP 4.11) remaining after 
absolution (RP 31.12), an “inner disorder” (RP 10.2, 15.4), a “sick 
condition” (RP 31.10), and a “rupture” within each person (RP 13.5) and 
with God (RP 14.3) which “leads tragically to divisions between brothers” 
(RP 15.1).  Finally, sin is “suicidal” (RP 15.4) and “deadly” (RP 17.4, 
17.14, 18.1, 34.2). 
As for the Church’s ministry to sinners, RP employs twelve medical 
terms.  This ministry consists of “interventions” (RP 13.4) which are 
equipped with the Church’s “life-giving” (RP 11.4) and “remedial”          
(RP 32.7) sacraments.  Continuing the work of Christ the “Physician”    
(RP 29.5), the Church seeks the revival of a “healthy” sense of sin among 
all peoples (RP 18.12), and it offers “the medicine of Confession”            
(RP 31.4), which “corresponds to that legitimate and natural need” for 
“psychological self-liberation” (RP 31.10), and acts of penance that fight 
the aforementioned infectious source of sin (RP 31.12).  The Church 
wants to “cure” (RP 31.5) and “treat” (RP 31.10) those who are sick with 
sin, and “to mend the divisions, to heal the wounds and to re-establish, 
at all levels, an essential unity” (RP 3.1). 
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As in OP, RP’s medical language highlights the fact that sin is 
contagious and pervasive.  This language also reminds us that great 
healing is possible, but that, at the same time, sin is always threatening 
to emerge in old and new forms, so that healing must be coupled with 
preventative measures.  This is to say that the medical model agrees with 
the personalistic model (and the liturgical-narrational model) that sin is 
only progressively overcome.  One interesting difference between OP and 
RP is that RP calls the confession of sins “medicine” while OP does not. 
Having described the medical model of sin and reconciliation, and 
having demonstrated its employment in RP, as well as in OP, I now 
proceed to do the same vis à vis the fourth and final model:  the 
liturgical-narrational model. 
 
Liturgical-Narrational Model 
 
The liturgical-narrational model of sin and reconciliation—like the 
medical model—integrates biblical, patristic, and modern ideals, and it 
shares some tenets with the personalistic and medical models.70   It sees 
the world as the stage upon which the economy or history of salvation 
unfolds.  Its moral methodology is a form of character ethics—i.e. an 
ethics of being, which de-emphasizes rules consciousness since it sees 
the Christian moral life “as pertaining to a way of life guided by the 
paradigmatic story of Jesus Christ.”71 This model views human persons 
and communities as participating—implicitly and/or explicitly—in 
ongoing liturgies and narratives.72  It holds that sin is a mysterious force 
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and situation that enslaves and confuses humanity.73  As for actual or 
personal sins, these are whatever runs counter to the virtues, formal 
norms, and images of goodness that are communicated in the Judaeo-
Christian stories of salvation.  It also sees actual sins as idolatries, 
blasphemies, and lies. 
Again, joined with this hamartology is a correlative response to sin 
that is liturgical and narrational.  Reconciliation is a soteriological plan 
initiated by the three divine persons which climaxes in the proclamation 
and sacrifice of Jesus.  Jesus’ liberating mission is at once message, 
work, and narrative which in turn is continued by a Church of prophets, 
priests, and narrative contributors.  The liturgical-narrational model, 
however, also remembers that Jesus’ earthly life—i.e. the “narrative” that 
he “wrote” via his deeds—was sinless, and that the Church’s narrative is 
both holy and sinful.74   Since this model sees the Church as a priestly 
People, it is open to ministerial pluralism and diversity.  Furthermore, 
this model respects the role of ritual in conversion, centering these 
rituals on praise of God and on proclamation—or narration—of salvific 
stories, and it expects conversion to be both individual and communal.  
The four traditional parts of penance, as well as penitential ministry, are 
understood as follows:  contrition is a desire to continue salvation 
history; confession is proclamation;75 absolution is a deprecative 
statement which petitions and blesses;76 the act of penance is anything 
that fosters a renewed commitment to and participation in the Church’s 
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saving work; penitential ministry includes the proclamation and listening 
of any community member. 
 
Liturgical-Narrational Model in OP 
 
Part One of OP’s Introduction contains four tenets which are 
characteristic of the liturgical-narrational model.  Two of these are that 
reconciliation is a work initiated by the three divine persons, and that 
this work is both realized and continuing.  We are told that the Father 
has reconciled the world to himself via the Son (OP 1.1), that the Son 
reconciled sinners with the Father (OP 1.2), and that the Son sent the 
Holy Spirit so that the Church could and can forgive and preach (OP 1.2).  
Furthermore, we are told that forgiveness has been realized (OP 1.2, 2.2), 
but also that we must be continually repentant (OP 1.1, 1.2, 1.3). 
The third and fourth tenets are that the Church continues this 
work of reconciliation, and that it does this in its sacraments and 
especially via proclamation.  Again, the Church’s reception of the Holy 
Spirit enables it to continue this work (OP 1.2), something which it has 
never failed to perform (OP 1.3).  Reconciliation is not only a sacrament 
in itself (OP 2.3), but it also is intrinsic to the sacraments of baptism     
(OP 2.1) and eucharist (OP 2.2).  Especially noteworthy is how often Part 
One refers to the auditory or proclamatory dimension of this work.  
Before the Son’s earthly ministry, the prophets “sounded” an “invitation 
to repentance” and John the Baptist “preached a baptism of repentance”   
(OP 1.1).  The Son of God “calls” us out of darkness (OP 1.1), he “began 
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his work on earth by preaching” (OP 1.1), and he sent his apostles “to 
preach repentance and the forgiveness of sins” (OP 1.2).  Led by the 
preaching of Peter (OP 1.3), the Church “calls” us to conversion (OP 1.3) 
and “proclaims its faith in ‘the one baptism for the forgiveness of sins’”     
(OP 2.1). 
One way that the Church continues the work of reconciliation is by 
its pursuit of its own collective conversion.  Part Two introduces this 
tenet of the liturgical-narrational model in several sentences, among 
which is what is perhaps OP’s most original and outstanding statement: 
Thus the people of God becomes in the world a sign of conversion 
to God. (OP 4.1)                                                                                
Not only is the Church like its holy and reconciling Head, not only is it “a 
sign . . . of communion with God” (LG 1), but it also is radically different 
and apart from Him.  OP’s liturgical-narrational statements do not 
pretend that the Church is composed of either innocent or guilty 
members, with the innocent welcoming back the guilty when they are 
penitent.  Nor do these statements support those who claim that “only 
when the Church reflects Jesus is the Church really Church.”77  Instead, 
these statements recognize that the Church as a whole, as well as each 
individual within the Church, “is at the same time holy and always in 
need of purification” (OP 3.2).  The Church cannot be expected to signify 
or reflect Jesus in all ways since part of the Church’s life involves 
repenting, converting, and receiving (as well as giving) forgiveness, 
experiences which are alien to the sinless One. 
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In addition to saying that the Church itself is a sign, the liturgical-
narrational voice within Part Two also discusses the many other signs 
and expressions of conversion and reconciliation.  These include the 
enduring of difficulties (OP 4.1), the proclamation of the word of God    
(OP 4.1), charity, example, and prayer (OP 4.2), absolution (OP 6.5), and 
the eucharist (OP 6.6).  Of course, the confession of sins is one of these 
signs since such confession expresses individual (OP 6.1) and communal 
(OP 4.1) conversion.  Part Two’s discussion of confession also reminds us 
of the liturgical-narrational emphasis upon the auditory dimension of the 
work of reconciliation.  This emphasis continues in OP 7.3—penitents 
ought to “follow the voice of the Spirit more attentively”—and in OP 7.5, 
which begins:  “The celebration of this sacrament is thus always an act 
in which the Church proclaims its faith . . . .” 
Part Three contains another of OP’s outstanding liturgical-
narrational assertions:  the confession of sins is a ministry in the service 
of conversion and reconciliation.  This claim is made or implied four 
times in OP 11.  First, the acts of the confessing penitent—which, 
obviously, include his confession of sins—are discussed within a part of 
OP that is entitled, “Offices and Ministries in the Reconciliation of 
Penitents.”  Second, these acts are said to be “of the greatest importance” 
(OP 11.1).  Third, we are told that, when one confesses one’s sins, one 
“shares by his actions in the sacrament itself” (OP 11.2).  Finally,           
OP 11.3 says that the confessing penitent “proclaims the mercy of God in 
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his life” and “celebrates with the priest the liturgy by which the Church 
continually renews itself.”  Confession is thus one of the different ways in 
which all of the priestly people do the work of reconciliation (q.v. OP 8). 
Parts Four and Five, again, discuss OP’s three alternative rites of 
sacramental reconciliation, and penitential celebrations, respectively.  
These are presented not as private visits to a confessor but as true 
liturgies:  they are centered upon prayer and the word of God, and they 
are to be a work of the people.  What stands out the most in the 
discussion of these liturgies is the emphasis placed upon the word of 
God as being the basis, the context, and the final criterion of Christian 
morality.78   Parts Four and Five contain not less than 19 statements 
about the relationship of scripture to the work of conversion and 
reconciliation.79   Noteworthy among these is OP 24.1, which states that 
a hearing of God’s word is a part of the sacrament.  This hearing helps 
individuals and communities in at least five ways:  first, it calls them to 
conversion (OP 13.2, 17, 22.3, 24.1, 24.3, 36.1); second, it illuminates 
their examinations of conscience (OP 15, 17, 22.3, 25, 26.1, 26.2, 36.2); 
third, it forms consciences (OP 20.2, 24.1, 25, 36.2, 37.2); fourth, it 
increases awareness of, and confidence in, God’s merciful love (OP 17, 
20.2, 22.3, 24.3, 25, 36.1); fifth, it guides prayer and thanksgiving       
(OP 19.1, 20.1).  The liturgical-narrational model’s centering upon God’s 
word is thus concerned not with law-observance and act-analysis, but 
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with listening to the narrative of salvation and attempting to harmonize 
one’s whole life with that narrative.  This is summarized in OP 22.3: 
Communal celebration shows more clearly the ecclesial nature of 
penance.  The faithful listen together to the word of God, which 
proclaims his mercy and invites them to conversion; at the same 
time they examine the conformity of their lives with that word of 
God and help each other through common prayer.  After each 
person has confessed his sins and received absolution, all praise 
God together for his wonderful deeds on behalf of the people he 
has gained for himself through the blood of his Son. 
 
Of course, this emphasis upon the hearing of God’s word reminds 
us of the aforementioned auditory dimension of the work of conversion 
and reconciliation.  Parts Four and Five make other references to this 
dimension.  There is to be individual (OP 18.1) and communal (OP 27) 
confession, individual (OP 19.1) and communal (OP 27, 36.3) prayer, and 
individual (OP 20.1) and communal (OP 29, 35.5) praise and 
thanksgiving.  Furthermore, the celebrant is to pronounce the formula of 
absolution (OP 19.2) and proclaim Christ’s victory over sin (OP 35.4).  It 
is very interesting to notice that, in addition to the reading of the word of 
God, OP allows “readings from the Fathers or other writers . . . which will 
help the community and each person to . . . conversion of life” (OP 36.2). 
This latter allowance by OP relates not only to the auditory 
dimension of conversion and reconciliation but also to the liturgical-
narrational sensitivity to the fact that this is the work of all of Christ’s 
priestly people.  The best example of this sensitivity that can be found in 
Part Four is OP 26.  Here we are told that a communal examination of 
conscience may take the place of a cleric’s homily, and also that a lay 
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minister may lead this examination.  Furthermore, in Part Five, OP 36.3 
states that a lay minister may preside at penitential celebrations—
liturgies which “are very useful in places where no priest is available”     
(OP 37.3) and which “are very helpful in promoting conversion of life and 
purification of heart” (OP 37.1). 
Inclusion of the laity in the work of conversion and reconciliation 
also appears in the brief Part Six.  OP 40.2 says that the laity may assist 
parish priests in choosing texts and adapting celebrations to the needs of 
the community or group.  Such adaptation is the primary concern of Part 
Six, a concern that is rooted in the desire for “rich and fruitful” 
celebrations.  OP 40.1 also asserts that the community can be reconciled 
as a whole. 
To conclude my demonstration of the employment of the liturgical-
narrational model within OP, I return to the fifteen characteristics of 
conversion which Witherup claims recur throughout the inspired books 
of the Bible.  Previously, I pointed out that OP’s personalistic statements 
refer to seven of these characteristics.80   Four of these seven, as we have 
already seen, are shared by the liturgical-narrational model:  first, that 
conversion begins due to God’s initiative; second, that conversion 
depends upon the hearing of God’s word; third, that conversion is a 
process; fourth, that there is a communal dimension to conversion. 
The eight remaining characteristics are also referred to by the 
liturgical-narrational model, thus showing that this model—like the 
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personalistic model—is deeply rooted in scripture.  First, the mysterious 
dimension of conversion is referred to in OP 6.4.  Second, that 
conversion is part of a process of saving a people can be seen in OP 13.2.  
Third, OP 7.5 refers to the view of conversion as being a foretaste of the 
coming kingdom of God.  Fourth and fifth, OP 2 discusses the 
christological and symbolic orientations of conversion.  Sixth, OP 8 
highlights the fact that exhortations to conversion are primarily directed 
toward present members of the Church.  Seventh, that conversion leads 
to an experience of newness is pointed out in OP 20.2.  Finally, that 
conversion leads to evangelization can be seen in OP 1.3. 
My demonstration of the employment of the liturgical-narrational 
model of sin and reconciliation in OP is now complete.  I will now so 
demonstrate vis à vis RP. 
 
Liturgical-Narrational Model in RP 
 
RP contains nine tenets of the liturgical-narrational model.  One of 
these tenets is that reconciliation is a work that is initiated by the divine 
persons.  We are told that reconciliation is primarily a gift (RP 4.9, 5.4, 
7.1), but that it also is a history (RP 4.9), a task (RP 7.1), a work (RP 7.4), 
and a plan (RP 10.2) that is centered on the mystery of Christ (RP 7.2, 
10.4), who “entered into the history of the world, summing it up and 
recapitulating it in himself” (RP 10.5).  This mystery is present within 
Christians (RP 20.4), and it opposes, and is opposed by, the mystery of 
sin within the economy of salvation (RP 19.1; also see 22.2).  The latter 
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point brings to mind a second liturgical-narrational tenet in RP:  sin is a 
mysterious and antagonistic force that is seen as present and operative 
within salvation history.  RP’s best articulation of this tenet is to be 
found within RP 14.1: 
Clearly, sin is a product of man’s freedom.  But deep within its 
human reality there are factors at work which place it beyond 
the merely human, in the border-area where man’s conscience, 
will and sensitivity are in contact with the dark forces which, 
according to Saint Paul, are active in the world almost to the 
point of ruling it. 
 
Four other liturgical-narrational tenets that often overlap with 
each other in RP (e.g. RP 4.11 and 10.6) are:  first, that the Church 
continues the work of reconciliation; second, that this work is done 
through the sacraments and other signs; third, that this work includes 
an auditory or proclamatory dimension; fourth, that this work depends 
upon and is similar to narratives.  Since the latter two tenets overlap the 
most I will here focus my attention on illustrating them.  RP 6.3 tells us 
that the parable of the Prodigal Son (Lk 15.11-32) is “the story of the 
human family:  it describes our situation and shows the path to be 
followed.”  RP 14 and 15 show how the Eden (Gn 2-4) and Babel (Gn 11) 
narratives illuminate the mystery of sin, while RP 23.2 states that the 
image of King David in his penitence (2 Sm 12) motivates and influences 
the Church’s work of reconciliation.  RP 31.10 points out the liturgical 
and dramatic nature of the confession of sins:  “It is the act of the 
Prodigal Son who returns to his Father and is welcomed by him with the 
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kiss of peace.”  Finally, RP 35.3 emphasizes the evangelical basis of the 
Christian ethic. 
That the work of conversion and reconciliation is dependent upon 
and similar to narratives is—as we saw in Parts Four and Five of OP—the 
tenet that overlaps the most with the auditory/proclamatory tenet.  We 
are told that reconciliation is “good news” and a “message” which the 
Church “proclaims” (RP 4.11, 8.3, 10.6, 11.1), and that the Church 
reconciles by proclaiming (RP 8.6, 12.3).  Indeed, this proclamation is 
said to be essential to the Church’s pastoral activity (RP 11.3, 23.5).  We 
are also told that the reading and hearing of the word of God in 
community catalyzes conversion (RP 4.4, 22.1), highlights the ecclesial 
dimension of conversion and reconciliation (RP 32.4), and is anamnetic 
(RP 32.8).  Also auditory are all of the many possible forms of dialogue, 
which are seen as means of promoting penance and reconciliation       
(RP 25). 
There are three other liturgical-narrational tenets in RP:  first, the 
necessity of giving careful attention to celebrations of sacramental 
reconciliation; second, the inclusion of all of the people of God in the 
work of conversion and reconciliation; third, the inclusion of the 
Church’s own collective conversion in this work.  Regarding the first of 
these, RP 18.10 claims that a pervasive deadening of the sense of sin is 
due, in part, to celebrations which fail to balance the personal and 
communal dimensions of sin and conversion, and RP 28.3 states that 
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poor celebrations are one reason why the sacrament is in crisis.  
Regarding the second of these latter three tenets, two passages point out 
that the whole community supports each penitent (RP 17.4, 31.14), and 
two passages state that each and every member of the Church can 
contribute in one of many ways to the work of conversion and 
reconciliation (RP 8.3, 23.6).  The third of these tenets is expressed six 
times (RP 9.2, 9.3, 9.4, 12.5, 25.7, 25.11), all of which emphasize the 
point that the Church will reconcile only as well as it itself is converting 
and reconciling.  RP 9.2, which develops a statement of Pope Paul VI81 
and which echoes OP 3-4, is the most articulate of these six passages: 
. . . the Church, if she is to be reconciling, must begin by being a 
reconciled Church.  Beneath this simple and indicative expression 
lies the conviction that the Church, in order ever more effectively 
to proclaim and propose reconciliation to the world, must become 
ever more genuinely a community of disciples of Christ . . . united 
in the commitment to be continually converted to the Lord and to 
live as new people in the spirit and practice of reconciliation. 
 
In this second chapter I have described four post-Conciliar models 
of sin and sacramental reconciliation.  I have also demonstrated how OP 
and RP employ each of these four models.  In the following chapter, I will 
demonstrate how OP and RP establish one of these models—i.e. the 
juridical model—as the dominant model or paradigm. 
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CHAPTER 2 NOTES 
 
 1. Throughout this dissertation I will employ parenthetical 
references to OP’s and RP’s cited paragraphs.  Furthermore, I will employ 
a decimal-based identification system when referring to specific 
paragraph subdivisions of the officially numbered paragraphs of OP and 
RP.  Such a system seems to be necessary given the frequency of 
multiple subdivisions within these documents.  For example, RP 25 
contains 15 paragraph subdivisions which have not been officially 
numbered.  If I quoted a phrase from the 12th paragraph subdivision of 
RP 25, then I would refer to RP 25.12.  I chose numbers over letters    
(e.g. RP 25 L) since the former save the reader time.  After having devised 
this system I discovered that it is the same system employed vis à vis RP 
et al. in J. Michael Miller, ed., The Post-Synodal Apostolic Exhortations 
of John Paul II (Huntington, IN: Our Sunday Visitor, 1998).  See 
especially Miller, 8, 762. 
 
 2. See also Pope John Paul II’s later and shorter Apostolic Letter 
Misericordia Dei [By the Mercy of God] (Boston: Pauline Books and Media, 
2002), which merely reaffirms RP. 
 
 3. Although RP, being an Apostolic Exhortation, technically 
possesses less authority than does an Apostolic Constitution or an 
Encyclical, my reasons for calling it “crucial” are supported by P. 
Gervais, who has argued that RP is the summit of Conciliar and post-
Conciliar development.  See his article, “L’Exhortation apostolique 
‘Reconciliatio et Paenitentia,’” Nouvelle Revue Théologique 108 (1986): 
192-217. 
 
 4. See McCormick, 54-75, where his presentation on a “crime” 
model is one inspiration behind my presentation on a “juridical” model.  
Also see Dallen, 139-67. 
 
 5. Gula, 226.  Chapters 15 and 16 in Gula explain well both 
physicalist and personalist approaches to natural law.  Also see p. 8: 
. . . the interest of the ethics of doing has affinity with the interests 
of canon law and jurisprudence in general, and, in fact, moral 
theology was governed for a long time by a juridical perspective. 
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6. Declarative absolutions are those which are, naturally, 
“declared” by a confessor (i.e. “I absolve you”).  Although they are so 
declared in the name of God and in the name of the Church, they imply 
that the confessor is a, or the, source of the absolution—much like a 
judge is a source of a pardon.  The juridical tenor of declarative 
absolutions is contrasted by the liturgical/communal tenor of the older 
deprecative absolutions, which will be discussed below.  For now, see 
Dallen, 142, 211, and Lawler, 120, 122. 
 
 7. Mahoney, 247-8.  Also see Tatha Wiley, Original Sin: Origins, 
Developments, Contemporary Meanings (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist, 2002), 
133. 
 
 8. Dallen, 227-8, 247 n. 61. 
 
 9. Mahoney, 35, writes that the legal image of the sacrament of 
penance “reached its most thoroughgoing literal application in the 
treatment of Trent, and particularly in the conciliar definition that the 
act of the confessor is a judicial one . . . .” 
 
10. OP’s footnote to this quoted sentence refers to the Council of 
Trent, ibid., canon 1; q.v. Neuner and Dupuis, no. 1641.  With regard to 
the juridical emphasis upon the restoration of order, see Osborne, 
Reconciliation: 
The revised sacrament of penance, in some of its theological descrip- 
tion and in some of its pastoral practice, has given rise to the view 
that what one has lost through sin is now regained. . . . Rather, 
sinners are inundated with a superabundance of God’s forgiving and 
gracing love, far beyond anything which sinners lost and which 
sinners might strive to regain. (253) 
 
11. McCormick also sees this artificial division as being a tenet of 
the crime/juridical model: 
The crime model assumes that the sinner is different, [66] even 
separate, from the rest of humanity.  It tends to deny the biblical 
data that all are sinners.  Furthermore, the ambiguity of the 
experience of human evil is ignored or denied and a select group 
of persons is identified as the exclusive cause of sin, judged 
guilty and (quite logically) sentenced to punishment. (65-6) 
 
12. See, for example:  Raymond E. Brown, The Anchor Bible,     
vol. 29 A, The Gospel According To John (XIII-XXI) (New York: 
Doubleday, 1970), 1033-45; John L. McKenzie, “The Gospel According To 
Matthew,” chap. in The Jerome Biblical Commentary, vol. 2, The New 
Testament And Topical Articles, eds. Joseph A. Fitzmyer and Raymond E. 
Brown (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1968), 95.   
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13. See, for example, Council of Trent, ibid., Chapter 6 and canons 
9-10; q.v. Neuner and Dupuis, nos. 1627-8, 1649-50. 
 
14. Dallen, 3.  “Ancient penance” is Dallen’s way of referring to 
forms of penance which developed in the first six centuries of Church 
history. 
 
15. See ibid., 141-2; above, 18, 70 n. 6.  Also see Lawler, who 
writes: 
The deprecative formula continued with unquestioned validity in the 
East, but was replaced in the West in the thirteenth century by the 
declarative, judicial formula “I absolve you from your sins . . .” said 
by the priest.  As long as the formula was deprecative, the ritual 
connection between the forgiving and reconciling action of the 
Church in its minister and that of God in Christ was clear.  But 
when that formula was replaced with the declarative formula, the 
ritual connection was obscured, not to say lost entirely, and the 
priest emerged [121] in the character of a presiding judge, in both 
ecclesiastical practice and theological theory.  The new rite of 
reconciliation is schizophrenic here also. (120-1) 
 
16. The term “mortal sin” is not used here—nor anywhere—in OP, 
but it is indubitable that in OP “grave” and “mortal” are synonymous.     
RP 17.11 explicitly identifies “grave” sin with “mortal” sin. 
 
17. Neuner and Dupuis, no. 1647.  OP’s wording is:  “each and 
every grave sin.” 
 
18. Neuner and Dupuis, no. 1620. 
 
19. Ibid. 
 
20. Rather, Paul wants to forget his former claims to perfect 
observance of, and uprightness from, the Law.  See Phil 3.6-9 and 
Joseph A. Fitzmyer, “Pauline Theology,” chap. in The Jerome Biblical 
Commentary, vol. 2, 817:  “Paul recognizes that as a Christian he no 
longer has an uprightness of his own, based on the Law, but one 
acquired through faith in Christ, an ‘uprightness from God’ (Phil. 3.8-9).” 
 
21. Mahoney, 35-6. 
 
22. Idealistic ecclesiology and the sinfulness of the Church—and 
the Second Vatican Council’s teaching on these—will be further 
discussed in later chapters.  For now, note the observations of Francis A. 
Sullivan, The Church We Believe In (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist, 1988): 
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The realism with which the [Second Vatican] council admits that 
the church itself, and not just some of its members, is in need 
of purification and reform is a consequence of the new emphasis 
which the council put on the nature of the church as the “pilgrim 
people of God.”  Focusing too one-sidedly on the idea of the church 
as mystical body of Christ, one could be led to identify the church 
so closely with Christ as to attribute to her the sinlessness that is 
unique to her head [brackets mine]. (81) 
 
23. See Osborne, Reconciliation, 223, where it is argued that the 
form to be used when death is imminent (OP 64-5) constitutes a fourth 
distinct form. 
 
24. Dallen, 230. 
 
25. Ibid., 65-73. 
 
26. Individualism is also characteristic of personalistic thinking, 
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Norbert J. Rigali, “Sin in a Relational World,” Chicago Studies 23 
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27. See pp. 18, 21, 70 n.6, 71 n. 15, above. 
 
28. See Chapter Five, below.  Also see Dallen: 
The penitential celebration . . . is a crucial—though largely ignored— 
part of the reform, because only with the revitalization of the virtue 
of penance and the realization that the sacramental ritual recapitu- 
lates life experience can the new rites have hope of success. . . . 
The penitential celebration of the Word calling us to conversion not 
only offers the Church’s support but also proclaims the renewal and 
freedom from sin that is ours in Christ, that is, in the Church.  The 
efficacy of God’s Word means that this power is realized and drawn 
on in the very proclamation and that the penitential celebration is 
therefore not completely extrinsic to the sacrament [emphases 
mine]. (235) 
 
29. Osborne, Reconciliation, 198-220.  See also Francis 
Sottocornola, A Look At The New Rite Of Penance, Trans. Thomas A. 
Krosnicki (Washington, DC: USCC, 1975), 4-5. 
 
30. See Fitzmyer, “Pauline Theology,” 814-15, where he writes: 
The idea of reconciliation underlies many of Paul’s statements, but 
it is developed above all in 2 Cor 5.18-20; Rom 5.10-11; Col 1.20-21; 
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Eph 2.16. 
 
         31. See pp. 42-3, below.  Also see Dallen, 251ff., who writes: 
By basing itself on a personal and relational view of sin, this 
[reconciliation] approach to redemption and the sacrament of 
penance situates the believer within the history of salvation and 
a historic community [brackets mine]. (252) 
 
32. Gerald O’Collins, Interpreting Jesus, Introducing Catholic 
Theology Series, ed. Michael Richards, no. 2 (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 
1983; reprint, Ramsey, NJ: Paulist, 1985), 144-5 (page references are to 
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Corinthians,” chap. in The Jerome Biblical Commentary, vol. 2, 281. 
 
33. My application of the image of “asymptotic” realization to 
reconciliation is based upon Karl Rahner’s application of the same to 
morality/obedience.  See his “On the Encyclical ‘Humanae Vitae,’” chap. 
in Theological Investigations, vol. 11, Confrontations 1 (London: Darton, 
Longman & Todd, 1974), 263-87. 
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If by “God’s seed” we understand, as some commentators suggest, 
Jesus the Son of God, then we can say that in order not to sin 
. . . the Christian has within himself . . . the mystery of Christ . . . . 
(RP 20.4) 
In RP, the Pope seems to be ignoring the following rule as 
articulated in Raymond F. Collins, Introduction To The New Testament 
(Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1983): 
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. . . the Magisterium must listen to exegetes insofar as the 
Magisterium is appointed to proclaim authentically the word 
of God and exegesis articulates the meaning of that word as 
embodied in the New Testament Scriptures. (301) 
 
38. Raymond E. Brown, The Community Of The Beloved Disciple 
(New York: Paulist, 1979); Raymond E. Brown, The Anchor Bible, vol. 30, 
The Epistles of John (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1982). 
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46. The latter claim and implication will be criticized below in 
Chapter Three. 
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individual confession and individual absolution of sins.  It 
can thus be regarded as equal to the first form as regard the 
normality of the rite. 
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permitted, but only as a temporary measure until one of the 
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50. See Chapter Five, below. 
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intangible solidarity of evil, in a communion of sin, he does not 
. . . relate this mysterious union in evil . . . to sins of nations or 
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68. See p. 70 n. 6, above. 
 
69. McCormick, 138-43. 
 
 
 
   77
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THE DOMINANCE OF THE JURIDICAL MODEL 
 
 
One of the most authoritative sources on the subject of the use of 
models in theology is the work of Avery Dulles.  In light of the concerns of 
this dissertation, his most noteworthy comments are those which pertain 
to dominant models or paradigms.  Following Thomas Kuhn’s thought,1 
Dulles writes: 
A model rises to the status of a paradigm when it has proved 
successful in solving a great variety of problems and is 
expected to be an appropriate tool for unraveling anomolies 
as yet unsolved.2 
He then offers some caveats.  One of these is that no one paradigm is 
sufficient since each one favors particular “images . . . rhetoric . . . 
values, certitudes, commitments, and priorities.”3  Another caveat, 
related to the first one, is that a paradigm can be cherished to the point 
where new paradigms are resisted.4  Dulles argues that all valid models 
and paradigms are mutually complementary and so a pluralism of 
models must be accepted.5  His conclusion is that, in the absence of 
some comprehensive supermodel, we need to harmonize or blend (the) 
different models and their respective values.  He even grants that 
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theologians may legitimately begin with only one model and proceed to 
integrate within this model the values of (the) others.6 
What I find disturbing in his work, however, is that Dulles seems 
to ignore the fact that he himself ultimately sets up one model as 
primary; that is, despite all of his urging for pluralism and blending, he 
still interprets other models by way of, or incorporates other models into, 
a model that he establishes as dominant.7   My criticism is not of his 
failure to avoid such a preference, but is rather of his denial of this 
preference.  Indeed, one of my claims is that anyone who employs a 
models approach probably cannot avoid preferring and positing one 
model as primary or dominant over the rest. 
OP and RP, like Dulles, exemplify this claim.  This is to say that OP 
and RP, despite employing three other models of sin and reconciliation, 
ultimately reestablish the juridical model as the dominant model or 
paradigm.  This reestablishment is effected in two primary ways:  first, 
OP and RP reduce the sacrament of reconciliation to individual 
confession and a declarative absolution;8 second, OP and RP prefer an 
act-centered and classificatory hamartology.  Furthermore, these two 
primary ways overlap, and they imply or are interdependent with other 
tenets of the juridical model, with these latter tenets serving as 
secondary ways to the establishment of the juridical model’s dominance 
in OP and RP.  I will attempt to demonstrate all of this in this third 
chapter. 
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Reduction of the Sacrament of Reconciliation 
To Individual Confession and Declarative Absolution 
 
Both OP and RP explicitly and resolutely state that the essence of 
the sacrament of reconciliation is an individual absolution given to an 
individual penitent who has manifested his or her contrition via a private 
confession of sins.  Perhaps the most explicit and resolute of these 
statements are the following: 
Individual, integral confession and absolution remain the only 
ordinary way for the faithful to reconcile themselves with God 
and the Church . . . . (OP 31.1) 
 
The first form . . . is the only normal and ordinary way of celebra- 
ting the Sacrament, and it cannot and must not be allowed to 
fall into disuse or to be neglected.  The second form . . . is the 
same as the first form in the culminating sacramental act, namely, 
individual confession and individual absolution of sins.  It can 
thus be regarded as equal to the first form as regards the normality 
of the rite. (RP 32.2) 
 
Even if these were the only such statements in OP and RP, they are so 
forceful that they would, by themselves, dominate whatever the other 
three models say about the sacrament in these two documents.  
Nevertheless, their force is magnified by the presence of additional 
statements like them. 
Many of these similar statements reduce the sacrament by 
reducing the ministry correlative with the sacrament.  OP 9.3 tells us 
that there is only one minister of the sacrament:  “. . . a priest who has 
the faculty to absolve in accordance with canon law.”  This is so since 
Christ supposedly instituted the sacrament “when he gave to his apostles 
and their successors power to forgive sins” (OP 2.3; also see RP 8.3, 29.3, 
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30.2).  All that really matters, therefore, besides the penitent’s confes- 
sion, is this power as exercised by an ordained priest, who is also called 
a “judge” (OP 6.3, 10.1; RP 31.3, 31.5, 31.10) and a “confessor” (OP 10.2, 
10.3, 10.4, 31.4; RP 29.4, 29.6, 29.7, 31.11, 31.19, 32.4).  In fact, OP 21 
goes as far as saying that the exercise of this power alone is sufficient. 
I affirm, of course, that Christ has this power to forgive, that he 
confers this power, and that this power is exercised in the sacrament of 
reconciliation.  What I challenge is the juridical model’s reduction of the 
sacrament to this power, its single understanding of this power, and its 
limiting of this power to the ordained.9  By reducing the sacrament to the 
confession and—especially—to the absolution, OP and RP canonize the 
narrow scholastic theologies of the sacrament, about which Kenan 
Osborne rightly says “none of them nor any one of them can be set up as 
the ‘normative’ theology on the sacrament of penance against which any 
other theology of this sacrament must be judged.”10 
OP and RP also yield excessively to the juridical Council of Trent11 
in this reduction of the sacrament and its ministry.  The key Tridentine 
passage as regards this reduction reads as follows: 
But the Lord instituted the sacrament of penance, principally when 
after His resurrection He breathed upon His disciples and said: 
“Receive the Holy Spirit.  If you forgive the sins of any, they are 
forgiven; if you retain the sins of any, they are retained” (Jn 20.22f). 
The universal consensus of the Fathers has always acknowledged 
that by so sublime an action and such clear words the power of 
forgiving and retaining sins was given to the apostles and their 
lawful successors for reconciling the faithful who have fallen after 
baptism . . . .  Therefore this holy Council approves and accepts the 
words of the Lord in their full and true meaning . . . .12 
   83
This passage, as well as its correlative canon,13 is cited in OP 2.3 and 
twice in RP 30.2, and it is an implicit foundation of most of the juridical 
statements in OP and RP.  This excessive yielding to the Council of Trent 
must be seen for what it is:  a reduction of the sacrament disguised as 
fidelity to what is supposedly normative doctrine.  Meanwhile, true 
fidelity to the Tridentine teaching is mindful of the following three points: 
first, none of the Council’s chapters and canons is necessarily de iure 
divino—that is, a statement of divine law;14 second and third, historical 
consciousness and modern biblical criticism of Jn 20.22-4 and Mt 18.18 
refute the claims that Jesus himself instituted a sacrament of 
reconciliation at a given historical time and that he conferred the power 
of forgiveness exclusively to members of the Church’s hierarchy.15 
The meaning of the sacrament is also reduced via the very formula 
of absolution that OP establishes (OP 19.2; OP 21) and RP reaffirms 
(RP 31.11).  One of the specific tasks assigned by the Second Vatican 
Council to all prospective drafters of what would become OP was stated 
in SC 72: 
The rite and formulae of penance are to be revised so that they 
more clearly express both the nature and effect of the sacrament. 
 
Since elsewhere the Council favored an understanding of the nature and 
effect of the sacrament which pre-dates that of the juridical model,16  the 
drafters of OP were free to offer a non-juridical absolution formula.  To be 
specific, these drafters could have retrieved one of the deprecative 
formulae which are contained in the Gelasian Sacramentary.17  These 
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formulae clearly expressed that the sacrament of penance is a process in 
community which only culminates in the community’s prayer for its 
penitents that they be reconciled with God and the community.18  
Nevertheless, the final draft of OP posits a declarative absolution formula 
which calls attention to itself and thus symbolizes an understanding of 
the sacrament as one wherein an instantaneous pardon from a solitary 
judge is to be sought.19 
OP and RP also reduce our understanding of the sacrament by how 
they view penitential celebrations and Rites “B” and “C.”  Although it is 
written in OP that penitential celebrations are “very helpful in promoting 
conversion of life and purification of heart,” the same paragraph states:  
“Care should be taken that the faithful do not confuse these celebrations 
with the celebration of the sacrament of penance” (OP 37.1).  We are then 
told that what prevents these celebrations from being truly sacramental 
is their lacking the all-important priestly absolution (OP 37.3).20   RP 
belittles these celebrations further by completely ignoring them. 
Rite C—the Rite for Reconciliation of Penitents with General 
Confession and Absolution—is fully sacramental, but OP and RP strongly 
discourage its celebration.  This rite is allowed only if there is immediate 
danger of death and/or if sufficient “confessors” are not available          
(OP 31.3).  Even if these extreme conditions arise and Rite C is 
celebrated, those who receive general absolution for grave sins are 
“strictly bound . . . to go to (individual) confession within a year” (OP 34).  
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In other words, general confession and absolution are seen as being a 
temporary emergency response to sin which will suffice until individual 
confession and absolution are possible.  RP’s warnings about the use of 
Rite C are just as strong as those of OP, for example: 
The Bishop therefore, who is the only one competent in his own 
diocese to assess whether the conditions actually exist which 
Canon Law lays down for the use of the third form, will give 
this judgment with a grave obligation on his own conscience . . . . 
(RP 33.3) 
 
RP 32.5 even momentarily ignores Rite C when it says that one of only 
two forms of celebration—that is, Rite A or Rite B—may be chosen.21 
The use of Rite B—the Rite for Reconciliation of Several Penitents 
with Individual Confession and Absolution—is not discouraged by OP nor 
by RP.  This is so since Rite B “is the same as the first form in the 
culminating sacramental act, namely, individual confession and 
individual absolution of sins” (RP 32.2).  Thus, Rite B is a communal 
liturgy of the Word which leads toward priests reconciling penitents 
individually (OP 22.4; RP 32.4).22 
In addition to being itself a dominating tenet of the juridical model, 
this reduction of the sacrament to individual confession and absolution 
implies other such tenets.  It implies that (1) there exists an orderly 
society which, (2) through empowered officers only, can (3) convict,       
(4) punish, and (5) instantly pardon its (6) isolated and (7) law-bound 
members.  These implications can also be expressed negatively:  the 
Church is not a community of holy sinners which progressively, through 
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various means, and as community, converts and reconciles.  These 
implied tenets, again, add strength to the dominating force of the explicit 
tenet. 
 
Act-Centered and Classificatory Hamartology 
 
The second primary way in which OP and RP reestablish the 
dominance of the juridical model is by their preference for an act-
centered and classificatory hamartology.  This kind of hamartology is 
juridical since, like the civil justice system, it is concerned with ensuring 
that laws are not transgressed and with proportionate reparation when 
they are transgressed.  Also like the civil justice system, this type of 
hamartology is not really concerned with such things as personal and 
communal character, relationships, and civil/moral progress.  
Furthermore, it very simply and sharply dichotomizes the community 
into innocent and guilty groups, and it assumes that each individual acts 
independently and with absolute freedom. 
This hamartological preference is obvious in OP and RP when it 
overlaps with those statements which reduce the sacrament of penance 
to individual confession and absolution.  Here are two examples: 
In order that the faithful may profit from sacramental absolution 
given to several persons at the same time, it is absolutely necessary 
that they be properly disposed.  Each one should be sorry for his 
sins and resolve to avoid committing them again.  He should intend 
to repair any scandal and harm he may have caused and likewise 
resolve to confess in due time each one of the grave sins which he 
cannot confess at present. (OP 33) 
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. . . every serious sin must always be stated, with its determining 
circumstances, in an individual confession. (RP 33.2) 
 
This preference is also obvious in OP’s definitions of contrition (OP 6.2) 
and satisfaction (OP 6.4), and in RP’s special chapter on sin (RP 14-18).  
We can see in these paragraphs that “sins” are morally evil individual 
acts which have been committed.  Indeed, there are 15 instances where 
RP’s chapter on sin limits sin to an act committed.23  This centering 
upon moral evils committed ignores other kinds of sin—that is, it ignores 
sins of omission and, perhaps more importantly, it ignores the existence 
of morally evil habits and attitudes.  Nevertheless, like the civil justice 
system, OP and RP do not require that these “invisible” evils be 
addressed, and they thus contribute to an atmosphere of legalism and 
minimalism. 
Not only do OP and RP limit their concern to sins of commission—
they further limit this concern to those sins which can supposedly be 
classified as “grave,” “mortal,” or “serious.”  Although OP never reaffirms 
the traditional term “mortal sin,” it does perpetuate classification by 
discussing “grave” sins—sins which OP contrasts against the 
traditionally subordinate “venial” sins (OP 7.1, 7.3).  RP employs the term 
“mortal” sin—which it identifies with “grave” and “serious” sin—as well 
as the term “venial” sin (RP 17, 27, 33).  In OP there are four instances 
where the confession of grave sin is commanded (OP 7.2, 33, 34, 35.2), 
whereas the confession of venial sin is said to be optional (OP 7.2).  RP 
commands the confession of serious sin six times (twice in RP 27.6, 31.2, 
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twice in RP 33.2, 33.3), while it also calls the confession of venial sin 
optional (RP 32.6, 32.7).  In fact, RP claims that the traditional concept of 
mortal sin—that is to say, the juridical model of mortal sin—is 
unchangeable (RP 17.17), and it is implied that the teaching on sin as 
contained in the juridical tradition is identifiable with the teaching on sin 
that is given in the word of God (RP 17.18). 
This classificatory hamartology, which is analogous to the 
distinction made in the civil justice system between misdemeanors and 
felonies,24 is interdependent with the view that conversion and 
participation in the sacrament of reconciliation are required only of those 
individuals who are presently “guilty” of mortal sin.25  The latter have 
disrupted the order of things by their crimes, they are antagonistic 
toward the innocent community, and so they each must be judged, 
convicted, and punished accordingly.  Furthermore, after they repair the 
damage they have caused, these reformed criminals must rejoin those 
who comprise the innocent and balanced society in the latter’s perfect 
observance of the society’s laws.  As long as the reformed ones never 
again commit “felonies,” they need never again reform nor “go to court.” 
In other words, OP and RP emphasize the performance of 
satisfaction and reparation by mortal sinners while they rarely call for 
the pursuit of gradual conversion by all.  The restoring and maintaining 
of an alleged personal innocence and universal order (which are allegedly 
lost and disrupted, respectively, via mortal sin) are valued more than are 
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personal and communal discipleship and maturity.  OP 6.4 declares that 
suitable satisfaction and reparation, once performed, brings conversion 
to completion and restores order.  RP 26.6 echoes this when it says that 
doing penance “means above all to re-establish the balance and harmony 
broken by sin . . . .”  Meanwhile, those who have committed venial sin 
are only encouraged to use—but are, ultimately, free to use or not use—
the sacrament of penance (OP 7.3).  This is so since “mortal sin is the sin 
which, if unforgiven, leads to eternal punishment; whereas venial sin is 
the sin that merits merely temporal punishment” (RP 17.10). 
This classificatory hamartology is also interdependent with the 
juridical reduction of penitential ministry to ordained priests who have 
the faculty to absolve.  That is to say, such priests not only pardon via 
absolution, but they also officially judge whether or not absolution is 
necessary—i.e. whether or not those confessing to them are, in fact, 
guilty of mortal sin.  Thus, only two persons are essential for the 
celebration of the sacrament of penance:  the one who committed 
mortally sinful acts and who “accuses” himself of such, and the one who 
officially verifies this accusation (OP 6.3-4). 
Furthermore, this classificatory hamartology is interdependent 
with a punitive understanding of the sacrament of reconciliation.  Since 
the penitent is to confess each and every grave sin committed (OP 33, 34, 
35; RP 33.2), the judging priest is to help in this complete confession    
(OP 18.1; RP 29.6, 31.10).  Then, fulfilling “his office of judge wisely”       
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(OP 10.1), the priest is to impose an act of penance which should 
“correspond to the seriousness and nature of the sins” (OP 18.3).  
Although OP 18.3 says that the act of penance may include “service of 
one’s neighbor,” it is important to note the line drawn between works of 
penance on the one hand and charity toward neighbor on the other hand 
in OP 25.  RP 31.3 explicitly calls the act of penance “punishment.”  
Finally, both OP and RP—despite some usage of the term 
“reconciliation”—more often continue to call the sacrament one of 
“penance” or “confession,”26 and they speak of “penitents” rather than 
“converts.”27 
Sin classification is also interdependent with the possession of an 
idealistic ecclesiology.  If I know that I have done nothing which can be 
classified as mortal sin, then I can pretend that I am a full-fledged 
member of a sinless Church and enjoy a (false) sense of security in it.28  
Excellent examples of this link between sin classification and 
ecclesiological idealism are statements about the relationship between 
penance and eucharist: 
In the sacrament of penance the Father receives the repentant son 
who comes back to him . . . .  This is finally expressed in a renewed 
and more fervent sharing of the Lord’s table, and there is great joy 
at the banquet of God’s Church over the son who has returned 
from afar. (OP 6.5) 
 
. . . no one who is conscious of being in mortal sin, however contrite 
he may believe himself to be, is to approach the holy eucharist 
without having first made a sacramental confession. (RP 27.6) 
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While the language of OP 6.5 is less direct than that of RP 27.6, both of 
these statements convey the message that “sin that matters” is not to be 
found within the Church’s innocent confines. 
These and similar statements also convey the message that those 
who are now contrite after having committed mortal sin are, for the most 
part, “on their own” in their return to communion with the Church.  This 
is to say that OP and RP prefer to deny that the “innocent” Church 
shares somehow in the sinfulness of mortally sinning persons and that 
the Church is co-responsible for their conversion.  In OP we are told that 
serious sinners return not with the help of an actively concerned 
community but “by the grace of a merciful God” (OP 5.1) and by being 
“moved by the Holy Spirit” (OP 6.1).  Indeed, OP 6, which discusses the 
parts of the sacrament of penance, leaves the penitent almost utterly 
alone in his or her return to communion:  the judging priest is the only 
other member of the community mentioned as one who is to give 
assistance to the penitent, assistance which is itself only momentary       
(OP 6.5).  In the paragraph devoted to the act of penance (OP 6.4), nary a 
word is said about how the community may participate in this act nor 
about the community doing some shared act of penance related to the 
penitent’s.  OP 31.1 even says that serious sinners are to “reconcile 
themselves.” 
As for RP, one of its major biblical references vis à vis conversion is 
Lk 15.11-32 (see RP 5-6).  The parable contained in these verses tells of a 
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prodigal son who returns to communion only via his own personal 
contrition.  This image is fine, but it needs to be balanced by another:  
that of the paralytic whose sins Jesus forgave due to the faith of those 
who brought him to Jesus (Mk 2.1-12).  The latter image, however, is 
ignored by RP since RP insists that “there is a certain solitude of the 
sinner in his sin” (RP 31.14).  In RP, as in OP, the “sinless” Church can 
only wait for the internal contrition and external lifestyle changes of its 
mortally sinful members. 
An act-centered and classificatory hamartology is also interde- 
pendent with an overemphasis on the priority of true (or proper) sins as 
distinguished from sins by analogy.29  According to St. Thomas Aquinas, 
the primary type of sin is mortal sin, sin which he defined as a disorder 
in which one voluntarily turns away from one’s last end.30   This is sin  
in the true or proper sense of the word.  Thomas then explained that all 
other types of sin—e.g. original sin, venial sin—are sins only in a 
derivative or analogous sense.31 
Thomas’ hamartological starting point was the individual human 
person in abstraction, including the requirements for human agency—
intellect and will.32   This starting point is implicit in OP and explicit in 
RP.  For example: 
Sin, in the proper sense, is always a personal act, since it is an 
act of freedom on the part of an individual person. . . .This truth 
cannot be disregarded in order to place the blame for individual 
sins on external factors such as structures, systems or other 
people.  Above all, this would be to deny the person’s dignity and 
freedom, which are manifested . . . also in this responsibility for 
   93
sin committed. (RP 16.1) 
 
The problem with this and similar statements is that they seem to be 
theoretical choices made by proponents of the juridical model.  This is 
obvious when one recognizes that there is at least one other 
hamartological point of departure:  the experience of sin as being 
simultaneously chosen yet externally inflicted.33   Indeed, both OP and 
RP momentarily acknowledge the latter bipartite experience: 
The members of the Church, however, are exposed to temptation 
and unfortunately often fall into sin. (OP 3.2) 
 
Clearly, sin is a product of man’s freedom.  But deep within its 
human reality there are factors at work which place it beyond 
the merely human, in the border-area where man’s conscience, 
will and sensitivity are in contact with the dark forces which, 
according to Saint Paul, are active in the world almost to the 
point of ruling it. (RP 14.1) 
 
Nevertheless, such an awareness is immediately disregarded and 
replaced with the individualistic/voluntaristic hamartology. 
I cannot emphasize enough the fact that the authors of OP and RP 
were free to avoid an act-centered and classificatory hamartology (as well 
as the reduction of the sacrament of reconciliation to individual 
confession and absolution).  If, as RP 17.17 implies, the Council of 
Trent’s teaching prohibits the employment of anything except its own 
(classificatory) hamartology, why then does OP not reaffirm the 
traditional term “mortal sin?”34   And if, as RP 17.12 claims, the 1983 
Synod of Bishops reaffirmed Trent’s hamartological classifications, why 
then did the same Synod consider a threefold distinction of sins 
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(see RP 17.16)?35  The probable answer to these questions is that both 
the drafters of OP and the 1983 Synod of Bishops were aware of the facts 
that there have been plural hamartological schools throughout Christian 
Tradition and that the Council of Trent did not actually establish any of 
these schools as the normative one.36  Nevertheless, despite this probable 
awareness, OP and RP prefer the juridical model of sin and reconcilia- 
tion, and they disguise this preference as fidelity to “unchangeable” 
teaching.37 
Having shown that the juridical model is the dominant model—or 
paradigm—in OP and RP, I will, in the following chapter, demonstrate 
how the juridical paradigm is an inadequate paradigm of sin and recon- 
ciliation in this post-Conciliar age of the Church. 
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CHAPTER 3 NOTES 
 
 1.  See Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure Of Scientific Revolutions, 
2d ed. (Chicago: U of Chicago Press, 1970). 
 
 2.  Dulles, 33. 
 
 3.  Ibid., 35. 
 
 4.  Ibid. 
 
 5.  Ibid., 36. 
 
 6.  Ibid., 203-5. 
 
 7.  Ibid., 204.  Dulles obviously prefers the sacramental model of 
the Church. 
 
 8.  A concise description of the declarative type of absolution is 
given above, p. 70 n. 6. 
 
 9.  See Peter E. Fink, “History of the Sacrament of Reconciliation,” 
chap. in Fink, Alternative Futures, where it is written that in 2 Cor 5: 
. . . the whole Church community is named as that which is 
entrusted with the mission and the ministry of reconciliation. (74) 
Also see Osborne, Reconciliation, who writes: 
Throughout this [patristic] period, however, there was a constant 
belief that in the church of Jesus there was indeed a power to 
isolate, repel, and negate sin.  This was never questioned.  The 
application of this power to individual circumstances and the 
ritualized celebration of this power was not always clear.  Even 
the theological interpretation of this ecclesial power varied from 
writer to writer. . . .  The very elasticity which we find in this 
early reconciliation process helps us today to open ourselves to 
new patterns of pastoral practice and to see how change can make 
this power to isolate, repel, and negate sin . . . ever more 
meaningful to the life and experience of contemporary Christian 
communities [brackets mine]. (79) 
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10.  Osborne, Reconciliation, 119.  Also see Lawler, 122: 
“Trent . . . cannot be used to forbid absolutely general confession and 
general absolution.” 
 
11.  See above, p. 70 n. 9. 
 
12.  Council of Trent, ibid., Chapter 1; q.v. Neuner and Dupuis, no. 
1617. 
 
13.  Ibid., canon 1; q.v. Neuner and Dupuis, no. 1641. 
 
14.  Osborne, Reconciliation, 159-85. 
 
15.  Ibid., 17-24. 
 
16.  See the sentence in LG 11 that is devoted to the sacrament of 
penance.  This sentence respects the non-juridical patristic concern for 
reconciliation with the Church—q.v. above, p. 14 n. 16. 
 
17.  Two different Vatican committees were established to prepare 
a revised rite of penance.  Before the work of the second—and more 
conservative—committee became official, the draft rites of the first 
committee included optative, declarative, and deprecative absolution 
formulae.  See Dallen, 209-15. 
 
18.  Dallen reprints one of these formulae: 
“We ask you, Lord, to grant your servant the fitting fruit of penitence 
so that by obtaining pardon for what he/she has done he/she may 
be restored blameless to your holy Church, from whose wholeness 
he/she has strayed by sinning.  [We ask this] through Christ our 
Lord” [emphasis mine]. (240 n. 22) 
 
19.  See above, p. 71 n. 15. 
 
20.  See above, p.72 n. 28, for a contrary position. 
 
21.  A strong defense of Rite C is given in Osborne, Reconciliation, 
221-35; see especially 222 and 224. 
 
22.  See above, p. 74 n. 49. 
 
23.  See RP 14.4, 15.4 (twice), 16.1 (twice), 16.2, 17.12 (twice), 
17.14, 17.15 (thrice), 17.17, 18.6, and 18.7. 
 
24.  McCormick, 62. 
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25.  This view was non-existent in ancient penance; see            
Regis A. Duffy, Real Presence: Worship, Sacraments, and Commitment 
(San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1982): 
. . . Penance and conversion were seen as a lifetime process: 
once in Penance, one remained there.  (There was no conception 
of a Christian being at one moment “in the state of sin” and, at 
the next, “in the state of grace.”) (167) 
 
26.  OP calls the sacrament one “of penance” in 23 paragraphs, 
while it calls the sacrament one “of reconciliation” in only 7 paragraphs.  
RP calls the sacrament one “of penance” in 32 paragraphs and one “of 
confession” in 3 paragraphs, while, like OP, it calls the sacrament one “of 
reconciliation” in only 7 paragraphs. 
 
27.  “Penitents” has a strong juridical connotation.  “Converts,” on 
the other hand, connotes discipleship and retrieves the early Church’s 
term “conversi.”  See Dallen, 82-5. 
 
28.  See above, pp. 71-2 n. 22. 
 
29.  Contemporary Catholic theologians are questioning the 
necessity or validity of this distinction.  Among these are:  Norbert J. 
Rigali, “Human Solidarity,” above; Patrick Kerans, above, 59; Thomas F. 
Schindler, Ethics: The Social Dimension, Theology and Life Series, vol.27 
(Wilmington, DE: Michael Glazier, 1989), 140; Rosemary Radford 
Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk: Toward A Feminist Theology (Boston: 
Beacon, 1983), 181.  Also see O’Keefe, who writes: 
If one begins the discussion of sin from the traditional starting 
point and with traditional categories of the requirements for 
human agency, then social sin appears as “sin by analogy.” 
. . . If, however, one begins from the experience of sin as both 
freely chosen and yet almost imposed from without, then 
personal and social sin seem co-essential to any definition of 
sin. (23) 
 
30.  ST I-II Q.72 a.5. 
 
31.  ST I-II Q.88 a.1. 
 
32.  ST I-II Q.1 a.1. 
 
33.  See O’Keefe, ibid. 
 
 
 
 
   98
34.  Furthermore, OP momentarily implies—in OP 6.3—that 
hamartological classification is not necessary.  See David M. Coffey, The 
Sacrament of Reconciliation, Lex Orandi Series, ed. John D. Laurance 
(Collegeville: The Liturgical Press, 2001), 105-7. 
 
35.  Osborne, Reconciliation, 238. 
 
36.  Ibid., 237. 
 
37.  See Ladislas Orsy, The Evolving Church And The Sacrament 
Of Penance (Denville, NJ: Dimension Books, 1978), 28-51.  Orsy 
summarizes the history of the sacrament of penance in terms of two 
major patterns:  first, a Mediterranean pattern, where penance is public 
and liturgical; second, an Irish pattern, where penance is private and 
juridical.  Then, in light of the historical replacement of the 
Mediterranean with the Irish pattern, Orsy posits three possible 
theological interpretations or hypotheses:  first, an inauthentic evolution 
has been superseded by an authentic one; second, the Mediterranean 
pattern was an imperfect development that was perfected by its 
successor; third, both patterns were authentic expressions of the 
apostolic tradition.  Finally, Orsy accepts the third of these hypotheses 
as the correct one (since, “at one time or another, each system had the 
support of the universal Church, certainly of the universal episcopate”), 
and he concludes that “it is legitimate to think of new manifestations of 
the power of pardon that is present in the Church . . . .” (50-1) 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
THE INADEQUACIES OF THE JURIDICAL PARADIGM 
 
 
In 1984, agreeing with an observation made by the Sixth General 
Assembly of the Synod of Bishops, Pope John Paul II admitted that “the 
Sacrament of Penance is in crisis” (RP 28.2).1  This crisis is still very 
much with us.  Many Catholic faithful continue to see sacramental 
penance as optional and/or private; they either try to fit into and find 
meaning in the predominantly juridical practice of penance, or they shun 
such practice and pursue their need for reconciliation and conversion 
within irreligious support groups, addiction-recovery programs, 
psychotherapy, and/or religions other than Catholicism.2  Those who 
shun sacramental penance participate in parochial life as people who are 
possibly being formed by value systems which are alien to, and perhaps 
antagonistic toward, that of Catholicism.  As for those who claim that 
they find meaning in private penance, they may do so ignorant of the 
ecclesial and social dimensions of sin, conversion, and reconciliation. 
Ironically, the Pope, in RP, while reestablishing a juridical para- 
digm of sin and reconciliation, possesses some awareness of this 
paradigm’s contribution to the crisis in which penance is: 
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. . . certain deficiencies in the practice of sacramental Penance . . . 
include the tendency to obscure the ecclesial significance of sin 
and of conversion and to reduce them to merely personal matters. 
. . .  There also exists the danger . . . of routine ritualism that 
deprives the Sacrament of its full significance and formative 
effectiveness. (RP 18.10) 
 
Although here “deficiencies in the practice of sacramental Penance” are 
highlighted, the juridical paradigm’s theological influences are implicitly 
blameworthy.  Indeed, it is the task of this fourth chapter to demonstrate 
how the juridical paradigm is an inadequate paradigm of sin and 
reconciliation in this post-Conciliar age of the Church.  I will 
demonstrate this by specifying the following thesis:  the juridical 
paradigm, with all of its constituent juridical tenets, is significantly 
divergent from, or discordant with, the theological and pastoral methods, 
teachings, and tendencies of the Second Vatican Council.  In other 
words, Chapter Four will show how documents which establish the 
juridical model as the dominant model or paradigm (e.g. OP and RP) do 
so without sufficient respect due to the doctrinally authoritative and 
existentially relevant documents of this Council.3   I now proceed by 
demonstrating the inconsistencies between the moral theology, 
ecclesiology, and sacramental theology of the juridical paradigm versus 
those of Conciliar theology. 
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Moral Theology 
 
One of the theological categories in which the juridical paradigm is 
discordant with the Council—and with all thought which seeks to 
faithfully and meaningfully develop the Conciliar mind4—is the category 
of moral theology.  In Chapter One of this dissertation I stated that 
legalism/juridicism in Catholic moral theology had been accumulating 
ever since the early Church, but that they calcified via the manualist 
tradition.5  My use of the word “calcification” intends to convey a sense of 
hardening and sticking in a detrimental and almost ineradicable way.  
This is to say that it was not until the development of a manualist 
tradition that legalism/juridicism became the paradigm of Catholic moral 
theology,6 a paradigm which, I am arguing, is like a mass of unwanted 
barnacles on the ship that is the Church. 
After we trace the development of the manualist tradition, we 
ought to ask at least two questions:  first, what need(s) did/does the 
juridical manualist tradition meet?; second, what need(s) did/does this 
tradition fail to meet?  In pursuing answers to these questions we may 
better understand both why the juridical model became the paradigm of 
Catholic moral theology, and why this paradigm was considered 
inadequate by the Second Vatican Council and by Council-minded 
theologians. 
The manualist tradition begins, arguably, with the Celtic 
penitentials.  Appearing in the sixth century, these penitentials were 
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books which listed sins and their corresponding penances.7   These 
books both reflected and perpetuated how Celtic monks viewed and 
practiced “sacramental” penance.8 
The Celtic form of penance differed from the older Mediterranean 
form in several ways:  it was repeatable and private, and it emphasized 
the confession of the penitent (over his or her performance of penance) as 
well as the “sentencing” of a confessor (not the liturgical prayer of a 
community).  In other words, the widespread Celtic practice of juridical 
dialogues between confessing penitents and judging religious created the 
need for the books which, in turn, perpetuated the dialogues and their 
accompanying juridical and legalistic vision.  Furthermore, while 
prospective penitents did dialogue with episkopoi in the Mediterranean 
form of penance, this dialogue concluded with a bishop’s pastoral 
decision about the necessary penance, and it was only a prelude to an 
eventual and climactic communal prayer for reconciliation.9  However, in 
the Celtic form, this dialogue concluded with a monk’s observance or 
defense of codified laws, and it was the climax of the form.10  Finally, the 
juridical/legalistic tenor of the Celtic penitentials was compounded by 
the fact that these books imposed legal sanctions as well as ecclesial 
penances.11 
The penitentials would directly affect Catholic moral theology and 
sacramental penance from the sixth to the tenth centuries.  Also, they 
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would do so throughout much of Europe, thanks to the monks who 
brought them there from Ireland.12 
The manualist tradition also includes the Summae Confessorum.  
These were the penitentials of the eleventh and twelfth centuries:  they, 
too, were legalistic handbooks to be implemented by Catholic 
confessors.13   However, unlike the penitentials, these Summae reflect a 
more hierarchical (and less monastic) ecclesiology, since they were 
produced at a time when bishops and priests—not monks—were the 
primary ministers of the Church.  Furthermore, these Summae include a 
sophisticated legalism;  for example, they distinguish between mortal and 
venial sin.14   Perhaps the climactic Summa was that of Raymond of 
Penaforte (i.e. the Raymundina), which was composed in the thirteenth 
century and was still being published at the beginning of the sixteenth 
century.15 
The manualist tradition climaxes, of course, in the manuals of 
moral theology.  However, the manuals owe much to at least three other 
antecedents:  the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas; the Fourth Lateran 
Council; the Council of Trent.16   St. Thomas’ linking of morality with law 
is a basis of every manual.17   The Council of Trent reaffirmed the Fourth 
Lateran Council’s teaching that every (serious) sin ought to be confessed 
according to number and species.  Furthermore, in the sixteenth 
century, the Council of Trent established the seminary system, i.e. 
ecclesiastically controlled schools devoted to a standardized (Tridentine) 
   104
preparation of prospective priests.  Taken together, these last three 
antecedents summarize the manuals:  legalistic handbooks used by 
confessors in the post-Tridentine Church.  Indeed, manuals of Catholic 
moral theology were published and used from the sixteenth to the 
twentieth centuries, and they continue to significantly influence official 
Catholic teaching.18 
The juridical model became the paradigm of Catholic moral 
theology because the juridical manualist tradition meets a profound 
human and Christian need:  the need for universal moral laws.19   The 
rationality and consistency of these laws are as desirable today as they 
were during the ignorance and chaos of the Middle Ages.  Unfortunately, 
the manualist tradition fails to meet several other profound needs.20  
Perhaps the most profound of these needs is the need for a 
personalistic or relational view of the moral life.  It is just such a view 
that we find in the documents of the Second Vatican Council.21  
Although the Conciliar documents do refer to the moral law, 
nevertheless, in these references the law is seen as secondary to the 
personal relationships which the law serves:22 
Often refusing to acknowledge God as his source, man has also 
upset the relationship which should link him to his last end; and at 
the same time he has broken the right order that should reign 
within himself as well as between himself and other men and all 
creatures. (GS 13) 
 
Furthermore, although the Council does refer to particular sins as 
crimes,23  it does not view sinners as criminals; contrary to the juridical 
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model, the Council’s hamartology is relational in that it teaches that 
there are social or communitarian causes and effects of sin.  Regarding 
such effects, the Council writes: 
Those who approach the sacrament of Penance . . . are . . . 
reconciled with the Church which they have wounded by 
their sins . . . . (LG 11) 
 
Regarding such causes, the Council writes: 
 
. . . it cannot be denied that [man] is often turned away from 
the good and urged to evil by the social environment in which 
he lives and in which he is immersed since the day of his 
birth. (GS 25) 
 
The Council’s morality is relational since the Council teaches as it 
challenges the Church’s theologians to teach: 
. . . theological subjects should be renewed through a more vivid 
contact with the mystery of Christ and the history of salvation.  
Special care should be given to the perfecting of moral theology. 
Its scientific presentation should draw more fully on the teaching of 
holy Scripture . . . . (OT 16) 
 
In other words, a relational view of the moral life is inevitable when one 
“draws more fully” upon the Bible.  In order to understand better the 
latter, let us take a close look at how the Council treats a specific moral 
issue. 
 The Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World (GS) 
is the primary and most comprehensive expression of the moral theology 
of the Second Vatican Council.24   Having stated and explained principles 
of Catholic doctrinal and moral theology in GS 1-45, GS 47-52 contain 
the Council’s first extended application of these principles:  an 
application to the nature of marriage and human sexuality.  This 
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application exemplifies the Council’s shift from legalism/juridicism and 
to a relational theology which has been called “Christian personalist.”25 
Before the Council, the closest thing to the Church’s official 
definition of marriage was contained, in part, in Canon 1081.2 of the 
original (A.D. 1917) Code of Canon Law.26   Preceded by the first canon 
on marriage—Canon 1012—which calls marriage a “contract,” Canon 
1081.2 elaborates upon this juridical/contractual understanding: 
Marital consent is an act of the will by which each party gives and 
accepts a perpetual and exclusive right over the body for acts which 
are of themselves suitable for the generation of children.27 
 
A dramatic contrast is visible in the Council’s relational/biblical 
understanding of marriage: 
Thus a man and a woman, who by the marriage covenant of 
conjugal love “are no longer two, but one flesh” (Mt. 19:6), render 
mutual help and service to each other through an intimate union 
of their persons and of their actions.  Through this union they 
experience the meaning of their oneness and attain to it with 
growing perfection day by day. (GS 48) 
 
In the Code of Canon Law, marriage is a contract wherein rights to 
potentially procreative actions are exchanged in one act of the will.  
However, in GS, marriage is a covenant wherein two persons give all of 
themselves and gradually experience the unitive meaning of their 
marriage whether or not its procreative meaning is fulfilled.28 
Since the closing of the Second Vatican Council in 1965, Catholic 
theologians who have accepted the Conciliar challenge as issued in       
OT 16 have not only shifted their methodological basis from law to 
relationship.  These theologians have also discovered that a biblical 
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approach to morality emphasizes character over acts, and, more 
profoundly, that it represents the superiority of images and stories over 
laws in effecting the conversion and formation of persons.  With thinkers 
in mind such as Donald D. Evans, Paul Ricoeur, and James M. 
Gustafson, Richard M. Gula argues: 
Properly to understand moral behavior, then, we need to pay 
attention first to the images shaping the imagination, and the 
stories giving rise to these images, before we consider moral 
rules. . . . Each world we enter makes demands on our loyalty 
and is alive with many forms of communicating that loyalty. 
Rules and regulations try to do it, but stories, images, rituals 
do it better.29 
 
Similarly, with the sociology of religion in mind, James P. Hanigan 
writes: 
The attitudes and convictions generated by a religious symbol 
system produce in turn a commitment to action and to a 
special way of life.  It is because we think and feel in certain 
ways at the deepest levels of our being that we are moved to 
act in certain ways.30 
 
Sacred scripture, especially the Gospels, offers story after story wherein 
we come to know and are moved by the divine persons and human 
characters.  Furthermore, Jesus himself is frequently portrayed as 
preferring to teach morality through parables and images.31  Since the 
Bible is more of a story-book than a legal code, a predominantly legalistic 
morality cannot sufficiently reflect scripture—especially the Christian 
scriptures. 
 Not only do we learn morality best through stories, but also each of 
our own moral lives are stories themselves.32  Respecting this narrative 
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character of our individual and communal lives is a third result of a 
biblically based approach to morality.  If the first result can be 
summarized as a shift from law to relationship, and if the second result 
can be summarized as a shift from codes to stories, then this third result 
can be summarized as a shift from analysis to synthesis.33   In other 
words, this third shift calls for a movement away from emphasizing a 
juridical act-analysis and toward emphasizing a narrational life-
synthesis, toward a vision and revision of one’s “big (moral) picture.”  
This shift also is rooted in scripture since the focus of the Bible is the 
ongoing story of God’s historical relationship with His chosen people.  
Like those biblical characters, we in our own time continue that grand 
story via the living out of our own life stories.  Gula explains well how 
analysis is subordinate to synthesis: 
Individual actions are like the incidents which make up the story.  
No action has its proper moral significance in isolation from the 
whole narrative.  Since all moral action is interaction, each 
individual action finds its proper meaning from within the total 
narrative that is the moral life.34 
 
I have demonstrated that the moral theology of the juridical 
paradigm is inconsistent with that of both the Second Vatican Council 
and all thought which seeks to faithfully and meaningfully develop 
Conciliar teaching.  I now continue such a demonstration vis à vis 
ecclesiology and sacramental theology. 
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Ecclesiology and Sacramental Theology 
In Chapter Three, while discussing the juridical paradigm’s 
preference for a classificatory hamartology, I pointed out that asserting 
and maintaining a rigid conceptual distinction between “mortal” (or 
“grave”) and “venial” sins is interdependent with the possession of an 
idealistic ecclesiology.35  That is, a mortal sinner is seen as being 
someone who has forfeited full incorporation in a supposedly pure 
Church.  The problem with such an ecclesiology is its deemphasizing of 
the Church as simultaneously being a sociological entity—i.e. a finite 
group of sinful persons.  To put this yet another way:  the idealistic 
ecclesiology of the juridical paradigm can obscure or distract us from 
futuristic eschatology; unfortunately, the former emphasizes the Church 
as being already the “stainless bride”36 or sinless “Body”37 of Christ. 
Such an ecclesiology is inconsistent with the teachings and spirit 
of the Second Vatican Council.  The Council’s ecclesiological statements 
are supported by its primary metaphor for the Church:  the “People of 
God.”38   Unlike the tendency of the “Body of Christ” metaphor, the 
equally biblical “People of God” metaphor does not “obscure the personal 
responsibility and freedom of the members,”39 nor does it “make the 
presence of sin and error in the Church—even on the corporate and 
official level—unintelligible.”40   Furthermore, the “People of God” 
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metaphor highlights the fact that the Church as a community of laity, 
religious, and clergy is progressing toward perfection in history.41 
In light of these points, we can call the Council’s ecclesiology 
personalistic, anthropological, existential, or realistic42 in contrast to the 
idealistic ecclesiology of the juridical paradigm.  A realistic ecclesiology is 
visible in at least three of the Conciliar documents.  In The Dogmatic 
Constitution on the Church, six of the first eight paragraphs refer to the 
Church’s imperfection:  the Church “will be brought to glorious 
completion” (LG 2); the Church “grows visibly” (LG 3); the Church is 
inferior to God’s Kingdom and it “slowly grows to maturity” (LG 5); the 
Church “journeys” (LG 6); all members “must be formed in [Christ’s] 
likeness” (LG 7); the Church is “at once holy and always in need of 
purification” and it is constantly on “the path of penance and renewal” 
(LG 8).43  In The Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern 
World, the Council confesses the past and present sinfulness of the 
Church: 
The Church . . . is by no means unaware that down through the 
centuries there have been among its members, both clerical and lay, 
some who were disloyal to the Spirit of God.  Today, as well, the 
Church is not blind to the discrepancy between the message it 
proclaims and the human weakness of those to whom the Gospel 
has been entrusted. (GS 43) 
 
The Decree on Ecumenism reaffirms the former:  “Christ summons the 
Church, as she goes her pilgrim way, to that continual reformation of 
which she always has need . . .” (UR 6). 
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This realistic ecclesiology of the Council does not harmonize with a 
hamartology—such as that of the juridical paradigm—wherein a rigid 
conceptual distinction between mortal sin and venial sin is asserted and 
maintained.  In fact, the Council emphasizes the tenet that all Christians 
are constantly called to progress in holiness—not to merely avoid 
committing mortal sins: 
. . . all Christians, in the conditions, duties and circumstances of 
their life and through all these, will sanctify themselves more and 
more if they receive all things with faith from the hand of the 
heavenly Father and cooperate with the divine will, thus showing 
forth in that temporal service the love with which God has loved the 
world. (LG 41) 
 
The Council’s ecclesiology—as we are about to see—can also be 
called “sacramental.”  This fact leads us to a third theological category 
whereby the juridical paradigm of sin and reconciliation is shown to be 
inadequate in this post-Conciliar age of the Church.  That category is 
sacramental theology. 
In the juridical paradigm the sacraments of the Church are 
narrowly understood.  As we can see in canon law, all that the juridical 
paradigm is concerned with are the minimal conditions necessary for a 
sacrament to be an efficient cause.44   A sacrament is said to be 
“administered” by one ordained minister in one particular moment and 
via specific matter and form.45  Active participation by the local ecclesial 
community is not considered as being essential since the ordained 
minister performs the sacramental work for community members. 
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The sacraments are also viewed in this paradigm as being not 
symbols but merely signs of God’s (created) grace wherein God is 
understood as acting extrinsically toward the Church—by providing 
grace understood as a quantity—but not intrinsically within the 
relationships shared by Church members.46  For example, according to 
the juridical paradigm, reconciliation with God is objectively effected in 
the sacrament of reconciliation whether or not the penitent and his/her 
local fellow Christians are subjectively reconciled.  In other words, 
reconciliation with God is seen as being unrelated or extrinsic to 
interpersonal reconciliation. 
Once again—this time via sacramental theology—the juridical 
paradigm is inconsistent with the teachings and spirit of the Second 
Vatican Council.  According to the Council, the Church itself, despite its 
aforementioned imperfection, is a sacrament (LG 1), which means that 
the entire People of God must symbolize or express or make tangible 
whatever the intangible God intends.47  In order to better understand the 
non-juridical point that “the Church itself is a sacrament,” and to better 
understand the effect of this point upon the theology of sacramental 
reconciliation, let us follow the thought of one of the leading proponents 
of this point:  Conciliar peritus Karl Rahner. 
Rahner was contemporaneous with the generation of Catholic 
theologians in the twentieth century which sought to respond to modern 
philosophy via Thomism without the paranoia that was characteristic of 
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nineteenth century neo-Thomism.  This new generation (the nouvelle 
théologie), like the condemned modernists before them, argued that neo-
Thomism misappropriated Thomistic thought; the former claimed that 
St. Thomas was not really ahistorical.  Rather, Rahner and his peers 
sought to be historically critical, epistemologically sensitive, and 
pastoral.48 
Prominent members of this generation were Marie-Dominique 
Chenu and Henri de Lubac.  Chenu, inspired by his fellow Dominican 
Ambroise Gardeil, argued that faith is primarily transcendental, which is 
to say that it transcends the categories and language of historical 
dogmas.  He based this claim on Aquinas’ distinction between ratio and 
intellectus:  intellectus, the drive to understand, seeks not a dogmatic 
positivism but an increasing and open-ended intelligibility of Christian 
history.  According to Chenu, the human spirit possesses the power of 
faith, a power which philosophical effort would aid in reformulating 
doctrine in ever relevant ways.49 
Encouraged by fellow Jesuits Pierre Rousselot and Joseph 
Maréchal, de Lubac posited that knowledge of God is not a supernatural 
acquisition—contra neo-Thomism—but a natural experience.  For de 
Lubac, God is the transcendental condition for human knowledge and 
freedom, a tenet which implies that human persons subjectively 
experience God in every explicit act of knowledge and freedom.  In his 
controversial Surnaturel he concluded that the neo-Thomist concept of a 
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pure human nature receiving utterly extrinsically imposed grace—i.e. 
extrinsicism—is a distortion of both Augustine’s and Aquinas’ teaching.  
Humanity is “naturally supernatural,” maintained de Lubac.50 
What prevented Rahner from being scolded by neo-Thomist 
authorities along with the likes of Chenu and de Lubac was his “selective 
and discreet appropriation of Kantian and Heideggerian categories within 
a Thomistic framework.”51  From Kant Rahner takes an epistemology 
which begins with subjective experience.  Unlike essentialist theology, 
which is theocentric and which presupposes a static cosmos that is to be 
objectively conceptualized, Rahner’s starting point, and constant 
reference point, is the experiential knowledge and transcendental 
freedom of human subjects.52  Like Chenu and de Lubac, Rahner does 
not follow the legalistic/juridical method of neo-Thomism with its 
complacency in limiting knowledge of God to clear and distinct dogmas.  
Although Rahner sees a need for conceptual knowledge—i.e. dogma—he 
emphasizes the primacy of experiential knowledge (as well as that of 
transcendental freedom).  Examining the differences between these 
different types of knowledge and freedom justifies this latter emphasis. 
Conceptual knowledge seeks to categorize its objects.  In order to 
do this the immediate experiencing of something must be temporarily 
interrupted so that this something can be analyzed in its facets.  A 
strength of conceptual knowledge is that it enables us to share our 
knowledge about things with others—to agree with others via 
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objectivity.53  However, this type of knowledge is secondary since it 
depends upon experience.  Moreover, conceptualization is incomplete 
and avoidable:  incomplete in its inability to be open to the totality of an 
object; avoidable in that not everyone takes the time and effort to analyze 
their experiences.54 
Experiential knowledge, on the other hand, is immediate 
knowledge of something beyond our control.  It is a knowledge that is 
utterly open to the totality of a thing.  Its strengths are the lacunae of 
conceptual knowledge:  completeness and inevitability.  All normally 
functioning human persons have experiential knowledge, whether or not 
they can and do explicitly conceptualize it.  Moreover, experiential 
knowledge points to the fact that we can continually learn more and 
more about the things we experience.55 
As for transcendental freedom, it is analogous to experiential 
knowledge.  This type of freedom (in contrast to categorical freedom) is 
the preconceptual freedom of ours that is hidden behind every conscious 
categorical choice that we make in our everyday lives.  At best we only 
have an intuition of this freedom as it is the condition of our categorical 
freedom.  It shares the same qualities with experiential knowledge:  it is 
primary, complete, and inevitable.  Transcendental freedom is that which 
has made, makes, and will make one’s self to be; it is what makes a 
person morally responsible.56 
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Rahner furthers his anthropocentrism with a doctrine of Thomas’:  
human knowledge can transcend the physical world and attain to the 
metaphysical.  Rahner, like Maréchal, addresses modern philosophy via 
Thomas when he argues that in the human experience of knowing and 
choosing finite realities we preconceptually or implicitly experience the 
infinite reality of God.57  Rahner elaborates on this via an adaptation of 
Heidegger:  we can know things only because of an a priori structure or 
“existential” which transcends these things; a human being is a 
dynamism thrust toward Absolute Being, of which he or she has a pre-
apprehension or “Vorgriff.”58  That is to say that we grasp finite realities—
we understand particular horizons—against the backdrop of an infinite 
reality or horizon.59  Indeed, God, the horizon without a horizon, is the 
“supernatural existential,” the basic and hidden structure—given by God 
in his own self-gift—permeating all of a human person which enables the 
person to know and to choose categorically.60 
All of this enables Rahner to go on to say that human persons are 
naturally open to the supernatural.  The transcendental and the 
categorical are united:  they mutually cause each other.  This means that 
God is not an efficient cause who effects an extrinsic grace to be present 
in our otherwise “purely natural” lives.  Rather, God is a “quasi-formal” 
cause:  God’s self is intrinsic to the effected human person.61  To be 
human is to be open to the divine.  In Scholastic terminology, Rahner 
would say that God’s self is uncreated grace.62  Grace, that is God, is 
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thus experienced and responded to—consciously or unconsciously—
within human history.63 
A crucial part of Rahner’s theology is his understanding of real 
symbols; this serves as a support for his “supernatural existential” 
doctrine.  His basic principle here is that all beings are symbolic because 
in order to realize themselves they must express themselves.  The 
original unity of a being fulfills itself by developing into plurality.  Unity 
and distinction increase not in inverse proportion, but in like proportion.  
This explains formal causality, i.e. how the physical and the spiritual 
cause each other.  In other words, the symbol or expression of any thing 
is both caused by and causes the presence of the thing symbolized.64 
If the essence of human persons is to share in divinity, this 
essence cannot be realized apart from—i.e. extrinsic to—its symbol.  
Since the symbol of humans is the human body, then humans realize 
themselves through physical acts.  Moving toward the divine through 
one’s acts is not a threat to human autonomy but is rather the guarantee 
of autonomy.65  Every free action taken in history by a human person is 
simultaneously a spiritual action.  Behind every categorical option one 
makes lies one’s transcendental or fundamental option: one moves either 
toward or away from God’s gracious self-gift.  One’s transcendental 
option to fulfill oneself as a supernatural being is manifested in and 
affected by one’s categorical choices.  This transcendental option is 
inevitable and continuous during our free agency in history. 
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In light of this unity of the physical and the spiritual, we can 
understand Rahner’s assertion that secular and salvation histories are 
inseparable.  Since non-Christians as well as Christians share the same 
humanity, all members of human history are called to symbolically 
realize their humanity, which is to say that all humans act out of a 
transcendental option either for or against God.  Since the fundamental 
way in which the option for God is manifested is loving behavior, loving 
actions imply faith, whether these acts are performed by Christians or 
non-Christians.66  Salvation—including reconciliation—happens in 
human history or it does not happen at all.67 
The latter can be further understood in terms of Rahner’s 
distinction between explicit and implicit Christianity:  all humans are 
called to be Christians, whether or not they are conscious of it.68  This 
point is based upon the divinity of Christ and the dependence of knowing 
and free human persons upon God as the condition of knowledge and 
freedom.  Even the professed atheist is implicitly Christian as long as he 
or she is loving in his or her categorical acts.  In explicitly loving self and 
neighbor, the implicit Christian implicitly or preconceptually says “yes” 
to God who enables such love.69  And since Christ is the expression of 
God, this “yes” is a yes to Christ. 
Since every free act in history is at least implicitly spiritual, any 
time and place is a context of spiritual activity.  Rahner can thus speak 
of the “liturgy of the world.”70  The secular is not alien to the sacred but 
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is rather coextensive with it.  But if this is so, then why celebrate a 
ritualized liturgy in the Church of Christ?  Rahner responds to this 
question by admitting that Church liturgies and sacraments are not 
essential for any one person’s salvation, since, as we have seen, persons 
can find salvation apart from an explicit profession of Christian faith.  
However, Rahner goes on to say that the liturgy and sacraments of the 
Church best prepare one to respond positively to God as this God is 
hidden in everyday life, including interpersonal relationships.71   Indeed, 
just as implicit “yes’s” to God are expressed by humans in explicit acts of 
love, so too is the implicit presence/self-gift of God to humans—as 
hidden in transcendental knowledge and freedom—expressed explicitly 
by God in the person of Christ, in the Church, and in word and 
sacrament.  The liturgy of the Church, being symbolic, is the realization 
or culmination of God’s implicit self-gift.  Since we have seen that God’s 
self-gift is identified with uncreated grace,72 we can say with Rahner that 
grace culminates in its symbolic expression:  the sacraments.73 
This is to say that in the liturgy of the world a dialogue occurs.  
God’s saving gift of self is hidden in general human history in the 
universal human experience of transcendence.  And human persons 
implicitly accept this gift by doing loving deeds in history.  But in order to 
realize itself, general history—i.e. the liturgy of the world—must express 
itself.  This expression or symbol is salvation history—i.e. the liturgy of 
the Church.  Salvation history is the explicit manifestation of what is 
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already implicit in general history:  God’s saving gift of self and its 
acceptance by human persons.  The liturgy of the Church is thus the 
symbol or realization of the liturgy of the world; Church liturgy causes an 
explicit awareness of what has been, and is, already happening implicitly 
in general history, and Church liturgy, reciprocally, is caused by this 
worldly liturgy.74 
If this connection between everyday life and the Church’s 
sacraments is not observed, Christians run the dreadful risk of reducing 
religious or spiritual action to liturgical action.  Appearing to incarnate 
neo-Thomism, they will sharply separate the sacred and the “profane;” 
they will fail to experience and express their faith in everyday activities 
and relationships, and they will see the sacraments as magical medicine 
for, or as escapes from, or as meaningless in relation to, the everyday.  
Concerned about this possible disintegration, Rahner calls the Church’s 
sacraments “outbursts” of the giving of the divine and human persons to 
each other that is—or should be—happening silently in everyday life.75  
Indeed, far from being magic, or escapes, or meaningless, the sacraments 
assign the everyday to us as the place where God is hidden and where he 
calls us to accept his offer of salvation—including reconciliation.76 
Rahner elaborates upon how the sacraments are the highest 
realization or expression of grace via a theology of the word of God.  Of 
course, God’s word of salvation is given silently in history as the 
transcendental knowledge and freedom of all human persons.  But this 
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implicit gift possesses the least degree of concentration and intensity.77  
Since God’s word can realize its essence only in a historical process, this 
word has deficient and preparatory degrees or phases.  Thus, every part 
of salvation history that preceded the Church of Christ was a deficient 
phase.78  Indeed, even the scriptural word is only preparatory. 
Rahner’s major question here is how one can “reconcile a theology 
of the intrinsically efficacious word with the doctrine of the sacraments 
as the efficacious signs and words of grace.”79  He proposes that, in order 
to distinguish “word” from “sacrament,” there is a need to define the 
concept “opus operatum.”  He points out that there are two features 
which constitute the objective content of the concept “opus operatum” in 
its unity:  first, the word as the highest realization of the Church in its 
absolute commitment; second, the word spoken in situations that are 
decisive for human salvation.80  This can be understood by recognizing 
the nature of the Church as being the primary sacrament.  That is, the 
Church is the primary sacrament because the historical process of the 
increasing realization of God’s word reaches its finality and permanence 
in the Church: 
The Church is the permanent sign that God not only offers the grace 
of justification to the world but also that this grace is here.”81 
 
What distinguishes “word” from “sacrament” is that in the sacraments 
the Church actualizes itself in a total commitment of its essence towards 
an individual, becoming God’s saving word in an individual’s decisive 
situation.82 
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Having taken a close look at the non-juridical sacramental theology 
of Karl Rahner, we can see and understand his contribution in the 
following Conciliar teaching on the sacrament of penance: 
Those who approach the sacrament of Penance obtain pardon from 
God’s mercy for the offense committed against him, and are, at the 
same time, reconciled with the Church which they have wounded by 
their sins and which by charity, by example and by prayer labors for 
their conversion. (LG 11) 
 
In this teaching there are at least three points of divergence from the 
juridical paradigm.  First, we can see that the Second Vatican Council 
asserts an interrelationship between God and the Church whereby a 
penitent’s reconciliation with one is inseparable from his or her 
reconciliation with the other.  This implies that if I want to be reconciled 
with God then I must pursue reconciliation within myself and amongst 
my fellows.  Second, the Church is expected to “labor” for the desired 
sacramental effect.83  Given this expectation, the Council obviously 
rejects all kinds of sacramental minimalism/reductionism—for example, 
a reduction of sacramental reconciliation to the “essential” priestly 
absolution.84  Third, the aforementioned labor includes “example,” which 
implies the need for a penitent’s conversion-focused relationships with 
like-minded Christians to be more enduring than the moment which one 
spends in isolation with an ordained confessor. 
Besides this specific teaching on sacramental penance, the Council 
issued several general norms which are not valued—and are often 
opposed—by the juridical paradigm.  Unlike the juridical fixation on what 
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the ordained minister “has a right to do,”85   The Constitution on the 
Sacred Liturgy includes the Council’s preference for communal 
celebrations (SC 26-7, 110) and repeatedly urges that all should 
participate fully, consciously, and actively (SC 11, 14, 21, 27).  Such 
participation is said to be “demanded by the very nature of the liturgy” 
and something “to which the Christian people . . . have a right and 
obligation by reason of their baptism” (SC 14).  Also, unlike the juridical 
interest in the universal rigidity of sacramental rites,86 the liturgy 
Constitution frequently invites adaptation and inculturation (SC 1,4,21, 
37-8).  This is so since the Council “desires that . . . the rites . . . be given 
new vigor to meet present-day circumstances and needs” (SC 4).  
Furthermore, unlike the minimal—if any—inclusion of sacred scripture 
and instruction in the juridical approach to the sacraments,87 the 
Council decreed that “a more ample, more varied, and more suitable 
reading from sacred scripture should be restored” (SC 35), and that 
“instruction which is more explicitly liturgical should also be given in a 
variety of ways” (SC 35).  Finally, unlike the juridical paradigm’s 
separation of the religious from the secular, the Council taught as 
follows: 
They are mistaken . . . who think that religion consists in acts of 
worship alone and in the discharge of certain moral obligations, and 
who imagine they can plunge themselves into earthly affairs in such 
a way as to imply that these are altogether divorced from the 
religious life. (GS 43) 
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Although OP and RP have been published in this post-Conciliar 
age, they maintain the pre-Conciliar preference for the juridical paradigm 
of sin and reconciliation.  In this fourth chapter I have demonstrated that 
the juridical paradigm and the teaching of the Second Vatican Council 
are discordant according to the key categories of moral theology, 
ecclesiology, and sacramental theology.  Given the doctrinal authority 
and existential relevance of Conciliar teaching, I have ultimately 
demonstrated that the juridical model is an inadequate supermodel or 
paradigm in this post-Conciliar age.  Post-Conciliar documents such as 
OP and RP should elevate the liturgical-narrational model—not the 
juridical model—to the status of paradigm.  A more developed and 
revealing treatment of the liturgical-narrational model is the task of the 
following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4 NOTES 
 
 1.  Pope John Paul II described the crisis as follows: 
For the Sacrament of Confession is indeed being undermined, on 
the one hand by the obscuring of the moral and religious con- 
science, the lessening of a sense of sin, the distortion of the  
concept of repentance, and the lack of effort to live an authen- 
tically Christian life.  And on the other hand it is being undermined 
by the sometimes widespread idea that one can obtain forgiveness 
directly from God, even in an habitual way, without approaching 
the Sacrament of reconciliation. (RP 28.3) 
 
 2.  See Martos, 311-12, which includes the following: 
For a variety of reasons the Tridentine form of confession stopped 
being an effective sacrament for many Catholics, and the newer 
forms, although they aroused some interest and hope when they 
were first introduced, have been unable to take its place. (312)  See 
also Paul DeClerck, “Celebrating Penance or Reconciliation,” The Clergy 
Review 68 (1983): 310-21; see especially the surveys cited on p. 311. 
 
 3.  See James Dallen, “Recent Documents on Penance and 
Reconciliation,” in Reconciliation: The Continuing Agenda, ed. Robert J. 
Kennedy (Collegeville: The Liturgical Press, 1987), 95-113, which 
includes the following: 
. . . in the area of the sacrament of penance and reconciliation 
there is a clear evidence that the trends apparent throughout 
the twentieth century and given official status in the [Second 
Vatican] Council and in conciliar reforms have, to some extent, 
been suspended, minimized, or reversed in recent documents 
[brackets mine]. (95) 
Among these recent documents Dallen includes RP. 
 
 4.  Regarding the phrase “Conciliar mind,” see Ladislas Orsy, 
Theology and Canon Law: New Horizons for Legislation and 
Interpretation (Collegeville: The Liturgical Press, 1992), 14. 
 
 5.  See above, pp. 1-2. 
 
 6.  Gula, 25-8.  Also see David Kelly, “Aspects of Sin in Today’s 
Theology,” Louvain Studies 9 (1982): 191-7; see especially p. 193. 
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 7.  Osborne, Reconciliation, 87.  Also see John T. McNeill and 
Helena M. Gamer, trans., Medieval Handbooks of Penance (New York: 
Octagon Books, 1965), which includes English translations of the 
Penitentials of Finnian, Cummean, Theodore, et al. 
  
 8.  The word “sacramental” is set in quotation marks since the 
term “sacrament” vis à vis penance/reconciliation does not appear until 
the twelfth century.  See Osborne, Reconciliation, 70, 89. 
 
 9.  Dallen, Reconciling Community, 59, 67. 
 
10.  Ibid., 107. 
 
11.  Gallagher, 9. 
 
12.  Ibid., 7. 
 
13.  Ibid., 18-20. 
 
14.  Ibid., 19-20. 
 
15.  Ibid., 18. 
 
16.  Ibid., 45. 
 
17.  ST I-II Q.90 a.4.  Also see: Gula, 26f.; Gallagher, 84; Vincent 
MacNamara, Faith And Ethics: Recent Roman Catholicism (Washington, 
DC: Georgetown U Press, 1985), 10. 
 
18.  Gula, 35. 
 
19.  See Rigali, “Sin in a Relational World.”  See especially p. 323, 
where Rigali writes:  “Thus, the classical manuals of moral theology . . . 
generally define sin as a free transgression of divine law.” 
 
20.  These ignored needs include:  the need to respect the personal 
conscience of the penitent; the need to respect the virtue of epikeia; the 
need for respect for the historical circumstances of the penitent; the need 
for concern for the character development or personal growth of the 
penitent; the needs for a sense of social sin and communal penance.  On 
the virtue of epikeia, see:  ST II-II Q.120; Mahoney, 231-53; Timothy E. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
TOWARDS A CONTEMPORARY PARADIGM 
 
 
The central proposal of this dissertation is that now, in the wake of 
the Second Vatican Council, official Roman Catholic teaching on sin and 
reconciliation is not, but ought to be, based upon a contemporary 
paradigm—i.e. a paradigm which is concordant with, and adequate in 
light of, the doctrinally authoritative and existentially relevant teachings 
and goals of the Council.  The argument in Chapter Four was not that 
the juridical model is an inadequate model, but rather that it is 
inadequate as a paradigm.  A contemporary paradigm of sin and 
reconciliation would not jettison the juridical model, but would rather 
include what is still relevant and fecund in that and other models.  For 
example, respect for confession and absolution—which has long been 
intrinsic to the juridical model—ought to be included within the new 
paradigm.  Nevertheless, the new paradigm would be a model that would 
replace the juridical model in terms of primacy. 
I nominate the liturgical-narrational model as the contemporary 
paradigm of sin and reconciliation.  In Chapter Two I demonstrated that 
this model is employed in OP and RP.  The statements by which OP and 
RP employ this model may be summarized as follows:  the Church is a 
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sign of conversion to God, and all of its priestly people are called to 
reconcile primarily via proclaiming and hearing the history of salvation.  
In this fifth chapter I will expand upon this summary so that the 
theological principles and pastoral possibilities of the liturgical-
narrational model will be more fully revealed and developed.  Amidst this 
elaboration I will also point out how the liturgical-narrational model is 
concordant with, and adequate in light of, the teachings and goals of the 
Second Vatican Council. 
Chapter Five consists of five sections.  In the first section I will 
argue that salvation history contains myriad sin-salvation narratives, 
and that the confession of sins is narrative proclamation.  In the second 
section I will point out moral and ecclesial needs that are met best by a 
communal confession of sins.  In the third section I will argue that the 
sacrament of reconciliation need not and should not be reduced to 
individual confession and a declarative absolution.  In the fourth section 
I will suggest ways—i.e. ministries and forms of celebration—in which 
the theological principles of the liturgical-narrational paradigm can be 
pastorally practiced or implemented.  Finally, the fifth section contains 
concluding remarks. 
 
Confession As Narrative Proclamation 
 
My arguments in this chapter are related primarily to a contempo-        
rary proposal offered by theologian Patrick McCormick.1  After he surveys 
contemporary scholarship in the field of hamartology, especially 
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scholarship which employs a models approach, and after demonstrating 
the inadequacy of several models of sin, particularly what he calls the 
crime model, McCormick defends a disease model of sin and a healing 
model of reconciliation.2  He then develops these models into his major 
proposal:  that there is need for an addiction model of sin and a 
correlative recovery model of reconciliation.3  These models recognize 
that sin is partly beyond the will of a sinning person, that it is often 
repetitive, cyclical, ingrained and reinforced by other persons and 
communities, and that it can even be codependent and multigeneration-     
al.  These models also encourage us to see ourselves as sinning persons 
who are responsible for commitment to individual and communal 
recovery, a recovery that is progressive, integrating, confessional and 
centered upon God’s word and the virtues.4 
While I agree with much of what McCormick argues, I am 
recognizing and developing what I call a liturgical-narrational model of 
sin and reconciliation, a model that is both more comprehensive and 
more firmly based in Christian tradition than are McCormick’s models.  
The liturgical-narrational model sees sin and reconciliation in terms of 
the many subsidiary stories or narratives that are part of the one 
overarching narrative of salvation.  My development of this model 
emphasizes a crucial aspect of addiction-recovery:  the honest telling and 
retelling of one’s narrative of sin and salvation to and with a community 
of converting story-hearers and story-tellers.  McCormick discusses such 
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story-telling,5 but his focus on addiction and recovery fails to sufficiently 
situate this story-telling within the overarching story of salvation and the 
Church’s multidimensional mission in this ongoing story.6  I do so 
situate this story-telling by seeing it as proclamation by and in the 
Church.  In other words, I see the confession of sins and the sharing of 
one’s ongoing moral narrative as proclamation, a proclamation that is 
joined to the proclamation of God’s word. 
There are four premises which support the conclusion that the 
confession of sins is narrative proclamation.  The first premise is that the 
universal history of salvation contains personal and microcosmic 
histories of salvation.  The second premise is that sin histories are 
intrinsic components of salvation histories.  The third premise is that the 
proclamation and hearing of salvation history are both rights and 
obligations of every Christian person.  The fourth premise is that we can 
understand all of these sin and salvation histories as being narratives.  
Let us examine the first two premises via the thought of theologian 
Gerald O'Collins. 
Calling upon contributions by Karl Rahner7 and Paul Tillich,8 
among others, O’Collins distinguishes three types of salvation history.9  
Foundational salvation history refers to what the first Christians 
experienced and testified to:  the primordial Acts (upper case) of God in 
His incarnate, crucified, and resurrected Son.  This original type of 
salvation history is the normative basis of the two types of dependent 
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salvation history.  Collective dependent salvation history refers to the 
continuing acts (lower case) of God that communities are experiencing 
and cooperating in today.  The latter are “the signs of the times”—those 
public movements to which Jesus urges attentiveness10 and with which 
the Second Vatican Council cooperated.11  These signs are also 
encountered and responded to on a personal level, a level which 
O’Collins calls individual dependent salvation history. 
Although the two types of dependent salvation history are, by 
definition, subordinate to the foundational type, O’Collins reminds us 
that they are no less important.  Furthermore, O’Collins agrees with the 
premise that sin histories are intrinsic components of salvation histories: 
If out of love the Father “gave his Son up for us all” (Rom 8:32), 
Pilate, Judas and Caiaphas brought about the crucifixion through 
less than loving motives.  . . . Likewise today we can find the divine 
purposes being conveyed through episodes and situations in which 
evil bulks large and the (infinitely more powerful) reality of grace 
seems less apparent.12 
 
We will fail to recognize our individual and collective salvation histories if 
we ignore the intertwined sin histories, for God saves amidst sin and 
evil—not apart from them.  St. Paul himself exemplifies this 
comprehensive awareness in his inspired Letter to the Romans:  he sees 
that Pharaoh’s sinful obstinacy helped prepare for the universal 
proclamation of Yahweh’s saving name.13 
The third aforementioned premise—that the proclamation and 
hearing of salvation history are both rights and obligations of every 
Christian person—is an established doctrine in official Roman Catholic 
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teaching.  Proclamation pertains to the prophetic office of Christ, an 
office in which all the People of God share (LG 12).  The Dogmatic 
Constitution on the Church states that the laity ought to be “heralds of 
the faith” by word as well as by testimony of life (LG 35).  Similarly, in 
the Decree on the Apostolate of Lay People, lay people are said to possess 
a “right and duty to be apostles,” a ministry which obligates them to 
“bring all men throughout the whole world to hear and accept the divine 
message of salvation” (AA 3). 
The fourth aforementioned premise—that we can understand all of 
these sin and salvation histories as being narratives—is based upon a 
cogent argument made by philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre.14  Arguing 
against modernity’s atomizing of human action, MacIntyre claims that 
human actions are intelligible only when they are seen as elements in a 
sequence and in a context.  Hence our lives are more than histories—
they are narratives which we “author.”  He then quickly amends the 
latter statement: 
. . . we are never more (and sometimes less) than the co-authors of 
our own narratives.  . . .  We enter upon a stage which we did not 
design and we find ourselves part of an action that was not of our 
making.  Each of us being a main character in his own drama plays 
subordinate parts in the dramas of others, and each drama 
constrains the others.15 
 
Furthermore, lives are narrative-like since they possess a teleological 
character; each co-author anticipates and progresses toward individual 
and collective goals that ought to be intelligible.16  Finally, MacIntyre 
   138
states that these narratives which have been, and continue to be, 
“written” need to be told and heard if they are to continue intelligibly.17 
If personal and collective sins are part of the narrative of salvation, 
and if the proclamation and hearing of this narrative are both rights and 
obligations of every Christian person, then it follows that the confession 
of sins ought to be—in some appropriate manner—proclaimed in 
community.18  Many will argue, of course, that, in the Church’s current 
form of sacramental penance, the cleric who hears a confession 
represents the community, and thus that confession as communal 
proclamation is realized in the private confessional.19  However, the word 
“proclamation” connotes an imparting to as many as possible—not to one 
representative person.20  Indeed, it must be acknowledged that ancient 
penance21 is a precedent for the view of confession which I am proposing. 
In ancient penance, one of the climactic actions that was 
performed by penitents before or after their prolonged participation in a 
penitential process was an exomologesis.22   The exomologesis was a 
general confession of personal sinfulness and a proclamation of God’s 
mercy.  This action differed from modern confession in four ways.  First, 
it was, usually, unrepeatable.  Second, it was not a detailed listing of 
sins committed.  Third, its focus was God and His mercy—not the 
penitent and his sins.  Fourth, and most importantly for this chapter, it 
was performed in a public liturgy among fellow Christians.  Although 
there may have been a private non-sacramental confession of sins to a 
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bishop—so that the bishop could determine if the one confessing was 
ready for enrollment in the Order of Penitents—nevertheless the 
exomologesis was the only sacramental confession.23  This public 
confession and proclamation symbolized the penitent’s relationship and 
accountability to the entire community of God’s people, and it also 
enabled each community member to witness, and challenged each to 
cooperate in, salvation history as this history continued in the life of the 
penitent. 
I said that the exomologesis of ancient penance is a precedent for 
the view of confession which I am proposing.  The word “precedent” 
implies that my view is an augmentation of the exomologesis.  There are 
at least three ways in which my augmentation differs.  First, each 
penitent’s confession/proclamation needs to be made relatively 
frequently—i.e. at least once per month.  Second, each penitent’s 
confession/proclamation needs to specify the sins from which the 
penitent is being saved.  Third, all who are present at celebrations of 
sacramental reconciliation are to consider themselves penitents who 
need to confess/proclaim.  I will discuss further these ways in which my 
augmentation differs in the following sections of this chapter. 
Before moving on to point out various needs that are met best by 
communal confession, it is urgent to recall how OP and RP themselves do 
hold some respect for the liturgical-narrational model of reconciliation 
which I am here developing.  Early in its Introduction, OP states that the 
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Church is “a sign of conversion to God,” and that the Church expresses 
this conversion “when the faithful confess . . .” (OP 4).  In OP 11, the 
claim that the confession of sins is a ministry in the service of conversion 
and reconciliation is made four times; confession is a ministry (Part 
Three’s heading), an act “of the greatest importance” (OP 11.1), a 
“[sharing] in the sacrament itself” (OP 11.2), and a way in which the 
penitent “proclaims the mercy of God in his life” and “celebrates . . . the 
liturgy by which the Church continually renews itself” (OP 11.3).  
Furthermore, OP realizes that, in addition to hearing the word of God, 
hearing “readings from the Fathers or other writers . . . will help the 
community and each person to . . . conversion of life” (OP 36.2).  In fact, 
these other readings (i.e. examples of dependent salvation history) may 
be chosen by the laity and in light of the needs of the community or 
group (OP 40.2). 
RP includes at least four statements that especially reflect the 
liturgical-narrational model of reconciliation.  In RP 9.2 it is urged that 
the Church must become a community “united in the commitment to be 
continually converted.”  In RP 18.10 it is said that practicing sacramental 
penance in a way that obscures “the ecclesial significance of sin and 
conversion” has contributed to a “decline of the sense of sin.”  In RP 23 
the pastoral activity of penance and reconciliation is called the Church’s 
“specific mission,” and it includes various activities to be performed by 
every Church member.  Finally, in RP 31.10 confession is called a 
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“liturgical act” which “forces sin out of the secret of the heart and thus 
out of the area of pure individuality, emphasizing its social character ….” 
 
Needs Best Met By Communal Confession 
 
There are at least three moral and ecclesial needs that would be 
best met by confessions given publicly in a communal liturgy.  These 
three needs are compassion, prophecy, and symbolism.  Let us examine 
each of these needs vis à vis communal confession. 
No one can be a faithful disciple of Jesus’, no one can continue to 
grow as a Christian person, without receiving and giving compassion.  
According to the Gospel of John, Jesus ultimately calls his disciples to 
share friendship with Him and with each other.24   Now if the Church is 
to be characterized by friendship it would seem to be essential that its 
members be compassionate, for it is compassion that enables us to 
establish and maintain true friendship.  Theologian James P. Hanigan 
reminds us that compassion is “the ability to feel with, suffer with, 
experience with the other ….”25   Hanigan also points out that 
compassion is not automatic: 
We must be willing to let it occur, be willing to listen to the other, be 
willing to enter into the life of the other and experience the world 
through his or her eyes.26 
 
Given these truths about compassion, and given the important role 
that compassion plays in the mission of the Church, it is understandable 
that we question the quality and degree of compassion that is given and 
received in a celebration of sacramental reconciliation which limits 
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compassion-giving to only one fellow Christian (i.e. the ordained 
confessor).  Would not celebrations which involve public confessions 
provide an excellent opportunity for all Church members to enact their 
willingness to enter into their fellows’ lives—that is, their willingness to 
be compassionate?  And would not such celebrations enable the 
confessing penitents to attract companions who more fully understand 
the complexity of their spiritual journey, and who can be much more 
available than is an ordained confessor?  Although Twelve Step programs 
(e.g. Alcoholics Anonymous) and similar support groups do provide 
compassionate contexts for participants who are pursuing some sort of 
conversion, these groups cannot guarantee that participants will 
encounter fellows who will understand the principles, demands, and 
general experience of each participant’s own religious tradition.  For 
example, a Catholic Christian who pursues supportive companions at 
one or another Twelve Step program’s meetings will have to keep to 
himself his conviction that there are several specific ways by which our 
loving triune God reveals or “expresses” Himself:  Christian Scripture; 
Christian Tradition; the Magisterium; human reason and experience (DV 
6-10).  This suppression will be necessary because the second of the 
Twelve Traditions—which are to be respected as much as the Twelve 
Steps—reads as follows: 
For our group purpose there is but one ultimate authority—a loving 
God as He may express Himself in our group conscience.27 
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Due to this and other non-Catholic tenets,28 the support which the 
aforementioned Catholic Christian may find will most likely be 
incomplete and frustrating, and it will do more harm than good if it leads 
him away from his Catholic formation.  This criticism applies as well to 
other modern therapeutic movements, many of which hold 
presuppositions—e.g. ethical relativism—which contradict Catholic 
teaching.29 
Prophecy is another need which would be best met by communal 
confession.  I am referring, of course, to the need for speech which 
focuses a community on both God’s demands and the community’s 
response to these.30  The ministry of prophecy is unfulfilled if it is limited 
to the preaching, teaching, and spiritual direction of the clergy.  It would 
make little sense for the Church, in practice, to limit this ministry to the 
one or more ordained members of each local community, for doing so 
would constantly stifle the expression of unique prophetic insights 
possessed by many of the non-ordained members of each such 
community.  Indeed, the Church’s enduring recognition of and respect 
for the sensus fidelium argues against such a limiting (LG 12, 35, 37).  As 
I have written in the first section of this chapter, the confession of sins 
ought to be proclaimed in community because personal and collective 
sins are part of the narrative of salvation, and the proclaiming and 
hearing of this narrative are rights and obligations of every Christian 
person.31 
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Public confessions would extend the prophetic ministry in at least 
four ways.  When an individual would confess his own narrative of sin 
and salvation, each other community member would:  first, witness 
dependent salvation history; second, be challenged to resume or 
continue a life of Christian conversion; third, improve his sense of sin.32  
Earlier in this chapter I elaborated upon the first two of these ways;33  
upon the third of these, I will elaborate now. 
RP reaffirms Pope Pius XII’s statement that “the sin of the century 
is the loss of the sense of sin.”34  RP then goes on to list some probable 
causes of this loss, and concludes that a healthy sense of sin will return 
through sound catechetics, attentive listening to the Magisterium, and 
“by an ever more careful practice of the Sacrament of Penance” (RP 
18.12).  I agree with this conclusion, and I would add that our practice of 
this sacrament must also be more dialogical; i.e. it must provide each 
and every penitent with dialogue partners beyond the presiding priest.35 
Dialogical examinations of conscience and public confessions 
would enable us to share (theoretically, at least) with all of our fellows, 
face to face, our thinking about sin, conversion, and reconciliation.  
Although a presiding priest’s spiritual direction would continue to assist 
each penitent in his conscience examinations and confessions, the fact 
remains that there exists a local Catholic community full of fellows each 
of whom could offer the penitent a conscience-expanding insight not had 
by the presider.  Reciprocally, if the penitent has conscience-expanding 
   145
insights, these are likely to be withheld from the community if he only 
shares them with the presider in a private confession. 
The fourth way that public confessions would extend the ministry 
of prophecy involves a unique kind of confession:  the community’s 
collective confession of its collective sin and salvation narrative.  As I 
wrote earlier in this chapter, just as an individual will fail to recognize 
his personal salvation history if he ignores his intertwined sin history, so 
a community will fail to recognize or appreciate its collective salvation 
history if it ignores its intertwined collective sin history.36  Allow me to 
elaborate upon the relatively young concept of collective sin. 
A community as a whole can acquire moral guilt, for example, by 
omitting morally good acts that require a community’s organized activity.  
Enda McDonagh argues for a recognition of this kind of sin: 
In many situations today where one experiences moral obligation the 
source is not an individual but a group or society.  . . . one observes 
that very little response can be made to the situations by single 
individuals.  It is only in organized groups . . . that any effective 
response can be made.  . . .   The group itself as moral subject has 
received little attention.37 
 
Another example of collective sin is something pointed out in RP:  the 
conspiracy of silence (RP 16.9).  Indeed, a sin by a group, or personal 
sins that feed off of each other within a group, are too often covered over 
and festering due to the group’s unspoken agreement to keep silent 
about these sins.  By way of his recovery model of reconciliation, 
McCormick writes: 
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Recovery . . . is particularly concerned with the elimination of lies, 
propaganda and those secrets which divide the community and 
protect vested interests, or attempt to “keep the peace” by not telling 
the truth or not playing fair.38 
 
Turning to family reconciliation, but with other and larger groups in 
mind, McCormick continues: 
Real reconciliation calls for not only the separate confessions of 
husband and wife or parents and children, but also some form of 
communal reconciliation.  It is insufficient for the priest . . . to 
encourage them individually to deal with each other better.39 
 
Interestingly, OP contains at least one acknowledgment of the 
existence of collective sin, and of the need to deal with it: 
In fact, men frequently join together to commit injustice.  It is thus 
only fitting that they should help each other in doing penance.40 
 
Unfortunately, the pre-modern conceptual distinction between proper 
sins and sins by analogy41 is, at times, unjustly used in other official 
Catholic documents to deny the existence of, and the need to treat, 
collective sins.42   On the contrary, I submit that if we do not jointly 
name our shared sins in communal confessions then we will be guilty of 
a new type of social sin:  the sin of a group against itself.43 
Having argued that compassion and prophecy are needs best met 
by public confessions, I now argue so regarding the need for symbolism.  
Three aspects of sacramental reconciliation would be symbolized best by 
communal confessions:  first, each penitent’s relationship and 
accountability to his community; second, the community’s relationship 
and accountability to each penitent; third, the sinful dimension of the 
Church as a whole.  I will discuss the first two of these aspects together. 
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The Second Vatican Council stated that “liturgical services are not 
private functions but are celebrations of the Church . . .” (SC 26).  
Proponents of private confessions claim that such confessions do not 
contradict the latter quotation because these proponents see the 
ordained confessor as symbolizing the Church (e.g. RP 31.10).  
Challenging this claim is the fact that the ordained presider is not seen 
this way vis à vis the other six Catholic sacraments:  baptism, 
confirmation, eucharist, marriage, holy orders, and anointing of the sick 
ordinarily also involve the presence of a congregation of the faithful.  Why 
should the sacrament of reconciliation be exceptional? 
The answer to this question is that it should not be exceptional.  
Penitents should be surrounded by laity (and non-ordained religious) just 
as are baptisandi, confirmandi, communicandi, etc.  Indeed, before the 
juridical model of sacramental reconciliation arose in the sixth century, 
penitents were surrounded by a congregation of laity.  Ancient penance 
was truly a celebration of the Church. 
A celebration of sacramental reconciliation cannot be considered 
fully communal—and thus fully sacramental—unless all parts of the 
sacrament, including confession, are performed in community.44  Such 
celebration would—as it already does in the contemporary communal 
celebration of the other six sacraments—respect the modern Catholic 
sacramental theology which was embraced and recommended by the 
Second Vatican Council.  This theology includes the following teachings.  
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First, the saving grace of Jesus Christ is visibly present in history—i.e. is 
symbolized—only in the whole Church.  Second, the whole Church 
consists of two distinct and inseparable states of life:  hierarchy and 
laity.45   From these teachings it would seem to follow that the lone 
presider in a private confessional cannot by himself adequately symbolize 
the grace which God intends for repentant sinners.  Or, to put this in the 
form of a question, if the whole Church consists of two distinct states, 
then how can the ordained confessor be said to represent both of these 
states when he is exercising a hierarchical ministry in the private 
confessional?  Thus, if the whole Church—laity as well as hierarchy—is 
not visibly present when a penitent confesses and is prayed over         
(i.e. absolved), then the reciprocal relationship and accountability 
between penitent and community will not be properly symbolized.46 
The third aspect of sacramental reconciliation that would be 
symbolized best by communal confession is the sinful dimension of the 
universal Church.  This dimension, which Hans Küng has appropriately 
called the Church’s “un-nature,”47 needs to be sacramentally expressed, 
just as the Church’s nature as “sign of communion with God” is 
sacramentally expressed at eucharist (LG 1, 3).  The Church’s sinful 
dimension would be so expressed in the aforementioned confession of 
communal sins confessed by a local ecclesial community—through a 
spokesperson—to itself.  This claim is supported somewhat by Peter E. 
Fink’s argument for a universal Christian Day of Atonement: 
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What is envisioned is a day of fast and repentance on which the 
community will offer its prayer for God’s forgiveness and healing of 
sins that are elusive to personal grasp.  Included in this are the sins 
of the community itself, the sins of the Church, and the sins of the 
world.48 
 
In this chapter’s first section, I proposed that we view the confes- 
sion of sins—and of faith in God’s mercy—as narrative proclamations 
which ought to be presented to the local ecclesial community by 
penitents.  In this second section, I have explained how such confessions 
best meet certain moral and ecclesial needs.  In the following section, I 
will argue that the sacrament of reconciliation need not and should not 
be reduced to individual confession and a declarative absolution. 
 
A Broader Understanding of the Sacrament 
 
In Chapter Three I demonstrated that a prominent sign of the 
juridical model’s dominance in OP and RP is their reduction of the 
sacrament of reconciliation to a private confession of personal sins and 
to a declarative individual absolution given by an ordained confessor.  
These two acts are seen by proponents of the juridical model as 
constituting what they claim is the unchangeable bipartite essence of the 
sacrament (OP 31.1; RP 33.2).  Furthermore, of these two acts, the 
declarative absolution is regarded as being more important (OP 21;      
RP 30.2).  This reduction and unchangeable status is also said to be 
justified and warranted by the Council of Trent.49   My primary 
arguments against these claims were the following:  first, that none of the 
Tridentine chapters and canons is necessarily a statement of divine law 
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(i.e. de iure divino); 50  second, that a much broader understanding of 
sacramental penance was held and practiced long before the reduction of 
the sacrament took place.51  The latter point requires elaboration. 
In the eastern and western Mediterranean Church, from the mid-
second century to the eleventh century, penance was an extended public 
ritualized process; it was not focused upon two specific acts performed in 
a specific moment.52   Confession (i.e. exomologesis) and absolution were 
considered important, but they were part of a crescendo in a symphony 
of many “essential” acts.  These other acts included:  enrollment in an 
order of penitents; separation from the community and eucharist; 
distinctive dress; continual prayer and lamentation; fasting, almsgiving, 
and other penitential works; cooperation with a sponsor.53  Furthermore, 
confession and absolution were communal acts:  confession was a 
proclamation to many fellow Christians, and absolution was the prayer of 
these supportive fellows.  Indeed, the prayer of the community, led by its 
official presider, was the most prominent characteristic of penance in the 
patristic age.54 
Proponents of the juridical model of penance will argue that the 
broader liturgical model was replaced by the juridical model because the 
liturgical model became ineffective.  Indeed, it must be acknowledged 
that the ancient Mediterranean approach eventually was observed only 
by dying Christians because only they—due to their few remaining days 
on earth—could tolerate what had become a demanding and humiliating 
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life-long state.55  The juridical model’s first comprehensive penitential 
system—the repeatable private individual confession and tariff penance 
of the Celtic Church—satisfied the majority of Christians who were far 
from their deathbeds because this system presupposed that plural 
backsliding episodes are forgiveable, and that the types and duration of 
penance can be varied and terminal.56 
Unfortunately, valuable elements were forgotten when the ancient 
model was abandoned.  Perhaps the most valuable elements were the 
emphasis on conversion and reconciliation as happening progressively, 
that the penitent was not isolated from fellow penitents, that these 
penitents were ministered to by—and reconciled with—the local ecclesial 
community, the lay ministry of sponsorship, and communal confession 
and absolution in a liturgical context.  Of the latter valuable elements, 
the one to which I have not yet given extended attention is the ministry of 
sponsorship. 
The ministry of sponsorship here refers to special encouragement 
and co-discernment given to a penitent by a fellow lay person.57  
Although a similar ministry was an element of the Celtic form of 
penance,58 it was officially outlawed in the thirteenth century by the 
Fourth Lateran Council.59  This legislation represented and furthered the 
theologizing and practicing of the clerical monopolization of all Church 
ministries which had been developing in the Middle Ages.  It did this by 
assuming that the one who establishes objectively a penitent’s 
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reconciliation (i.e. the absolving priest) is also the only one who can be 
that penitent’s subjective counselor (i.e. sponsor/spiritual director). 
Today in the Catholic Church this assumption is being challenged:  
the ancient recognition of a ministry of sponsorship/spiritual direction to 
penitents that is distinguishable from the presidential ministry is—at 
least implicitly—being reconsidered.60   Such consideration is expressed 
in both OP and RP: 
. . . the confessor . . . should fulfill his office of judge wisely and 
should acquire the knowledge and prudence necessary for this 
task . . . .  Discernment of spirits is a deep knowledge of God’s 
action in the hearts of men; it is a gift of the Spirit as well as the 
fruit of charity. (OP 10.1) 
 
. . . the confessor must necessarily have human qualities of 
prudence, discretion, discernment and a firmness tempered by 
gentleness and kindness.  He must likewise have . . . preparation 
. . . in the different branches of theology, pedagogy and psychology 
. . . and communicable knowledge of the word of God.  . . . it is even 
more necessary that he should live an intense and genuine spiritual 
life.  . . .   All this fund of human gifts, Christian virtues and 
pastoral capabilities has to be worked for and is only acquired with 
effort. (RP 29.7-8) 
 
Obviously, these passages agree that the gifts necessary for the ministry 
of sponsorship/spiritual direction are separate from the powers conferred 
by priestly ordination.61   Furthermore, these passages do not offer 
resistance to the claim that the Holy Spirit may call and empower lay 
persons to and for this ministry.  Sponsorship/spiritual direction by lay 
persons is an urgent need because “people in trouble seek out others 
who have navigated these same treacherous waters at least slightly 
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ahead of them.”62   Rarely do we find clergy who have survived our 
specific “treacherous waters.” 
Reconsidering this and the other once-forgotten valuable elements 
of ancient penance will inspire us to transcend the narrow-mindedness 
of the juridical model, and to pursue and apply the insights of the 
liturgical-narrational model.  We will see that private confession and 
declarative absolution are contrary to the nature of liturgy which, by 
definition, is “the activity of the Church” (SC 7, 10, 26).  Furthermore, we 
will understand that the many tasks essential to this communal work of 
conversion and reconciliation are all parts of the sacrament.63 
In the following section of this chapter I will suggest ways—i.e. 
ministries and forms of celebration—in which the theological principles 
of the liturgical-narrational paradigm can be pastorally practiced or 
implemented.  Before doing so, however, let us compare the juridical and 
liturgical-narrational models of sacramental reconciliation via a table.  
This table will summarize the broader understanding of the sacrament 
which the liturgical-narrational model possesses. 
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Table 2.—Tenets of the Juridical vs. Liturgical-Narrational Models 
of Sacramental Reconciliation 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                 Juridical                                         Liturgical-Narrational 
 
 1. Council of Trent limits                      1. Council of Trent not final word 
     development 
  
 2. Sacraments are things                      2. Sacraments are encounters 
     received and/or given                           with other persons 
     (extrinsic view of grace)                         (intrinsic view of grace) 
  
 3. Instrumental, efficient causality        3. Symbolic causality 
 
 4. Fixation on matter and form              4. Celebration of 
                                                                  multifaceted ritual 
 
 5. Values uniformity                              5. Values flexibility 
 
 6. Clergy ministers                                6. Community ministers 
 
 7. Sacramental reconciliation                7. Sacramental reconciliation 
     is confession and absolution                 is a liturgy-centered 
                                                                  conversion process 
  
 8. Conversion precedes                         8. The sacrament celebrates 
     reception of the sacrament                    and facilitates 
                                                                  ongoing conversion 
  
 9. Confession is a private                      9. Confession is a public 
     self-accusation                                      proclamation 
 
10. Absolution is a                               10. Absolution is a 
      priest’s pardon                                     community’s petition 
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Implementing the Liturgical-Narrational Paradigm 
In this fourth section I will consider possible ministries and forms 
of celebration that enable the implementation of the liturgical-narrational 
paradigm of sin and reconciliation.  As far as ministries are concerned, I 
envision the primary ministries to be those of narrative proclamation and 
narrative listening.  For a Catholic who seeks to practice these 
interrelated ministries there are only two requirements:  first, reception 
of the sacraments of Christian initiation; second, a commitment to 
holistic conversion in and with the Church.  Since every initiated 
member of each Catholic community has his own sin and salvation 
narrative, and since the community as a whole has such a narrative, 
every such member is equally called to these primary ministries. 
Beyond these ministries, I envision ministries which facilitate the 
primary ones.  Of course, there is need for an officially appointed 
presider of the community and of its worship.  There is also need for 
spiritual directors, those who are to assist individuals in certain specifics 
of their ongoing conversion and in preparing their personal 
proclamations to the community.  Two possible criteria for discerning 
who is gifted for giving spiritual direction are, first, evidence of perennial 
dedicated conversion, and, second, capacity for informative and sensitive 
communication.  These spiritual directors may also be seen as and/or 
called sponsors. 
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The last two ministries suggested—presider and sponsor/spiritual 
director—are very traditional.  Less traditional would be prophet-
proclaimers, those who would regularly synthesize and proclaim the local 
community’s sin and salvation narrative.  Also less traditional would be 
dialogue facilitators, those who would lead those aforementioned 
dialogical rites wherein each participant’s sense of sin is publicly 
nourished.  All of these secondary ministries, whether they are more or 
less traditional, would require special training under ecclesiastical 
auspices. 
Finally, regarding possible forms of celebration, the preferences of 
the liturgical-narrational model are forms already provided for in OP:  
those labeled as “Rite C” and “Penitential Celebrations” (OP 31-37, 60-66, 
Appendix II).64  Since the liturgical-narrational model, like the Second 
Vatican Council (SC 1, 4, 21), values the adaptation of rituals, most, if 
not all, of the model’s ideals and goals can be realized via these 
adaptable and community-oriented rites. 
To be more specific regarding celebrations, there are five special 
foci of the liturgical-narrational model:  first, the proclamation of the 
foundational or universal narrative of sin and salvation; second, each 
person’s proclamation of his individual sin and salvation narrative; third, 
the proclamation of group sin and salvation narratives including shared 
or collective sins; fourth, communal dialogue about sin and conversion; 
fifth, celebration of the Church’s sinful and converting dimension.  Of 
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these foci, the first can be, as it already is, addressed within all Rites’ 
Celebrations of the Word of God.  The second, third, and fifth foci can be 
addressed within an adapted Rite of Reconciliation within Rite C.  The 
fourth focus, communal dialogue about sin and conversion, can be 
addressed within Penitential Celebrations as well as within Rite C. 
All absolutions in these reconciliation rites would, of course, be 
prayers by the whole community, not declarations by the presider only.65  
I recommend the usage of either the Lord’s Prayer66 or the following 
prayer from the Gelasian Sacramentary: 
Hear our petitions, Lord, and let not the mercy of your compassion 
be far from this servant of yours; heal the wounds and forgive the 
sins so that no longer kept away from you by iniquity your servant 
may always be strong enough to cling to you as lord.67 
 
As for acts of penance, these would be renamed “acts of conversion,” and 
these would be seen as ongoing requirements, not as “debts” that can be 
“satisfied.”  These acts could be agreed upon by the whole community, 
and they should be meaningful signs of conversion. 
The following outlines are proposed adaptations of Rite C, and of 
the Penitential Celebration, respectively, in light of the ideals and goals of 
the liturgical-narrational model. 
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Table 3.—Outline of Liturgical-Narrational Adaptation of OP Rite C 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
  I.  Introductory Rite 
 
      A.  Penitential Hymn 
 
      B.  Greeting 
 
C. Opening Prayer 
 
 II.  Liturgy of the Word 
 
      A.  First Reading 
 
B.  Psalm 
 
C.  Gospel 
 
D.  Homily 
 
E.  Dialogical Examination of Conscience 
 
F.  Silent Reflection 
 
III.  Rite of Reconciliation 
      A.  Prayer of Contrition 
      B.  Proclamations of Individual Narratives 
      C.  Proclamation of Community’s Narrative 
      D.  Assignment of Acts of Conversion 
      E.  Communal Absolution Prayer 
      F.  Sign of Peace/Reconciliation 
IV.  Concluding Rite 
      A.  Concluding Prayer 
      B.  Thanksgiving Hymn 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 4.—Outline of Liturgical-Narrational Adaptation of  
OP Penitential Celebration 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
  I.  Introductory Rite 
 
      A.  Penitential Hymn 
 
      B.  Greeting 
 
      C.  Opening Prayer 
 
 II.  Liturgy of the Word 
 
      A.  First Reading 
 
      B.  Psalm 
 
      C.  Gospel 
 
      D.  Homily or Appropriate Non-Biblical Reading 
 
      E.  Dialogical Examination of Conscience 
 
      F.  Silent Reflection 
 
III.  Penitential Rite 
 
      A.  Prayer of Contrition 
 
      B.  Lord’s Prayer 
 
IV.  Concluding Rite 
 
      A.  Concluding Prayer 
 
      B.  Recessional Hymn 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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Conclusion 
In this fifth and final chapter, the theological principles and 
pastoral possibilities of the liturgical-narrational model of sin and 
reconciliation have been more fully revealed and developed.  Also, this 
model’s concordance with, and adequacy in light of, the teachings and 
goals of the Second Vatican Council have been pointed out.  In the first 
section of this chapter, I proposed that we view the confession of sins as 
a narrative proclamation.  In section two, I pointed out moral and 
ecclesial needs that are met best by such communal confessions.  In 
section three, I argued for a broader understanding of sacramental 
reconciliation.  In the previous section, I suggested specifically how a 
liturgical-narrational paradigm could realize the Church’s pursuit of 
conversion and reconciliation in Christ.  In this final section, I submit 
some concluding remarks. 
During the late 1980s and early 1990s I noticed that various types 
of Twelve Step programs were enjoying widespread popularity in the 
United States.  When I investigated the goals and means of these 
programs, I realized why they had become so popular.  It was because 
members of these programs were being delivered from the enslaving grip 
of various addictions, and they were doing this largely because they 
finally found fellows with whom they could “share their experience, 
strength, and hope”68 simply by telling and hearing their life stories. 
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I wondered:  can the Church—which is the symbol of Christ69—
also deliver its members from the same and other evils as well or better?  
The answer seems to be yes—if we see the storytelling that is crucial in 
Twelve Step programs as being a prototype of a new form of confession. 
This is to point out that I have not, by myself, created the 
liturgical-narrational model of sin and reconciliation; if I had done so, it,  
obviously, would not have a foundation in the Church’s Tradition.70  
Rather, this model is based in Tradition, e.g. in ancient penance.  It 
continues to be present in post-Conciliar documents such as OP and RP, 
and I have developed it further.  For example, my proposal that we view 
the confession of sins as narrative proclamation is a synthesis of the 
liturgical character of the ancient public exomologesis and of the detail-
oriented character of private confession. 
This leads us to a second issue:  am I suggesting that an 
implemented liturgical-narrational paradigm of sin and reconciliation be 
the replacement of Twelve Step programs?  For Catholics, the answer is 
yes.  There is at least one good reason:  because liturgical-narrational 
celebrations of reconciliation would better deliver Catholic persons and 
communities from the evils that plague them.  Recall my earlier 
observation:  although Twelve Step programs do provide compassionate 
contexts for participants who are pursuing some sort of conversion, these 
programs cannot guarantee that participants will encounter fellows who 
will understand the principles, demands, and general experience of each 
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participant’s own religious tradition.  For example, a Catholic who 
pursues supportive companions at one or another Twelve Step program’s 
meetings will have to keep to himself his conviction that there are several 
specific ways by which God expresses Himself—not only one general way, 
as Tradition 2 states.  On the other hand, if Catholics gathered to 
publicly confess—i.e. proclaim—their sin and salvation narratives among 
fellow Catholics, each would attract companions who would more fully 
understand the complexity of their spiritual journey.71 
Remark number three:  I have not, above, explicitly identified what 
I think was/is the overall theological paradigm of the Second Vatican 
Council itself.  Such identification is not a real necessity given the aims 
of this dissertation.  Nevertheless, if the Council did, in fact, teach 
according to, or within, such a paradigm, then what is the character or 
name of that paradigm?  Several interrelated candidates may be 
identified:  historical consciousness;72 personalism;73 existentialism;74 
anthropology.75  Any of these candidates is compatible with the liturgical-
narrational model of sin and reconciliation. 
My fourth closing remark is concerned with the frequency of 
conducting liturgical-narrational penitential and reconciliation 
celebrations.  OP Rite C, as I have adapted it, would probably take 
between one and two hours to celebrate.  Given this amount of time, a 
realistic goal regarding frequency is once per month.  If a parishioner 
needs sacramental reconciliation more frequently than this, Rite A is 
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accessible.  Rite C should especially be celebrated once during Holy 
Week,76 perhaps once during Advent, and near the end of communal 
retreats. 
OP’s penitential celebration, as I have adapted it, would probably 
take between 30 and 60 minutes to celebrate.  Given this shorter amount 
of time, and given the fact that it does not require the preparatory efforts 
nor the presence of a Catholic priest, it is not unreasonable to expect 
each local Catholic community to conduct such a celebration at least 
once per week—perhaps every Friday evening.77 
I could not consider this dissertation complete if I failed to include 
within its pages some praise for one of whom I have presently been so 
critical:  the venerable author of RP et al, Pope John Paul II.  I must 
admit that I agree with the Pope as often as I disagree with him.  For 
example, I agree with his views on anthropology and moral theology—
including his personalistic approach to the natural moral law78—while I 
disagree with his hierarchicalism.79 
Although I may never agree with the latter, I ought to consider 
whether or not I’ve tried to understand it.  George Weigel, the American 
Catholic theologian whose recently published biography of the Pope is 
partly the fruit of unprecedented access to the Pope, has written that 
John Paul II has been greatly misunderstood, including by Catholics in 
America.80  Unfortunately, many of us Americans, who take political and 
economic freedom for granted, have failed to notice that this Pope’s 
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teachings and actions are often driven by his bent against incarnations 
of totalitarianism which have sinned against him, his fellow Poles, and 
his fellow Europeans.  I have long suspected that the Pope believes in 
fighting a fire with fire:  i.e. the way for the Church to overcome the evils 
inflicted by totalitarian States is to have the Church, to a certain extent, 
mirror such States.  If this has indeed been his modus operandi, then I 
can at least understand his hierarchicalism, for it helped to solidify a 
Church that, in Poland and elsewhere, has outlasted Nazi and 
Communist oppression.81 
I hope and pray that my central and subsidiary proposals, as 
presented in this dissertation, will help to reconcile a Church that, 
everywhere, will outlast all sin and evil. 
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CHAPTER 5 NOTES 
1. McCormick, above. 
2. Ibid., 123-45. 
3. Ibid., 146-200. 
4. Ibid., 178-200. 
5. Ibid., 193-200. 
6.  Ibid., 193.  In his therapeutic model of liturgy, James 
Empereur does situate personal storytelling within the overarching story 
of salvation.  Thus, what I call the liturgical-narrational model is similar 
to this therapeutic model.  Furthermore, there are elements of his 
liberation model of liturgy in the liturgical-narrational model.  See 
Empereur, 85-118, especially: 
    There is something in all of us that inhibits us from wanting to know 
the truth and recognizing the evil in our lives and society.  The 
clarification that is involved in dealing with this is assisted by God 
and because this is so, one can speak of this clarification as being 
salvational.  The liturgy is the event of the community which both 
brings this clarification to common acceptance and which gives the 
individual worshiper the permission, the support, and the direction 
to engage in this clarification process. (87) 
 
7. Rahner, Foundations, 138-75. 
 8.  Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol. 1 (London: 1978), 126-
28. 
  
 9.  O’Collins, Fundamental Theology, 101-13. 
 
10.  Matthew 16.3. 
 
11.  See, for example, GS 2. 
 
12.  O’Collins, Fundamental Theology, 104-5. 
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13.  Romans 9.17.  See Joseph A. Fitzmyer, “The Letter To The 
Romans,” in The Jerome Biblical Commentary, vol. 2, above, especially: 
The Pharaoh was an instrument in God’s plan, just as Moses was.  
Indeed, his very obstinacy was the means God used to save Israel. 
(319) 
 
14.  MacIntyre, 204-25.  See also my quotation of Gula, above, 
108. 
 
15.  MacIntyre, 213. 
 
16. Ibid., 215-16. 
 
17.  Ibid., 216.  See also Bellah et al., especially the following: 
Communities, in the sense in which we are using the term, have a 
history—in an important sense they are constituted by their past—
and for this reason we can speak of a real community as a 
“community of memory,” one that does not forget its past.  In order 
not to forget that past, a community is involved in retelling its story, 
its constitutive narrative, and in so doing, it offers examples of the 
men and women who have embodied and exemplified the meaning of 
the community. (153) 
 
18.  For example, an appropriate way to confess sins in community 
would be one wherein excessively detailed confessions are avoided.  
Furthermore, it would be appropriate to schedule group-specific 
gatherings for the sacrament:  e.g. for those who’ve indulged their 
aggressive appetite; e.g. for men who’ve sinned against their wives; e.g. 
for teens only.  Such scheduling might be facilitated if parishioners were 
to complete and submit anonymous survey forms beforehand.  That is, 
surveys could help liturgical planners to divide all of the penitent 
parishioners into groups according to sins and/or situations which they 
share.  This is not to say that all reconciliation celebrations ought to be 
group-specific, since all of our specific sins are forms of selfishness. 
 
19.  Also, many may argue that communal confessions would be 
illicit.  However, in principle, confessing sins simultaneously to more 
than one other human person is licit according to Canon Law.  See the 
revised Codex Iuris Canonici (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 
1983); trans. Canon Law Society of America (Washington, DC: Canon 
Law Society of America, 1983).  In particular, see Canon 983.2: 
An interpreter, if there is one present, is also obliged to preserve the 
secret, and also all others to whom knowledge of sins from 
confession shall come in any way. 
Also, in light of this concern to “preserve the secret,” it is important to 
recognize that my view of confession as proclamation emphasizes the 
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proclamation of the penitent’s salvation from his sins, not the 
proclamation or revealing of the sins themselves.  It is hoped that this 
emphasis will eventually eradicate an “eavesdropping” mentality which 
may initially be possessed by those who hear the sins that will be 
confessed/proclaimed.  Of course, my view of confession requires 
confidentiality among the community of narrative listeners. 
 
20.  See Empereur, who writes: 
The eventful word both depends on the community and is 
constitutive of community.  A community is that group of people 
who share the same language, who assent to the same proclamation 
in their lives. (78) 
 
21.  Above, p. 71 n. 14. 
 
22.  Dallen, Reconciling Community, 20 ff.  See also Osborne, 
Reconciliation, 56-62. 
 
23.  Osborne, ibid., 68. 
 
24.  Jn 15.9-17. 
 
25.  Hanigan, 217. 
 
26.  Ibid., 218.  See also James Lopresti, “The Church As Sinful 
Reconciler,” in Robert J. Kennedy, ed., Reconciliation: The Continuing 
Agenda (Collegeville: The Liturgical Press, 1987), 1-13; see especially the 
following: 
. . . people in trouble connect with others who suffer the same 
deprivation, malaise, or captivity.  . . .  We might call this the 
“community principle.” (11) 
 
27.  Alcoholics Anonymous World Services, Inc., Twelve Steps And 
Twelve Traditions (New York: Alcoholics Anonymous World Services, Inc., 
1953). 
 
28.  For example, note the utilitarian understanding of prayer in 
Step 11: 
Sought through prayer and meditation to improve our conscious 
contact with God as we understood Him, praying only for 
knowledge of His will for us and the power to carry that out. 
Step 11 limits prayer to petition for personal knowledge and power, while 
it ignores prayer of adoration, thanksgiving, etc.  Another example is the 
lack of social concern in Tradition 10: 
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Alcoholics Anonymous has no opinion on outside issues; hence 
the A.A. name ought never be drawn into public controversy. 
See ibid. 
 
29.  See Bellah et al., 113-41, especially 129.  See also Benedict M. 
Ashley and Kevin D. O’Rourke, Healthcare Ethics: A Theological Analysis, 
3d ed. (St. Louis: The Catholic Health Assn. of the U.S., 1989), 342-5. 
 
30.  Lawrence Boadt, Reading The Old Testament: An Introduction 
(Mahwah, NJ: Paulist, 1984), 307.  See also Fink, “History Of The 
Sacrament Of Reconciliation,” 87-8. 
 
31.  Above, 135-8. 
 
32.  Duffy, Real Presence, 170-2. 
 
33.  Above, 136-9. 
 
34.  RP 18.3 citing Pope Pius XII, Radio Message to the United 
States National Catechetical Congress held in Boston, MA (October 26, 
1946): Discorsi e Radiomessaggi, VIII (1946), 288. 
 
35.  Incidentally, RP 25 is a long paragraph which urges various 
types of dialogue as necessary means to reconciliation. 
 
36.  Above, 136. 
 
37.  Enda McDonagh, “The Structure and Basis of the Moral 
Experience,” Irish Theological Quarterly 38 (1971): 3-20; excerpted in 
Ronald P. Hamel and Kenneth R. Himes, eds., Introduction To Christian 
Ethics: A Reader (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist, 1989), 106-19 (reference to 108).   
 
38.  McCormick, 189.  See also James L. Empereur and 
Christopher G. Kiesling, The Liturgy That Does Justice (Collegeville: The 
Liturgical Press, 1990), 151.  Also, other examples of collective sin can be 
found in Sullivan, Church: 
. . . there is sometimes reason to admit that the church at large 
shares in the guilt of sins that have been committed by its leaders.  
One example of this is the blame which the Catholic Church must 
share for the breakdowns of Christian unity which took place in the 
eleventh and sixteenth centuries.  . . .  One might think of other 
examples of historical sins for which the church in some way shares 
a collective responsibility:  such as ill-treatment of the Jewish 
people, racial discrimination, the exploitation (83) of colonized 
nations, and the toleration of slavery. (82-3) 
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39.  McCormick, 196. 
 
40.  OP 5.3.  For RP’s acknowledgement of the existence of 
collective sin see RP 2.3, 12.5, and 18.10.  For such an acknowledgement 
in sacred scripture, see e.g. Lam 1.14, 18a, 22. 
 
41.  Above, p. 97 n. 29. 
 
42.  For examples, see:  RP 16.1, 7; the International Theological 
Commission, Memory And Reconciliation: The Church And The Faults Of 
The Past (International Theological Commission, 2000), no. 1.3. 
 
43.  Prior to this claim of mine, social sin has been limited either to 
the sin of an individual against a group, or to the sin of a group against 
an individual, or to the sin of one group against another.  See RP 16.6-7.  
Also note Bellah et al.: 
. . . if the community is completely honest, it will remember stories 
not only of suffering received but of suffering inflicted—dangerous 
memories, for they call the community to alter ancient evils. (153) 
 
44.  OP’s Rite B (OP 22-30) is not fully communal.  See above, 
pp.74-5 n. 49. 
 
45.  Schillebeeckx, 47-52. 
 
46.  See Peter E. Fink, “Reconciliation And Forgiveness: A 
Theological Reflection,” chap. in Alternative Futures, 43-72; see 
especially the following: 
The priest remains presider over the assembly’s prayer and action, 
but he never absorbs its totality into himself.  Others in the 
assembly have an important role to play in the reconciliation of 
penitents, and that role needs actively to be pursued and liturgically 
expressed [emphasis mine]. (70) 
 
47.  Hans Küng, The Church (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1967), 
28 ff. 
 
48.  Peter E. Fink, “Liturgy For A Christian Day Of Atonement,” 
chap. in Alternative Futures, 127-145; quotation from p. 131. 
 
49.  OP 2.3, 7.2, and RP 30.2 cite Council of Trent, Session XIV,   
De sacramento Paenitentiae, chapter 1 and canons 1, 7, and 8; q.v. 
Neuner and Dupuis, nos. 1617, 1641, 1647-8. 
 
50.  Above, p. 83. 
 
   170
51.  Ibid., pp. 98 n. 37, 131 n. 84. 
 
52.  Osborne, Reconciliation, 54, 206.  See also Dallen, Reconciling 
Community, 253: 
Just as God’s dealings with humanity have a history, so do God’s 
workings in the life of the individual.  Ancient penance showed 
greater sophistication in this regard than later forms, because its 
framers knew that neither divine grace nor the human response to it 
can be realized in a moment. 
 
53.  Osborne, Reconciliation, 57-73. 
 
54.  Ibid., 70.  See also above, 131 n. 83. 
 
55.  Osborne, Reconciliation, 67. 
 
56.  Dallen, Reconciling Community, 110, 362.  See also 
Diekmann, “Theological Evaluation,” 88. 
 
57.  Osborne, Reconciliation, 73. 
 
58.  Dallen, Reconciling Community, 100-138, especially 110. 
 
59.  Ibid., 149. 
 
60.  Ibid., 308 f., 369 f. 
 
61.  See Regis A. Duffy, “Concelebration of Penance And a 
Therapeutic Model,” Worship 48 (1974): 258-69.  Duffy points out the 
following: 
Canon Law has always recognized at least implicitly that ordination 
did not necessarily ensure that the individual was suited for the 
ministry of confessor. (267) 
 
62.  Lopresti, 11.  See also the Pontifical Council for the Family, 
From Despair To Hope: The Family and Drug Addiction (Boston: St. Paul 
Books & Media, 1991), where it is written: 
Ex-drug users become specialists in confronting the drug problem 
because they have gone through this suffering themselves.  They 
know how to accept the proposal of the Gospel and, consequently, 
are more suitable to transmit what they have received to those who 
now find themselves in the same situation. (27) 
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63.  See Fink, “Reconciliation And Forgiveness,” where it is written: 
It will be necessary in the future to abandon the sense of one 
enactment of the sacrament “doing it all” and begin to see many 
sacramental enactments (69) in relation to each other and to the full 
human process of reconciliation they serve and guide. (68-9) 
 
64.  The legitimacy of Rite C/general confession and absolution is 
defended well by Osborne, Reconciliation, 221-35, especially 222 & 224. 
 
65.  See above:  70 n. 6; 71 n. 15; 84; 131 n. 83.  Also see:  Dallen, 
Reconciling Community, 69-70, 141-2, 211; Lawler, 120-2. 
 
66.  See Diekmann, “Reconciliation Through the Prayer of the 
Community,” 38-41. 
 
67.  Dallen, Reconciling Community, 69.  Minimal adaptation is 
warranted:  “this servant” should become “us servants” or simply “us;” 
“your servant” should become “we servants” or simply “we.” 
 
68.  This quoted phrase is present in “The A.A. Preamble.”  I here 
reprint this Preamble in its entirety since such a reprinting is the 
expressed wish of the A.A. Grapevine, Inc.: 
  Alcoholics Anonymous is a fellowship of men and women who 
share their experience, strength and hope with each other that 
they may solve their common problem and help others to 
recover from alcoholism. 
  The only requirement for membership is a desire to stop 
drinking.  There are no dues or fees for A.A. membership; we 
are self-supporting through our own contributions.  A.A. is 
not allied with any sect, denomination, politics, organization 
or institution; does not wish to engage in any controversy; 
neither endorses nor opposes any causes.  Our primary 
purpose is to stay sober and help other alcoholics to achieve 
sobriety. 
Copyright © by the A.A. Grapevine, Inc. 
Also, the A.A. Grapevine, Inc. would like me to provide the 
following disclaimer: 
Permission to reprint the A.A. Grapevine, Inc. copyrighted 
material [in this publication, organization, or website] does 
not in any way imply affiliation with or endorsement of this 
organization. 
 
69.  Above, 121. 
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70.  See Hans Küng, Theology For The Third Millennium: An 
Ecumenical View, trans. Peter Heinegg (New York: Doubleday, 1988), 
where it is written: 
This much at least is certain:  Neither the individual theologian nor 
theology as a whole can simply create a paradigm.  Rather, a 
paradigm takes shape in an extraordinary complex of various social, 
political, ecclesiastical, and theological factors.  It grows out of them 
and matures in them. (173) 
 
71.  See above, 142.  For two more good reasons, see above, 143-9. 
 
72.  Above, 3-5. 
 
73.  Above, 1, 4, 104-8, 110-22. 
 
74.  Above, 4-5, 110-22. 
 
75.  Ibid.  See also Charles Moeller, “History of the Constitution,” 
chap. in Commentary on the Documents of Vatican II, vol. 5, Pastoral 
Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, ed. Herbert Vorgrimler 
(New York: Herder and Herder, 1969), where it is written: 
Christian anthropology . . . is the nucleus which, with the theme of 
man made to the image of God, was already in the texts of the 
Preparatory Commission.  This theme, new for a conciliar text, was 
to appear in a number of passages in the Pastoral Constitution and 
play a part in other conciliar texts.  Its acceptance by Vatican II is 
an important event, for it oriented Vatican II along the axis of this 
Christian anthropology, the elaboration of which is perhaps the 
most urgent task of the 20th century. (71) 
 
76.  A traditional day would be Holy Thursday.  See Dallen, 
Reconciling Community, 70. 
 
77.  Recall above, 72 n. 28. 
 
78.  See, for example, John Paul II, Encyclical Letter Veritatis 
Splendor [The Splendor of Truth](Boston: St. Paul Books & Media, 1993), 
nos. 57-61.  See also Rocco Buttiglione, Karol Wojtyla: The Thought of 
the Man Who Became Pope John Paul II, trans. Paolo Guietti and 
Francesca Murphy (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1997), 149-53, which 
includes the following understanding of the Pope’s personalism: 
. . . being in truth is linked to experiencing truth in one’s own life 
and not simply to conforming one’s behavior to the norm.  The norm 
ought to be obeyed in a personal way; that is to say, it must be 
accepted by the conscience as true. (152) 
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79.  See, for example, RP 29.  Interestingly, the Pope’s 
hierarchicalism is accompanied by a seemingly contradictory advocacy 
for the apostolic rights of the laity.  See Buttiglione, 188-90. 
 
80.  George Weigel, Witness To Hope: The Biography of Pope John 
Paul II (New York: HarperCollins, 1999), 7.  See also his Catholicism and 
the Renewal of American Democracy (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist, 1989), 27-44. 
 
81.  Given this bent of his, I can also understand the Pope’s 
emphasis on personal sin as being primary vs. collective sin.  I share this 
bent against totalitarianism, but I don’t allow it to lead me to assume 
that seeing collective sin as being as serious as personal sin is beginning 
down a slippery slope toward a totalitarian-like abolition of personal sin 
and, thus, of all things personal.  See RP 16 and above, 97 n. 29, 145-6. 
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